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.'  \ Abstract 
One significant disadvantage of interpreted bytecode languages, such as 
Java, is  their low execution speed in comparison to compiled languages 
like  C.  The mobile nature of bytecode adds to the problem,  as many 
checks  are  necessary  to ensure that downloaded  code  from  untrusted 
sources is rendered as safe as possible.  But there do exist ways of speed-
ing up such systems. 
One approach is  to carry out static type checking at load time,  as in 
the case  of the Java Bytecode Verifier.  This reduces  the number of 
runtime checks that must be done and also allows  certain instructions 
to be replaced  by  faster  versions.  Another approach  is  the use of a 
Just In Time (JIT) Compiler,  which takes the bytecode and produces 
corresponding native code at runtime.  Some JIT compilers also carry 
out some code optimization. 
There are, however, limits to the amount of optimization that can safely 
be done by the Verifier and JITs; some operations simply cannot be car-
ried out safely without a certain amount of runtime checking.  But what 
if it were possible to prove that the conditions the runtime checks guard 
against would never arise in a particular piece of code?  In this case it 
might well be possible to dispense with these checks altogether, allowing 
optimizations not feasible at present.  In addition to this, because of time 
constraints, current JIT compilers tend to produce acceptable code as 
quickly as possible,  rather than producing the best  code possible.  By 
removing the burden of analysis from them it may be possible to change 
this. 
We  demonstrate that it is  possible to define  a  programming logic  for 
bytecode programs that allows the proof of bytecode programs containing 
loops.  The instructions available to use in the programs are currently 
limited, but the basis is in place to extend these. The development of this 
logic  is  non-trivial and addresses several difficult problems engendered 
by the unstructured nature of bytecode programs. Acknowledgements 
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Introduction 
One significant disadvantage of interpreted bytecode languages, such as Java [3,  24, 
18,  28J,  is  their low  execution speed in comparison to compiled languages like  C. 
The mobile nature of bytecode adds to the problem, as many checks are necessary to 
ensure that downloaded code from untrusted sources is rendered as safe as possible. 
But there do exist ways of speeding up such systems. 
One approach is  to carry out static type checking at load time,  as in the case of 
the Java Bytecode Verifier  [29J.  This reduces the number of runtime checks that 
must be done and also allows certain instructions to be replaced by faster versions. 
Another approach is  the use of a  Just In Time (JIT) Compiler,  which takes the 
bytecode and produces corresponding native code at runtime.  Some JIT compilers 
also carry out some code optimization [23J. 
There are,  however,  limits to the amount of optimization that can safely be done 
by the Verifier and JITs; some operations such as array bounds checking and type 
casting simply cannot be carried out safely  without a  certain amount of runtime 
checking [29J.  But what if it were possible to prove that the conditions the runtime 
checks guard against would never arise in a particular piece of code? 
In this case it might well  be possible to dispense with these checks altogether, al-
lowing optimizations not feasible at present.  In addition to this,  because of time 
constraints, current JIT compilers tend to produce acceptable code as quickly  as 
possible, rather than producing the best code possible.  By removing the burden of 
analysis from them it may be possible to improve on the current situation. 
12 CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION  13 
1.1  Java 
Java is  a concurrent object-oriented programming language developed by Sun Mi-
crosytems [2J.  It is syntactically similar to C and C++, but imposes a 'safer' pro-
gramming style than these languages.  This is achieved by the use of stricter runtime 
type-checking, not allowing the user to manipulate pointers directly, and using au-
tomatic garbage collection as opposed to users explicitly allocating and deallocating 
memory. 
Java was initially intended to be used in the construction of software systems running 
on networks of machines with varied architecture. This meant that it was important 
that the code  produced should  be portable----able  to run on any  machine  in  the 
network regardless of differences in architecture, and that a machine receiving some 
Java code across the network should be able to assure itself that the code was,  to 
some degree of certainty, safe to run. 
The issue of portability is addressed by a Java program being compiled into a class 
file containing architecture neutral bytecodes, which are then run on the Java Virtual 
Machine (JVM) [29,  55],  an emulator running on a 'real' machine.  This means that 
the same Java program can be run on any machine for which there exists an imple-
mentation of the JVM, without the rewriting/recompilation needed in traditional 
systems.  The class files  are designed  to be downloaded  from  the Internet,  which 
further simplifies the matter of obtaining new software. 
Classes are loaded by the JVM using a class loader.  The 'primordial' class loader, 
shipped with the JVM, loads both the trusted core classes shipped with the JVM 
and  any  classes  that can  be  found  on  the  CLASSPATH  a  designated  area of 
filespace  [29,  30J.  These classes will  be assumed not to be malicious  and are not 
subject to bytccode verification.  If a class cannot be found on the CLASSPATH, a 
specialised class loader object will be instantiated to download it from a web server. 
These classes are subject to bytecode verification. 
Once loaded, a class will be linked and initialized.  During linking, classes obtained 
from outside the system the current JVM is running on will be verified by the JVM's 
Bytecode Verifier.  The Verifier ensures that the classfile meets certain criteria of type 
safety and well-formedness that mean it will not cause certain catastrophic problems 
at runtime, thereby dealing with the problem of the safety of code received across a 
network. 
The verifier ensures,  amongst other properties,  that bytecode instructions receive 
the right  number of arguments,  and that the arguments are of the correct  type 
and in the right  order, that the operand stack will  not overflow or underflow,  the CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION  14 
program counter is  never pointing to somewhere outside the range of a method's 
code, and that objects are initialized before use.  This ensures the type safety of any 
downloaded classes, i.e.  that instructions are passed arguments of the correct type. 
It is assumed that classes written by a user and located on the CLASSPATH will 
have been created by the javac compiler and will therefore also be correctly formed. 
A full  description of the verifier can be found in [29]. 
In addition to checking classes conform to certain rules, the Bytecode Verifier carries 
out some optimization of the bytecode by substituting faster versions of certain byte-
codes (signified by the suffix quick).  These instructions are more efficient because 
they do not contain checks that are redundant after bytecode verification. 
Before  it can be initialized,  a  class  must  be loaded  and linked.  It is  up  to an 
implementation of the JVM to decide whether it will load and link classes 'early', 
but a class must be loaded on its first  active use.  The initialization of a class will 
also trigger the initialization (preceded if necessary by loading and linking) of all its 
superclasses.  A diagram outlining these operations can be seen in Figure  1.1.  Note 
that the shaded parts of the diagram indicate the additional elements of the JVM 
necessary to run untrusted code from outside the local file system. 
1.2  JIT Compilers 
As  mentioned, one of the biggest drawbacks of interpreted bytecode languages like 
Java is  their slow execution speed.  One solution to this might be to compile Java 
programs to native machine code rather than bytecode.  But, unlike bytecode, the 
native code will  be specific  to a  particular machine  and,  if downloaded  from  an 
untrusted source, cannot be verified by the JVM's bytecode verifier.  The execution 
speedup will therefore be offset by a severe deterioration in the code's mobility-the 
main selling point of interpreted bytecode systems. 
Systems using a Just In Time (JIT) compiler attempt to provide as much speedup as 
possible while still keeping the advantages of bytecode.  This is done by downloading 
bytecode files  and verifying them as usual, but then also calling the JIT compiler 
to translate the bytecode to native code at runtime, producing the native code just 
before it is needed.  JIT compilation is carried out on a method only at the point at 
which it is  called so that unnecessary translation is  not done.  Some JIT compilers 
also profile code in order to determine whether it is worth compiling a method [23]. 
The native code produced by the JIT for  a particular program is  not stored after 
termination of the program but, during execution, the pointer to a method's code 
is replaced by a pointer to the compiled code for that method. ClIAPTER 1.  lSTRODUCTION 
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The most basic JIT compilers carry out a  process  known  as  inlining.  The usual 
implementation of the JVM interpreter is a large switch statement with cases cor-
responding to the various instructions of the virtual machine;  execution of a JVM 
program consists of repeated execution of this switch statement.  This means that 
a signicant amount of time is  spent executing the various jumps and comparisons 
involved in the switch statement itself,  rather than in executing the instruction of 
the program running on the JVM. 
Inlining the code means taking the corresponding native code instructions for  each 
virtual machine instruction in a method's code and concatenating them into a single 
stream of machine code.  This not only removes the overhead inherent in the inter-
preter, but means that it is  no longer necessary to maintain the program counter 
and stack of the virtual machine; the method has effectively been detached from the 
virtual machine paradigm and can be treated just like any other program for  the 
concrete machine it is running on. 
For example, the chunk of code in one interpreter implementation, [19], correspond-
ing to the JVM instruction dup is 
Id  [1.11  - 4],  %00 
st %00,  [%11] 
add %10,  1,  %10 
add %11,  4,  %11 
b  .LL16 
nop 
Ilload val  on  top of  JVM  stack into reg 00 
I/store val in reg 00  at new  top of  JVM  stack 
//increment  JVM  program counter 
//increment stack pointer 
//branch 
I/do nothing 
Of these instructions, only  half are actually concerned with carrying out the dup 
instruction; the others are there only to implement the interpreter.  By inlining the 
code for  dup we can reduce it to the following three instructions 
Id  [1.11  - 4],  %00 
st %00,  [%11] 
add %11,  4,  1.11 
Ilload val  on top of  JVM  stack into reg 00 
//store val in reg 00  at new  top of  JVM  stack 
//increment stack pointer 
It is also possible to inline method calls, whereby the call to a method is replaced by 
the code of the method itself.  This is usually only possible for  very short methods. 
In addition to this basic translation technique, more complex JIT compilers carry 
out optimization of the code.  This is usually carried out on some sort of intermediate 
code  which is  at a lower  level than that of the bytecode, while not actually native 
code.  Methods used may include CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION  17 
Copy Propagation Bytecode is stack based whereas most 'real' machines are reg-
ister based.  The translation from  bytecode to native code often causes un-
necessary mov  instructions, which move values from  one register to another, 
to be generated.  For example,  mav  r1  -> r2 followed  by mav  r2 -> r3 is 
equivalent to mov  r1  ->  r3. Copy propagation is concerned with eliminating 
these unnecessary instructions and can also be carried out backwards. 
Assertion Merging When a bytecode instruction is broken down into simpler in-
termediate instructions it can become apparent that a particular assertion is 
being repeated, e.g.  a reference is non-null or a number is non-zero.  Analysis 
of the code may allow removal of these duplicate assertions. 
Live Variable Analysis A variable is  live  if it holds a value that may be needed 
in the future.  Therefore, if two variables in a  program are never live at the 
same time, the same register may be used to store their values. 
Dead Code Elimination This  attempts  to  identify  and eliminate  instructions 
which carry out redundant operations. 
Strength Reduction This attempts to replace an operation with an equivalent 
one that executes faster,  e.g.  use shift to divide and multiply by powers of 
two. 
Common Subexpression Elimination Removes redundant calculations. 
Loop Unrolling In cases where it is possible to calculate n, where n is the number 
of times the loop will be executed, remove the loop structure and replace with 
n copies of the loop body. 
More information on code optimization can be found in [5]  and [6]. 
One other way in which Java enforces type safety is by checking all array references 
at runtime to ensure that the array reference is non-null and that the index is not out 
of bounds.  This avoids the potentially catastrophic results of writing to an area of 
memory outside the array bounds, a situation all too possible in programs written in 
C or C++. But it also means that bytecodes for array operations cannot be replaced 
by the more efficient qui  ck bytecodes mentioned in Section 1.1.  The following ix86 
assembly code was produced by the GCJ program [44J  and corresponds to the Java 
statement testarray  [i)  : =  2 
53:  movl  Oxfffffff8(%ebp),%ebx 
56:  movl  Oxfffffffc(%ebp),%esi 
59:  cmpl  Ox8(%ebx),%esi 
//bounds  check 
//bounds  check 
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5c:  jb  70  <main __ 5ArrayPt6JArray1ZPQ34java4Iang6String+Ox50> 
5e:  addl  $Oxfffffff4,i.esp 
61:  pushl  i.esi 
62:  call  63  <main  __ 5ArrayPt6JArray1ZPQ34java4Iang6String+Ox43> 
67:  addl  $Ox10,i.esp 
6a:  movl  i.eax , i.e ax 
6c:  testl  i.eax , i.eax 
6e:  je  70  <main __ 5ArrayPt6JArray1ZPQ34java4Iang6String+Ox50> 
70:  leal  Oxc(i.ebx),i.eax 
73:  leal  OxO(,i.esi,4),i.edx 
7a:  addl  i.edx , i.e ax 
7c:  movl  $Ox2, Ci.eax) 
82:  leal  Oxffffffe8(i.ebp),i.esp 
85:  popl  i.ebx 
86:  pop I  i.esi 
87:  movl  i.ebp,i.esp 
89:  popl  i.ebp 
Only the instructions 
70:  leal  Oxc(i.ebx),i.eax 
73:  leal  OxO(,i.esi,4),i.edx 
7a:  addl  i.edx,i.eax 
7c:  movl  $Ox2, (i.eax) 
actually update the array, and so if it was possible to prove that the array bounds 
check for this operation was unnecessary it would be possible to eliminate the extra 
instructions.  As it is often the case that an instruction such as testarray  [i]  : = 
2 appears in the body of a loop in order to carry out an operation on the entire 
array, the number of instructions eliminated could potentially be quite large. 
1.3  Reasoning about Programs 
In order to reason about programs it is necessary first to build a logical model of the 
world of the programs:  the language used to write them and its semantics, and the 
environment in which they run.  This section provides a brief background to some 
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in the rest of this report.  A detailed discussion of all the topics in this section can 
be found in [56]. 
1.3.1  Assigning Meaning to Programs 
There are three main  approaches to formalising  the meaning of a  program:  op-
erational semantics,  denotational semantics,  and axiomatic semantics.  The ideas 
behind axiomatic semantics will be dealt with in the following section 1.3.2. 
An operational semantics for a language is defined in terms of the operations carried 
out by an abstract machine, where a rule is stated defining the result of execution 
for each type of command in the language.  Commands are identified synt.actically, 
e.g.  a rule would exist for an assignment statement x  :=  expr.  Application of the 
rules leads to evaluation of an expression in the language in relation to a particular 
state which encapsulates the environment in which the program is being executed. 
Evaluation can be described either as one complete operation, i.e.  a  boolean ex-
pression evaluating to a boolean value, or as a series of smaller transformations on 
a state leading eventually to a value.  The former is known as a 'big-step' semantics, 
the latter a 'small-step' semantics [56]. 
A denotational semantics formulates the meaning of a program more abstractly as 
a partial function from states to states rat.her than rules of execution for particular 
syntactic constructs.  This has the advantage of making it possible to compare the 
equivalence of two programs written in two different languages. 
1.3.2  Reasoning about Program Properties 
In his seminal paper An Axiomatic Basis for Computer Programming,  [20], 
c. A.  R. Hoare describes a set of rules (or axioms) that can be used to reason about 
what a program does.  Rules of the form described in the paper are often referred to 
as a programming logic or Hoare  logic,  and allow us to go one step further than an 
operational or denotational semantics in terms of reasoning about programs.  Rather 
than just allowing reasoning about the value of initial and final states with regard 
to a program, a Hoare logic allows us to make more fine-grained statements about 
states. We are able to say whether if we execute a command C in any state satisfying 
the predicate P--and execution t.erminates- we will end up in some state satisfying 
Q. 
A Hoare logic specification takes the form 
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where 
•  C is a statement in the programming language 
•  P  is a precondition 
•  Q is a postcondition 
Partial correctness specifications  (signified  by  the curly brackets around pre- and 
post-conditions) do not require proof of termination. 
Although in both operational semantics and Hoare logic predicates are used to assist 
reasoning about programs, they are essentially quite different: 
•  Operational Semantics describe  what  the operating environment  of the 
program 'looks like' after the execution of each instruction.  This description 
of the environment is known as the state and includes information such as the 
types of values held on the stack and in local variables. 
•  Predicates in Hoare Logic describe properties which are true at a particular 
point in the execution of a program (i.e.  in a particular state).  For example 
'the value at the top of the stack is  greater than 10'  or 'variable x  has the 
value 7'. 
In situations where an operational semantics for  a language exist, it is  possible to 
formulate the Hoare triple in terms of the logic in which the semantics is described. 
In higher order logic the relationship between the Hoare rules and the operational 
semantics can be defined as  follows: 
{P} C {Q}  ==  "Va a'. P(a}  /\  eval(C,a} =  a'  => Q(a'}  (l.1) 
This states that a Hoare Logic specification {P} C {Q} is equivalent to the statement 
that for  all states, a, a', if P  holds in the state a, and executing C  in the state a 
results in the state a', then Q will hold in the state a'. 
Although the rules of a Hoare logic are often stated as axioms-hence the alternative 
description of such rules as an axiomatic semantics---it is also possible to derive them 
from the operational semantics using 1.l. Derivations from denotational semantics 
are equally possible, as described by Gordon in [16]. CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION  21 
Derivation from an operational or denotational semantics results in a programming 
logic in which we  may have more confidence than one in which the rules are merely 
arbitrarily stated. This is particularly true if we are dealing with a language which 
is  sufficiently different from the simple imperative language described by Hoare as 
to make it unclear exactly what form  the rules should take.  This is  the situation 
described in Chapter 4,  in which we describe the derivation of a programming logic 
for  bytecode programs, which are certainly very different from  the programs dealt 
with by Hoare.  Our derivation is based on the operational semantics for  the JVM 
developed by Pusch [45],  and this is described in some detail in Section 2.1.2. 
1.3.3  Inductively Defined Relations 
It is  often  the case  that operational semantics and other execution  relations  are 
defined in terms of inductively defined  sets.  And while Pusch's semantics are not 
defined in this way, two of the execution relations for bytecode described in Chapter 3 
are.  Consequently we give a brief outline of the concepts involved in such a definition 
and the related technique of rule  induction.  This technique is  described  fully  by 
\Vinskel in his book  The Formal Semantics of Programming Languages [56J. 
We can inductively define a set by a collection of rules.  For example, the set of odd 
numbers is defined by the rules 
Odd 1 
Odd x 
Odd  (x  +  2) 
In order to show that a property P is  true of all members of such a set, we  use the 
principle of rule induction.  This is based on the idea that if a property is preserved 
by application of all the rules defining the set, it is true for  all members of the set. 
The principle can be stated as:  if for  all axioms 
x 
P{ x)  is true, and for all rules of the form 
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the statement 'Vi.  1 SiS n  ==>  P  Xi  ==>  P  X  holds, then P{n) holds for  any n 
in the set. 
1.4  Mechanized Reasoning 
Much of the work  that has been done recently on proving properties of the Java 
language has involved the use of some form of mechanical proof assistant [38, 45, 26, 
46].  As the semantics for even subsets of Java, or simplified versions that disregard 
aspects of the language such as exception handling, are very large and complex it 
is easy for  mistakes to creep into a paper and pencil proof.  Indeed one of the few 
substantial pieces of work undertaken in the area without the aid of a proof tool, 
that of Drossopoulou and Eisenbach [14], was found to contain 'one major error and 
one noteworthy omission' when checked by Syme using his proof tool Declare [52]. 
This does not imply that all proofs carried out using a mechanised proof tool are 
completely flawless.  All results depend, at the bottom line, on the definitions pro-
vided  by  the user.  But if such definitions  are correct,  a  proof tool can be relied 
upon to provide a greater degree of reassurance that results produced are also cor-
rect, leaving critics only the smaller task of examining the definitions.  Obviously 
the degree of confidence in the proofs depends to a great extent on the proof tool 
used and its implementation. 
1.4.1  Isabelle 
Our work, and that of Pusch on which it is based, uses the Isabelle system [42].  Most 
proof systems support one particular logic from among the many used by computer 
scientists.  For example,  the HOL system  [33]  supports reasoning in  higher order 
logic,  whereas Larch  [51]  supports proofs in multisorted first  order logic.  Isabelle, 
designed  by  Paulson,  is  a  generic  prover,  meaning it supports a variety of logics 
(known as object logics).  Isabelle has a meta logic which is used to formulate object 
logics.  The meta logic  is  the subset of higher order logic  containing implication, 
universal quantification, and equality.  A full description of the system can be found 
in  [42],  and discussion related to implementation and development issues in  [40, 
41,43]. 
Like HOL, Isabelle is based on the LCF prover designed by Milner and his colleagues 
in  the 1970s  [32,  17].  In LCF, terms and formulae  are values  in ML,  the meta-
language used to implement the system, and can be composed and decomposed by 
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arbitrarily,  inference rules  are used  to map existing theorems to new theorems 
starting with a small set of built in theorems, known as axioms.  New theorems can 
be proved in two ways:  by working forwards, using the inference rules to map already 
proved theorems to new theorems; or working backwards, splitting the original goal 
into smaller goals which can be proved trivially using existing theorems and inference 
rules.  The process of backwards proof is managed by functions known as tachcs. 
Isabelle is  an interactive prover, meaning that while it supports a variety of poten-
tially complex logics, the user is expected to find the proof.  Isabelle does, however, 
provide several powerful automatic tactics in the form of decision procedures based 
on non-logic-specific tableaux methods.  Isabelle is a procedural prover, but recently 
the Isar interface has been developed [1],  providing a more declarative interface. 
The definitions  and datatypes that make  up each logic  are stored in a  theory  file 
(denoted by  the suffix  . thy).  Proof scripts for  derivation of new  theorems from 
these definitions are stored separately in files  with the suffix  .ml (for ML). 
1.5  Contribution 
We demonstrate that it is  possible to define a programming logic for  bytecode pro-
grams that allows the proof of bytecode programs containing loops.  The instructions 
available for  use in the programs are currently limited, but the basis is  in place to 
extend these. 
The development of this logic was not by any means straightforward. It required the 
definition of several execution relations for  bytecode programs, each necessary for 
proofs of different  aspects of execution.  In addition, the fiat,  unstructured nature 
of bytecode programs presents a number of difficulties, particularly when reasoning 
about loops.  But there are, as we demonstrate, some quite elegant solutions to these 
problems. 
1.6  Outline of Thesis 
Chapter 2 examines work done in four  main areas,  all of which relate to our own 
work,  namely:  proving properties of the Java language itself, proving properties of 
programs written in Java, improving the performance of JIT compilers, and incorpo-
rating proof into 'real world' systems.  In each case two or three papers are discussed 
in some detail, followed  by a brief description of examples of other notable work in 
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the work described in this report. 
Chapter 3 describes the development of three execution relations for  bytecode pro-
grams and the alterations and extensions of Pusch's semantics necessary for  this. 
All these relations are necessary for  the development of the programming logic for 
bytecode programs described in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 describes the derivation of the rules of the bytecode programming logic 
and the difficulties encountered in its development, particularly with respect to the 
unstructured nature of bytecode. 
Chapter 5 outlines in some detail the proof of soundness of the rule for  loops in 
bytecode programs.  Although the rule itself does not differ greatly from  the rule 
for while statements in the conventional Hoare logic, the proof of its soundness is a 
great deal more complex.  In this chapter we describe the soundness proof and the 
three main results necessary to achieve it. 
Chapter 6 discusses the use of the bytecode programming logic to prove properties 
of example programs. 
Chapter 7 discusses the results of the work and the lessons learnt from it, particularly 
with regard to two topics:  the practicalities of proof at the bytecode level,  and the 
role of mechanized reasoning in such proofs.  The chapter concludes by suggesting 
areas in which the work could be developed further. 
1.7  Related Publications 
Early results relating to this project were published in  [47],  and a more complete 
summary of the work in [48]. Chapter 2 
Related Work 
In this chapter we review work related to our own in four general categories, namely: 
proving properties of the Java language itself, proving properties of programs writ-
ten in Java, improving the performance of JIT compilers, and incorporating proof 
into 'real world' systems.  In each case two or three papers are discussed in some 
detail, followed by a brief description of examples of other notable work in the area, 
concluding with a discussion of the relevance of the approaches taken to the work 
described in this report. 
2.1  Proofs about the Java Language and JVM 
A large amount of work  has been done in recent  years on  formalizing  aspects of 
the Java language and the JVM with the aim of proving that they possess certain 
desirable properties.  The starting point for  such projects is  the English language 
specifications  of the Java language  [18]  and the JVM  [29]  published by Sun Mi-
crosystems. 
2.1.1  The Java Language 
As  one  of Java's main attractions for  users is  its claim  [18]  that its strong type 
system makes downloading and running programs across a network safe, much work 
has been done on formally proving the type soundness of the language.  The aim is 
to show that the static checks done on a Java program at compile time really do 
lead to type safe execution at runtime, i.e. the program will not carry out operations 
that violate the typing rules, such as attempting to add a value of type String to 
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one of type Integer. 
In  Java  is type-safe  probably  [14],  Drossopoulou and Eisenbach describe an opera-
tional semantics for  a subset of Java that they call Javas.  Javas includes primitive 
types, classes with inheritance, instance variables and instance methods, interfaces, 
shadowing of instance variables, dynamic method binding, statically resolvable over-
loading of methods, object creation, null pointers, arrays and a minimal treatment of 
exceptions.  The authors also define the notion of a well-formed environment and go 
on to prove that indeed a well-typed Java program run in a well-formed environment 
will not give rise to typing violations. 
The work of Drossopoulou and Eisenbach is  unusual in that it does not utilize any 
form of mechanized proof tool.  In  Proving  Java  Type  Soundness  [52],  Syme uses 
their work as a basis for  a  proof of the type soundness of a very similar subset of 
the Java language using the prover DECLARE. Syme goes on to validate much of 
the work of Drossopoulou and Eisenbach, but does identify 'one major error and a 
noteworthy omission' in their work, highlighting the difficulties inherent in dealing 
with such large proofs without the aid of a proof tool. 
In JavG-!ight  is  Type Safe-Definitely [38],  Nipkow and von Oheimb have carried out 
a similar proof of type soundness, this time for  a subset of Java they call Javalight, 
using the prover Isabelle/HOL. Though independent of the work of Drossopoulou 
and Eisenbach, and differing in certain aspects (such as the use of a big-step rather 
than small-step semantics), there are similarities between the two projects, which 
are discussed. 
2.1.2  The JVM 
The work described above is  all concerned with the Java language as a high-level, 
object oriented language.  But while the Java language and the JVM are obviously 
closely related and their type-systems very similar, they are separate entities and as 
such, a proof of type soundness of one does not necessarily imply the same property 
holds of the other. 
In her paper Formalizing  the  Java  Virtual  Machine  in Isabelle/HOL  [45],  Pusch 
details a formalization of the JVM-which she describes as preliminary 
-~in the theorem prover Isabelle (using the HOL object logic).  We  describe this 
paper in more detail than the others mentioned in this chapter as it is the work on 
which our own is based. 
Pusch's aim is to provide a formal version of the Java Virtual Machine Specification 
[29]  that is  not prey to the ambiguities and inconsistencies which tend to invade CIIAPTER 2.  HELATED WORI':  27 
Operational semantics 
exec  - all ::  [instr classfi Ie  ,jvm_ tate, jvm_state] -> bool 
- -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - ----------- - - - - - - - - ------
exec ::  instr clas  file  *  jvm_state -> jvm_statc option 
- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - ------- - - - - - - - - --- ------- . 
exec_XX ::  [command, paltial state] -> partial state 
Model Syntax and Environment 
jvm_state = (xcpt, heap, frames)  val ::= rntg int I Addr loc I Null 
The Language 
C ::= Pop I Dup I Skip I ... 
Figure 2.1:  l'E'presentation of the .lVI\1 opewlional sculllnt irs 
ill formal  sl)('cinr(ttions (and  indC'cd  do  in the cas(' of the .JV:\[  Sp('('ifiC'<tt ion).  As 
t his  is  a  C'ollsidcrH blc  lllldcrt aking,  thc  theorem  provcr lscl \)elle  is  \Is('d  t ()  ensure 
a  degree of  I'eliabilit),  not  likciy  Lo  be achieved  in  a  proof by ll<llld.  Alt hough  a 
large subset of the .len·a  IcUlguage is  formalised.  there nre Clrcas  not  trcatC'd  in  lhis 
impietnelltat ion;  LlH'sC  includc cxception handling anel  cl.vnaIllic  class loading. 
The paper ollLiinC's  the formalization of hot h  static aspects o[ .JeWel  prograllls, e.g. 
well-fontwlillC'ss  of dassfiles  and  ['clations  lwlw('('n  classes.  and  prop('rti('s  of  the 
Java run-tinH' systcm including object initialisation and Lhe .JVl\l  heap.  The author 
also describcs  eUl  operational scmantics for  the subscL  of  the  .J V  [\ I i  ll!-.LrucLioll  set 
cOllsidel'rd. 
As Pll!:>ch's semantics are the b&c,is for our work, we give c1  brief descriplion of SOtlll' of 
llw maill feat mes of lwr formalization herc.  An ou  tlinc of l he fOl'l1l  of the sl'manl  ics 
can 1)('  S('C'l1  ill  Figure 2.1. 
Th  Language The commands in the langUi:l.ge  are .Lwa hytccoc\r instruct ions. 
C  ::=  Pop I Dup  I Swap I .. , 
The Environment  Valucs arC' modelleci  by  the c\c)LaL,Vpe 
unl  ::=  Intg ml I Addr lor  I Null CHAPTER 2.  RELATED WORK  28 
and a state is a  triple (xcpt  Option,  heap,  frame  list)  where  xcpt  Option is 
an exception option (this is None if no exception has been thrown at this point 
in execution), heap is the object heap of the JVM, and frame  list is the frame 
stack for the program.  The frame stack is a list of frames, each frame relating 
to the invocation of a particular method.  A frame consists of variables of the 
following types: 
•  opstack---operand stack for the current method, modelled as a list of type 
val 
•  locvars---list of local variables for  the current method, each of which can 
hold a value of type val 
•  cname--name of the class the current method belongs to, 
•  method_lac-method locator for the current method, and 
•  p_count~current value of the program counter. 
Operational Semantics of Commands Unlike  the operational semantics men-
tioned in Section 1.3 and described in detail in [56],  Pusch's semantics for  the 
JVM are not presented as a set of rules.  Instead she takes the approach more 
common to denotational semantics of defining execution in terms of a partial 
function on states.  Partial functions deal with the situation where, for  some 
values, the result of the function can be undefined.  They can be represented 
in Isabelle by the Option type 
datatype  'a option = None  I  Some  'a 
where an undefined result returns the value None. 
Pusch's semantics can be viewed as having three layers: 
execution of a single class of bytecode operations Pusch divides the byte-
code instructions of the JVM into several categories: 
•  load and store 
•  create object 
•  manipulate object 
•  manipulate array 
•  check object 
•  method invocation 
•  method return 
•  operand stack 
•  conditional branch ClIAPTER 2.  RELATED WORK  29 
•  unconditional branch 
The effect  on the state of executing the commands in each category is 
defined in a separate Isabelle theory file  for  each category of command, 
for  example 
execos  ::[ op_stack,  opstack,  p_countJ  =} 
(opstack  * p  _count) 
execJas  ::  [load_and_store,  opstack,  locvars,  p_countJ  =} 
(opstack  * locvars  * p_count) 
At this level the operational semantics are similar to conventional oper-
ational semantics, in that the command itself is  passed to the function 
exec....xx along with a state (in this case actually only the part of the state 
affected by the execution) and the updated state returned. 
execution of a  bytecode instruction The next layer defines the execution 
of one bytecode instruction of any category by the function 
exec  ::  instr classfiles  * jvm_state =} jvm_state  Option 
It is  at this point that the semantics become noticeably different to the 
usual style.  Here  the arguments to the function  exec  are  a  state and 
instr classfiles, so the function is not passed a single command and state, 
but a complete environment from  which it must extract the relevant in-
struction and state.  Once we  have  obtained the correct classfile from 
the set of classfiles passed to the function, we must look at the program 
counter of the current stack frame  (contained in jvm_state)  in order to 
determine the current instruction.  The result jvm_state  Option  reflects 
the fact that the result of execution may not be defined. 
execution of a  whole program The execution of an entire program is given 
by the function 
execa  II  :: [bytecode, jvm_state, jvm_state ] =} bool 
CFS ~ s ~*  t =  (s, t):  {(s, t). exec (CFS, s)  - Some t}* 
where CFS denotes a set of classfilcs. 
This corresponds  to eval,  mentioned  in  Section  1.3,  in that it returns 
true only if executing the given code in the initial state s results in the 
final state t.  Once again, the code to be executed is not explicit in the 
arguments to the function,  but must be extracted from  the state and 
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In Pr07Jing  the Soundness of a .Java  Bytecode  Verifier in Isabelle/HOL [46],  Pusch 
uses the operational semantics described here to prove the type-soundness of the Java 
bytecode verifier, i.e., that any program bytecode program passed by the verifier will 
have the properties described in Section 1.1. 
2.1.3  Comments 
The work described in this section differs from our own aims in that we wish to prove 
properties of specific bytecode programs compiled from Java source code and run 
on the JVM, rather than properties of the Java language and JVM themselves.  But 
since it is pointless to prove 'extra' desirable properties of a program not believed 
to possess the more basic property of type-soundness,  the proofs of Java's type-
soundness can be considered fundamental to our own  work.  In addition to this, 
Pusch's formalization of the semantics of the JVM is the basis of our work. 
2.2  Proving Properties of Java Programs 
In this section we describe a number of projects whose aim is to enable the proof of 
properties of individual Java programs. 
2.2.1  Extended Static Checking 
The Extended Static Checking system (ESC)  [13]  aims to statically determine sim-
ple errors in programs, e.g.  array out of bounds errors or simple deadlocks and race 
conditions in concurrent programs. The user annotates programs with simple speci-
fications, and these are passed to a verification condition generator, which produces 
a logical formula encapsulating the desired property.  This formula is then passed to 
ESC's dedicated automated proof system, Simplify which either proves the validity 
of the formula, or returns an instance in which it is false to the user. 
ESC differs from  the traditional approach to program verification, in that it does 
not attempt to prove that a program is  correct, merely that it does not suffer from 
certain specific  problems.  The authors refer  to this  as  'lightweight'  verification, 
but note that the comparative simplicity of the properties proved is  offset  by the 
complexities of the Java and Modula-3 languages and environment. The paper also 
draws attention to the fact that the information produced by ESC for an incorrect 
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that this additional verification of simple properties might  be viewed  by  users in 
the future in a similar light to typechecking.  To this end, any additional burden on 
users is reduced by ensuring that annotations are simple and proof of the required 
logical properties is both fast and automatic. 
The authors also describe how in designing ESC's integral theorem prover, they faced 
the challenge of achieving the correct balance between interaction and automation. 
Interactive provers are often very powerful, but require a great deal of user input and 
knowledge---a feature the authors felt  would be likely to discourage a great many 
programmers from using the system.  Automatic provers, on the other hand, require 
little user interaction but are often unable to deal with the decision procedures the 
authors felt  were  essential to the system-e.g.  those  for  linear  arithmetic.  The 
resultant  prover is  described  as  having two  parts:  a  set of co-operating decision 
procedures, and a search procedure that manages the search for  a proof. 
The system has been used  to verify  properties of several  programs,  including an 
interface for  Modula-3  that implements a  dynamically expandable array,  the 10 
streams package of Modula-3; and parts of the ESC system itself. 
2.2.2  The LOOP Project 
The aim of the Logic  of Object-Oriented Programming  (LOOP) Project  [25]  is to 
specify and verify properties of classes in object oriented languages, with the aid of 
proof tools such as Isabelle and PVS [4].  The main focus of the project is the verifi-
cation of programs written in JavaCard- -a subset of Java used to program Smart-
Cards.  In [54],  van den Berg and Jacobs note that reasoning about  "real world" 
programming languages, such as Java, which may not be mathematically clean has 
always been extremely challenging.  However with improvements in theorem prov-
ing technology and increased computing power, it is now becoming a realistic goal. 
The authors also  mention the high level of interaction and feedback  between  the 
theoretical basis of their work and the practical aspects involved in verifying actual 
programs. 
The LOOP tool accepts Java programs, CCSL specifications [49]' and JML programs 
(Java programs  annotated with  Java Modelling  Language  (JML)  specifications). 
JML is a behavioural interface specification language, designed specifically for Java, 
which enables pre- and post-conditions to be written in a Java-like manner.  It is 
designed with ease of use for  those with little experience of logic in mind. 
The tool translates the input programs into higher order logic descriptions of their 
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for the Isabelle and PVS provers, but the authors claim that this could be extended 
to any other prover that uses higher order logic.  On the basis of these descriptions, 
the provers can be used to prove that the programs meet their specifications and 
other properties. These proofs are often carried out using a specialised Hoare logic. 
Unlike the ESC, which requires no input from the user, but is  limited in the prop-
erties it can check, the LOOP tool can be used to provide a basis for  an unlimited 
variety of properties,  but requires  a  great deal of user interaction.  As  both ap-
proaches are valid for different users and problems, and especially as both tools use 
the JML language, the authors suggest they may provide complementary approaches 
to proofs of 'real world' programs. 
2.2.3  The T JVM 
In [34]  Moore describes the development of a simplified or 'toy' JVM  (T  JVM) in 
order to explore verification issues for  object-oriented bytecode.  The TJVM was 
formalized in ACL2  (A Computational Logic for  Applicative Common Lisp)  [27], 
and is based on Cohen's defensive JVM  [12].  Moore employs the standard method 
of formalizing machines in ACL2, whereby the state of the T JVM is represented as a 
LISP object and an interpreter for T JVM bytecode as a LISP function.  The T JVM 
differs from the JVM in that it does not deal with resource limitations, exceptions, 
or access types (e.g.  a load instruction loads a value of any type). 
The interpreter for  the TJVM is  defined  as  an iterated step function:  tjvm s  n 
where the function that evaluates a single step of execution is applied n times to the 
initial state s.  This definition of the execution of a bytecode program in terms of a 
concrete number of steps contrasts with Pusch's definition in terms of the reflexive 
transitive closure of pairs of states in a successful execution path.  This reflects the 
differing aims of the authors:  Pusch's proof objectives are of abstract properties of 
the JVM and bytecode programs in general;  Moore's involve proving that specific 
programs are "correct"  in the more widely understood sense of the word, i.e.  they 
result in a particular value being produced. 
After setting up the ACL2 prover by proving several lemmas about simple arithmetic 
and single steps of execution, Moore describes how  proofs can be obtained for  the 
total correctness of several small  programs  (e.g.  factorial)  by  instructing the 
prover to inductively "unwind"  the code.  Each method that is proved increases the 
capacity of the prover, as any future occurences of such a method will be treated as 
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2.2.4  Comments 
While all  three projects described above involve proving properties of actual Java 
programs, ESC and LOOP are probably most closely related in that they attempt 
to model the Java world with as much accuracy as possible,  and carry out proofs 
at the level of the Java source language.  Moore's work, in addition to dealing with 
proofs at the bytecode level, is concerned with a restricted subset of the language 
and does not model many of the features that make reasoning about Java and other 
'real world' languages particularly difficult. 
Despite this, van den Berg and Jacobs claim that thanks to improved proof tech-
nology and advances in computing power such 'real world'  proofs are becoming a 
realistic goal.  Certainly ESC  and LOOP demonstrate that this is  true to a  de-
gree.  However it seems likely that the aim of projects nowadays to prove only that 
programs possess certain, comparatively simple, desirable properties, or do not pos-
sess  other undesirable ones plays a  part.  Due to the sheer complexity and scale 
of real  world  systems,  it seems likely that the distinction between 'toy' systems, 
like Moore's, in which it can be proved that a very simple program is  correct,  and 
systems like ESC and LOOP which can prove that a program of some considerable 
complexity does not have certain clearly defined classes of error, will  be preserved. 
But as the proof of a few specific properties is frequently all that is needed in prac-
tice,  perhaps the tendency towards this 'lightweight' verification is  an advance in 
itself. 
With regard to our own work, despite the fact that Moore's work carries out proof 
at the level of bytecode, it seems likely that ESC and LOOP are more immediately 
relevant as we are aiming at real world applicability and proof of certain properties 
rather than correctness per se. 
2.3  Improving Performance of JIT Compilers 
In this section we  describe two projects whose aim is  to improve the performance 
of JIT compilers.  One is specifically aimed at Java JIT compilers, the other is  not 
specifically concerned with Java or  JITs, but the techniques used to improve the 
efficiency of a bytecode-like assembly language may well  have applications to JIT 
compilers. 
In Annotating the Java Bytecodes in Support of Optimization, [22j, Hummel, Azevedo, 
Kolson, and Nicolau observe that while Java provides a portable, platform-independent 
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map well  onto modern CPUs, which rely heavily on the use of register and caches 
for  speed.  In addition to having no concept of registers,  Java bytecodes are also 
unable to express optimizations like  instruction scheduling, elimination of runtime 
checks, and automatic reclamation of memory. 
With the goal of achieving  C-like  performance while  retaining the portability of 
bytecode and preserving compatibility with existing JVMs, the authors propose an 
annotating compiler.  This behaves initially like  a  traditional optimizing com-
piler,  analysing the code and performing optimizations before emitting bytecode. 
But rather than discarding the information produced by the analysis, the compiler 
attaches the relevant information to each emitted bytecode in the form of an anno-
tation. 
The annotations contain information useful for 
•  register allocation 
•  memory disambiguation 
•  memory reclamation 
•  run-time checking 
This information would normally have to be recomputed from the bytecode by the 
JVM, which  in  some instances may not be possible as  too much information may 
have been lost.  Annotations are stored separately from  the bytecode in  a classfile 
in order not to interfere with the running of the program on standard JVMs.  A 
JVM with an annotation aware JIT compiler, however, can use the annotations to 
produce more efficient code more quickly. 
The table in Figure 2.2 (taken from [22]) shows the annotated bytecode for the Java 
expression 
a[i]  = (2*a[i])  +  b[i] 
The src, inter, dest, and last use columns denote virtual register allocation performed 
during the original source to bytecode translation. Virtual register vO  is mapped to 
physical register RO,  vi  to Ri, etc.  until all available registers are used up, after 
which the virtual registers are mapped to memory locations. 
The inter column tells a JIT compiler to save intermediate values in the specified 
register(s)  if possible.  The last  use  column denotes when a  register ceases to be 
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CODE  src  inter  dest  last use  r-t check  memory ref tag 
aload a  vO  /stack/objref/a 
iload i  vI  /stack/int/i 
iconst 2 
aload a  vO  vO  /stack/objref/a 
iload i  vI  vI  / stack/int  /i 
iaload  vO,v1  v2  v3  111  /heap/array  /int/* 
imul  v2,v3  v3 
aload b  vO  / stack/  ob jref/b 
iload i  vI  vI  / stack/int  /i 
iaload  v4,v1  v2  v4  101  /heap/array  /int/* 
iadd  v3,v4  v3  v4 
iastore  vO,v1,v3  v2  v3  v3  000  /heap/array  /int/* 
Figure 2.2:  Example of annotated bytecode 
r-t check  column specifies which run-time checks should be performed.  For array 
accesses, at most three possible checks are required: 
1.  Is the array reference equal to Null? 
2.  Is the array index less than O? 
3.  Is the array index greater than or equal to the length of the array? 
Each check  is  assigned  a  bit in  r-t check;  if the bit is  1,  then the code must be 
generated to do the check.  The memory ref tag column provides memory reference 
information suitable for  performing disambiguation. 
The authors report substantial improvements in performance when using the An-
notated JIT. For one benchmark the performance is almost three times faster than 
with a standard JIT, for another, almost twice as fast. 
In  A  Dependently  Typed  Assembly Language  [57]  Hongwei  Xi  and Robert Harper 
describe an assembly language with a restricted form of dependent types.  Dependent 
types are types which depend on terms, e.g.  List  (n)  is the type of lists of length 
n  . as opposed to the more usual type of List which includes no information about 
its length.  More information can be found in [58]. 
In an overly complex type system, type checking can be infeasible (or actually unde-
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means that only very elementary properties can be expressed and hence checked:  it 
is usually not possible for  a type checker to identify an attempt to remove an item 
from an empty list, for example.  By restricting the dependent types in the language 
to those needed to ensure certain specific properties, the authors attempt to strike 
a balance between these two extremes. 
In Dependent Types in Practical Programming [58] the authors describe a method for 
eliminating array bounds checks in functional  programs.  They define dependent 
type constructors of the form 
{n:nat} 
Constructors may also contain conditions such as 
{n:nat Hi:natl  i  < n} 
A function nth, which returns the nth item of a list, therefore has the type 
{n:nat }{i:natl  i  < n}  'a list(l) * int(n)  ->  'a 
which eliminates the need for runtime checks on the length of the list.  This approach 
is now applied to assembly language, producing a dependently typed assembly 
language (DTAL) that supports a limited form of dependent type system which 
captures both type safety and memory safety.  The paper describes an operation 
semantics and a set of typing rules for DTAL, from which type-soundness is proved. 
2.3.1  Comments 
The work described in this section represents two very different approaches to the 
optimization of assembly language programs.  The AJIT project starts by gathering 
information from  a  high-level  Java program,  applying it to the 'middle' stage of 
a bytecode program, resulting in a more efficient assembly language program.  The 
techniques involve no formal methods-although the authors mention the benefits in 
increased user confidence of applying such methods-but demonstrate a measurable 
improvement in the efficiency of the JIT. 
The DTAL project, on the other hand, is  not concerned with high level languages 
or stack-based languages, but purely with assembly language. It takes a very formal 
approach to the problem, but ultimately also results in more efficient code. 
With regard to our work, it is clear that the AJIT project has more relevance.  It 
demonstrates the value  to JIT performance of the knowledge  of the existence of 
certain properties in a bytecode program, and provides a system by which they can CHAPTER 2.  RELATED WORK  37 
be conveyed to a user.  It seems likely that a proof element could be incorporated 
into such a  system.  While not disregarding the applications of a  JIT producing 
dependently typed assembly code,  it appears to have less  immediate relevance to 
our work. 
2.4  Incorporating Proof in Systems 
While users may be keen to have the added reassurance of code that has been proved 
to have desirable properties such as type-soundness, they may well be put off using 
such systems if they are presented with a great deal of extra work and complexity to 
achieve such a result. In this section we discuss three projects aimed at incorporating 
proof into real world systems while retaining a 'user-friendly' interface. 
2.4.1  Eiffel 
Eiffel [53]  is an object oriented language that implements proof annotations (known 
as assertions) that allow programmers to express formal properties of classes.  As-
sertions are boolean expressions and can have the following forms: 
•  Routine Preconditions:  these express requirements a client  must satisfy 
before they call a routine. 
•  Routine Postconditions:  these express conditions the supplier  (i.e.  the 
routine being called) guarantees on return, if its preconditions were satisfied 
on entry. 
•  Class Invariant: this must be satisfied by every instance of the class, when-
ever an instance is externally accessible. It characterises the semantics of the 
class. 
The assertion mechanism can be used to implement what the developers of Eiffel 
refer  to as  programming by contract.  This means that every  routine in  the 
code has a client-supplier contract specifying how it should be used by calling 
procedures  (clients)  and what it does itself (as  a  supplier).  The aim is that all 
routines used in a system conform to their client-supplier contracts.  Unlike  type-
constraints which can be checked statically, Eiffel contracts may rely on data values 
and so can only be checked at runtime. The handling of such errors is dealt with by 
Eiffel's exception mechanism, and Eiffel provides a history table in order to make 
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2.4.2  Ada Spark 
Spark [9]  is a subset of the Ada programming language enriched with annotations. 
Spark uses a tool known as the Examiner, which has two basic functions: 
•  checking that the code conforms to the rules of the kernel language. 
•  checking consistency between the code and the embedded annotations by con-
trol, data and information flow  analysis. 
In order to ensure correct dynamic behaviour of the code, certain proof annotations 
can be inserted that allow analysis of a program's dynamic behaviour prior to ex-
ecution.  The annotations allow the Examiner to generate theorems; proving these 
theorems verifies that the program is  correct with respect to the annotations.  The 
proof annotations comprise 
•  pre and postconditions of subprograms 
•  assertions such as loop invariants 
•  declarations of proof functions 
The generated theorems are known as verification conditions and can be veri-
fied  by hand or by using other Spark tools such as the Simplifier and the Proof 
Checker.  The Examiner is  also able to generate path functions which show the 
effect of traversing the various paths in a subprogram. 
The Examiner provides three different levels of analysis,  according to how  critical 
the safety of the code is 
•  The lowest level of analysis is Data Flow Analysis.  This involves checking 
that the usage of parameters and global variables corresponds to their modes; 
that values are not overwritten without being used; that all imported variables 
are used somewhere. The interdependencies between variables as expressed in 
the derives annotation are not checked. 
•  The next level is Information Flow Analysis. This requires derives anno-
tations, and in addition to carrying out data flow  analysis it checks that the 
modes of parameters and global variables and their usage in the code of the 
body correctly match the interdependencies given in the derives annotation. 
This level of analysis is known as shallow verification as it checks the static 
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•  The highest level of analysis involves generating verification conditions in 
addition to performing flow  analysis and requires proof annotations. 
Verification  conditions  are obtained through a  series  of operations on the stated 
conditions which annotate the code.  These operations correspond closely to those 
involved in Hoare Logic proofs, e.g.  the Assignment Axiom. 
2.4.3  Proof Carrying Code 
Proof Carrying Code (PCe) [36,35, 11, 50} is a technique developed by George Nec-
ula and Peter Lee to attempt to address the problem of safe execution of untrusted 
code.  In an instance of pee a code receiver establishes a set of safety rules that 
guarantee safe behaviour of programs (or at any rate, what the receiver is  defining 
safe behaviour to be);  the code producer then creates a formal safety proof that 
proves the untrusted code's adherence to the safety rules.  The receiver is then able 
to use a simple and fast proof valida  tor to check that the proof is valid and hence 
that it is safe to execute the untrusted code. 
A pee implementation contains the following elements: 
•  A formal specification language-first order predicate logic- is  used to 
express the safety policy. 
•  A formal semantics of the language used by the untrusted code. This 
is  usually in the form  of a logic  relating programs to specifications.  A form 
of Floyd's verification-condition generator  [15J  is  used to extract the safety 
properties of a program as a predicate.  This predicate must then be proved by 
the code producer using the axioms and inference rules supplied by  the code 
consumer as part of the safety policy. 
•  The language used to express the proofs is a variant of Edinburgh Logical 
Framework (LF)  [8J  (a typed lambda calculus). 
•  An algorithm for validating the proofs. This involves type-checking the 
LF expression that represents a proof according to a set of typing rules agreed 
on by the code producer and receiver. 
•  A  method for generating the safety proofs.  This element is  used only 
by the code producer and the implementation involves a theorem prover that 
emits the required proofs.  In  [37J  the use of a certifying compiler, which 
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a certifier which checks the type and memory safety of any program produced 
by the compiler is investigated. The use of a certifying compiler has the added 
advantage that it is much simpler to verify the output of the compiler than to 
verify the compiler itself. 
2.4.4  Comments 
Both PCC and Java are designed to ensure the safety of untrusted executable code, 
downloaded from another system, without access to source code.  Eiffel and Spark try 
to ensure the production of safe executable code within a system; and they depend 
on being able to examine the source code (in order to deal with annotations). 
PCC employs a combination of First Order Logic, a language semantics, a theorem 
prover and a form of the lambda calculus to produce and encode its proofs of program 
correctness.  It can therefore be viewed as the most 'heavy duty' in terms of formal 
methods.  Spark involves data and information flow analysis combined with a form of 
Hoare logic in order to carry out both static and runtime checks.  Whereas Java uses 
dataflow analysis with additional runtime checks to ensure the safety of programs, 
Eiffel uses a rather weaker form of the annotations used in Spark. 
In terms of our own work, the notion of annotated code as used in Spark and Eiffel, 
could be used in some form in the proof of bytecode programs.  It is  unreasonable 
to imagine that users would be willing to annotate bytecode programs themselves. 
However  as many of the properties involved  are very low  level  (e.g.  just prior to 
execution of an array store application, checking whether the array reference is non-
null), an automatic annotating mechanism might be feasible. 
The concept of Proof Carrying Code is  very relevant to our work,  as  it provides 
a method of providing the user with the added reassurance of verified  code in  a 
relatively painless manner. As the vast majority of Java users are not well-versed in 
theorem proving techniques, they are unlikely to welcome a system that demands 
skill in such techniques. 
2.5  Conclusions 
A large amount of work has been carried out on proving that the Java language and 
JVM are type safe.  Most of this work has been carried out with the aid of mecha-
nized proof tools.  In addition to this there are several ongoing projects that aim to 
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verification in  which the aim  is  to prove particular properties of programs, rather 
than program correctness.  We feel  that these techniques are applicable to our own 
work on proving certain properties of Java bytecode programs with a view  to im-
proving the performance of JIT compilers. 
In addition there exist several projects on improving the performance of JIT compil-
ers, and incorporating proof into systems, which would be of relevance to developing 
a technique to proving properties of bytecode programs into a working system. Chapter 3 
Bytecode Execution Relations 
The decision to prove properties of the bytecode programs themselves, rather than 
the corresponding Java source was made based on two main factors: 
1.  Java programs are downloaded by consumers as bytecode, not source 
2.  It is  perfectly feasible (albeit not common in practice) to produce Java byte-
code from another high level language, e.g.  C, ML. 
In order to reason about properties of bytecode programs it is necessary to develop 
a logical framework that supports this. 
The fact that bytecode is  'flat' and contains goto instructions presents difficulties 
not encountered in the standard logic, which deals with a structured programming 
language.  The standard Hoare logic  has three main components, however,  which 
can be applied to bytecode programs, namely: 
1.  The notion of evaluation of a section of code in  the language (which can be 
based on the operational semantics) 
2.  Definition of a pre- and post-condition relation on execution of code. 
3.  Higher level rules for combining patterns of code 
The development of some logical  relations corresponding to the first  item in this 
list  the evaluation of bytecode--is discussed in the rest of this chapter. There are 
three execution relations for  bytecode instructions.  The block execution relation 
(Section 3.3) describes the complete execution of a block of bytecode.  The sequence 
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execution relation (Section 3.2) describes the complete execution of a block of byte-
code of a very restricted class of instructions.  Finally, the execution path relation 
(Section 3.4) is concerned with the relationship between intermediate states in the 
execution of a  block of bytecode and the initial and final  states.  These relations 
are all  necessary for  the development of points 2 and 3 on the list,  which will  be 
discussed fully in Chapters 4 and 5. 
3.1  Extending the Semantics 
While Pusch's formalization of the JVM is  fairly comprehensive,  the objective of 
the work differs from ours, and some alterations to the model are necessary in order 
to allow the definition of the bytecode logic.  We  describe these alterations briefly 
before commencing discussion of any bytecode execution relations. 
3.1.1  Arithmetic Instructions 
As  Pusch's work formalises a subset of the JVM, certain instructions are omitted. 
These include  all  arithmetic instructions,  such  as  iadd,  isub.  In  order  to prove 
properties of real programs,  however  trivial,  Pusch's model must be extended to 
include this class of instructions. 
Each of the load and store instructions in Pusch's instruction subset are represented 
by a value in the datatype load_and_store whose components are the name of a load 
and store instruction and its arguments.  The following function is then defined for 
each element of the load_and_store datatype: 
execJas ::  [load_and_store,  opstack,  locvars,  p_countJ  =? 
(opstack  *  locvars  *  p_count) 
This takes a load and store instruction, an operand stack, a set of local variables 
and a program counter and returns the updated values of the operand stack, local 
variables and program counter. 
It is simple to add the instructions 
•  iadd- -add the two integers at the top of the stack 
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to the existing load and store instructions of the model.  The corresponding exten-
sions to execJas are also straightforward, and the resultant Isabelle theory file  can 
be found in Appendix B of this report. 
3.1.2  Branching Instructions 
Problems are also encountered with the representation of branching instructions. In 
Java bytecode, branching instructions are absolute jumps to a label, but in Pusch's 
model they are represented by relative branches, where the new value of the program 
counter is  obtained by adding an offset to the current value.  This offset is  positive 
for  a branch forward, negative for  a branch backwards. 
While this convention appears suitable for  Pusch's higher-level proofs,  difficulties 
arise when using it to reason about lower-level properties.  In particular, problems 
are encountered with proofs involving branches backwards where a negative integer 
is added to the program counter (a natural number cast to an integer) and the result 
is  then cast to a  natural.  This repeated type-casting makes the proofs in  Isabelle 
very awkward. 
Consequently, in place of the two varieties of branching instructions in Pusch's model 
(cond_branch  and uncond_branch)  we  have four types of branching instruction: 
cond_branch-fwd  =  IfnulUwd  nat 
Ilfiacmpeq_fwd ins_type  nat 
Ilficmpit-fwd nat 
cond_branch_bwd  - IfnulLbwd  nat 
I Ifiacmpeq_bwd  ins_type nat 
IlficmplLbwd nat 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
All of these take a natural number as offset, which is either added or subtracted to the 
current program counter depending on whether the branch is forwards or backwards. 
This keeps all branching proofs in the realm of natural number arithmetic, greatly 
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3.2  Execution of a Sequence of Bytecode 
Instructions 
45 
The conventional Hoare logic is based on an operational semantics where execution 
begins at the start of the sequence of commands and finishes at the end (assuming 
the program terminates). But with bytecode there is the possibility of jumping into 
the code at some point after the start and out at a point before the end.  How, then, 
should execution of a sequence of bytecode be defined? 
Consideration of a straightforward recursive definition of the form 
exec·  [] ao  =  a 
exec·  (x : xs) ao  =  exec·  xs (exec x  ao) 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
where x is a bytecode instruction and xs a list of bytecode instructions, immediately 
reveals it to be unsuitable as the execution of xs would not necessarily be linear:  ex-
ecution might well jump back to the beginning of xs after a few instructions.  Pusch's 
formalisation recognises this by defining execution of several bytecode instructions 
as the reflexive, transitive closure of a series of single execution steps: 
execall ::[bytecode,  jvm_state,  jvm_state] =} bool 
CFS ~ s  ---,>* t =  (s, t):  {(s, t). exec  (CFS, s)  =  Some tr 
(3.7) 
where CFS denotes a set of classfiles. 
To define a partial correctness relation it is  necessary to know that, for  a sequence 
of bytecode instructions, if we  start executing in state ao  we  will  finish  execution 
in state an.  But the above relation does not have anything to say about a state's 
position in the sequence  of  states produced  by  executing  a  number of bytecode 
instructions, only whether or not it is  in the sequence.  We  must therefore define 
what it means to 'finish' execution of a sequence of bytecode instructions. 
One possibility is to state that execution of a sequence of instructions has finished 
when the program counter is no longer pointing into the sequence. This results in the 
definition of a relation describing the execution of a list of bytecode instructions in 
which if execution begins in state ao  inside a sequence, it results in state (Tn, where 
the program counter of an  is outside the section. CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS  46 
3.3  The Block Execution Relation 
Suppose that 
•  CPS is a set of Classfiles 
•  The start of the bytccode sequence is signified by 5, and the fimsh by f, where 
sand f  are triples of the form  (classname,  method locator,  program counter) 
each allowing identification of a single instruction in  CPS. 
•  ao  and an  are states, each consisting of  (exception  option,  heap,  frame  stack 
list). 
We  write (CPS, a 0)  ~  an  to mean that executing the sequence of instructions 
f 
in CPS that begins at the instruction indentified by s and ends at the instruction 
identified by f, starting in the state ao,  results in the state an, where the instruction 
identified by an is not contained in the sequence of instructions in CPS bounded by 
sand f. 
The program counter of s must be less than or equal to the program counter of f, 
i.e., the block consists of at least one instruction. The program counter of state 0"0, 
should be greater than or equal to the program counter of s and less than or equal to 
the program counter of f. The program counter of f should be less than the length 
of the code of the current method (measured from the start of the method code) to 
ensure that we  are not referring to non-existent pieces of code.  This condition also 
ensures that Isabelle's standard lemmas about lists can be used,  as  many require 
that an indexing value, e.g.  pc(f), be less than the length of the list being operated 
on. 
The program counter of the final state O"n  should be either less than the program 
counter of s  or greater than the program counter of f.  Finally,  sand f  should 
identify instructions in the same method of the same class. 
We introduce the following definitions 
Definition 1  (Program counter inside block) 
inside  pC(O"o)  s f  =  pc(s)  ~ pc(ao)  1\  pC(O"o)  ~ pc(f) CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 
Definition 2 (Program counter outside block) 
outside pC(O'o)  s I  ==  pC(O'o)  <  pc(s)  V  pc(f)  <  pC(O'o) 
Definition 3 (States in same method) 
same_method s 0'0  0'  n I  ==  (cJass( s)  =  class( 0'  0)  = 
class(  0'  n)  =  cJass(f»  /\ 
(method(s)  =  method(O'o)  -
method(O'n)  =  method(f) 
And the block execution relation is defined inductively by the rules 
Definition 4  (Block Execution Relation) 
exec( CFS, 0'0) = Some O'n; 
inside  pC(O'o)  s I; 
same_method s 0'0  O'n  I; 
pc(f) < length(geLcode CFS s); 
outside pc( 0'  n)  S I 
(CFS,O'o)  ~  O'n 
f 
exec( CFS, 0'0) =  Some 0'1; 
inside  pC(O'o)  s I; 
same_method s 0'0  0'1 I; 
pc(f) < length(get_code CFS  s); 
(CFS, 0'1) ~  O'n 
f 
(CFS, 0'0) ~  O'n 
f 
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(Stop) 
(Continue) 
Rule Stop refers to the case in which one step of execution results in the program 
counter being outside the sequence of instructions under consideration.  At this point CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS  48 
execution of the block would be considered finished, giving us the final state required 
by the programming logic. 
Rule Continue is the case where, after one step of execution, the program counter 
is still within the block of code delimited by 8 and 1- This the inductive part of the 
definition, as the relation is defined in terms of itself.  Execution of the block would 
now carryon, with continued application of the rules until the Stop rule applies 
and we obtain a final state. 
As can be seen from the definition of the block execution relation, all states in the 
relation must refer to instructions within a single method.  Obviously it would be 
desirable to extend the relation in the future to allow method invocation and possible 
ways of doing this are discussed in Section 7.2. 
In addition to this,  it is  assumed either implicitly or,  where necessary,  explicitly, 
that execution of the instructions between  the boundaries of an instance of the 
block execution relation do not throw exceptions.  This is to simplify the definition 
of the bytecode programming logic  described  in  Chapter 4.  Again,  further work 
could be done leading to a programming logic for bytecode which allows for abrupt 
termination, such as that described by Huisman and Jacobs in  [21]  for  Java source 
code.  The exception - free property is defined in Section 3.4, Definition 9. 
The case  split and induction rules for  the block  execution relation are shown  in 
Figure 3.1  as they appear in Isabelle.  It will be apparent, however, that this format 
is  not very readable and so all  proofs will  be  described in the text using  a  less 
proof-tool specific notation. 
As many of our proofs involve retrieving the code of a particular method in a set 
of classfiles,  and then taking a smaller 'slice' from  it, the following  definitions are 
given: 
Definition 5  (Isolate sequence of instructions from classfile) 
CFS  [8 ... f]  ==  slice  pC(8)  pc(J) (get-code CFS 8) 
Definition 6  ('Slice' instructions from longer list) 
sliceabx8  =  take (Suc(b-a)) (drop a xs) CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 
val mycases  = 
"[I  ?CFS  ?s ?f  1- ?a -block-> ?b; 
[I  exec  (?CFS,  ?a)  K  Some  ?b;  inside  (third_of  ?a)  ?8  ?f; 
pc_of  ?f  <  length  (get_code  ?CFS  (cn_of  ?s)  (ml_of  ?s»; 
same_method_frs  ?s  (hd  (snd  (snd ?a»)  (hd  (snd  (snd ?b»)  ?f; 
outside  (third_of  ?b)  ?s ?f  I]  ==>  ?P; 
!!  c. 
[I  exec  (?CFS,  ?a)  E  Some  c;  inside  (third_of ?a)  ?s ?f; 
pc_of ?f < length  (get_code  ?CFS  (cn_of  ?s)  (ml_of  ?s»; 
same_method_frs  ?s  (hd  (snd  (snd ?a»)  (hd  (snd  (snd c») ?f; 
?CFS  ?s ?f  1- c  -block-> ?b  I] => ?P  I]  a_>  ?p"  :  thm 
val exec_block3.induct  -
"[I  ?xo  (?xn,  (?xm,  ?x1) , 
?xk)  (?xj,  (?xi,  ?xh) ,  ?xg)  1- (?xf,  ?xe,  ?xd)  -block-> ?xc,  ?xb, 
?xa; 
!!CFS  a  aa b  ab ac ba ad ae  bb bc af  ag bd be. 
[I  exec  (CFS,  a,  aa,  b)  - Some  (ab,  ac,  ba); 
inside  (third_of  (a,  aa,  b»  (af,  (ag,  bd),  be)  (ad,  (ae,  bb),  bc); 
pc_of  (ad,  (ae,  bb),  bc) 
< length 
(get_code CFS  (cn_of  (af,  (ag,  bd),  be» 
(ml_of  (af,  (ag,  bd),  be»); 
same_method_frs  (af,  (ag,  bd),  be)  (hd  (snd  (snd  (a,  aa,  b»» 
(hd  (snd  (snd  (ab,  ac,  ba»»  (ad,  (ae,  bb),  bc); 
outside  (third_of  (ab,  ac,  ball  (af,  (ag,  bd),  be) 
(ad,  (ae,  bb),  bc)  I] 
_a>  ?P  CFS  af  ag  bd be  ad ae  bb  bc  a  aa b  ab  ac  ba; 
!!CFS  a  aa b  ab ac ba ad  ae  bb af ag bc bd  ab ai be bf. 
[I  exec  (CFS,  a,  aa,  b)  - Some  (ad,  ae,  bb); 
inside  (third_of  (a,  aa,  b»  (ab,  (ai, be),  bf)  (af,  (ag,  bc),  bd); 
pc_of  (af,  (ag,  bc),  bd) 
< length 
(get_code CFS  (cn_of  (ab,  (al,  be),  bf» 
(m1_of  (ab,  (ai,  be), bf»); 
same_method_frs  (ab,  (ai, be),  bf)  (hd  (snd  (snd  (a,  aa,  b»» 
(hd  (snd  (snd  (ad,  ae,  bb»»  (af,  (ag,  bc),  bd); 
CFS  (ab,  (ai,  be), 
bf)  (af,  (ag,  bc),  bd)  1- (ad,  ae,  bb)  -block-> ab,  ac,  ba; 
?P CFS  ab ai be bf  af  ag bc bd ad ae bb  ab  ac  ba  I] 
_a>  ?P  CFS  ab ai be bf  af  ag  bc bd a  aa b  ab  ac  ba  I]  -->  ?P  ?xo  ?xn ?xm  ?xl  ?xk  ?xj  ?xi ?xh  ?xg ?xf  ?xe  ?xd  ?xc  ?xb  ?xa"  thm 
Figure 3.1:  Case split and induction rule as they appear in Isabelle 
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3.3.1  Lemmas for the Block Execution Relation 
Working with the rules defined above, we obtain proofs of the following properties 
as 'sanity checks' on the inductive definition of the block execution relation. 
Lemma 1  (Initial state in block execution relation is inside the block) 
V CFS s f  0'0  O'n·  (CFS, 0'0) ~  an  ----t pc(s)  ~ pC(O'o)  ~ pc(J) 
f 
PROOF  This follows  from the rules for  the block execution relation (Definition 4) 
and the definition of inside (Definition 1).  _ 
Lemma 2  (Final state in relation is outside the block ) 
VCFS s f  0'0 an.  (CFS,O'o) ~  O'n  ----t PC(O'n)  < pc(s) V pc(J) < PC(O'n) 
f 
PROOF This follows  from the rules for  the block execution relation (Definition 4) 
and the definition of outside (Definition 2).  _ 
Lemma 3  (Initial and final states in relation not equal ) 
V CFS s f  0'0 an·  (CFS,O'o) ~  an  ----t 0'0  =1=  O'n 
f 
PROOF This follows  from the rules for  the block execution relation (Definition 4) 
and the definitions of inside  (Definition  1)  and outside  (Definition  2).  The initial 
state is  inside the block,  the final  state is  outside and,  as  a state cannot be both 
inside and outside a block, the states cannot be equal.  _ 
Lemma 4  (List of frames in initial state not empty ) 
V CFS s f  0'0 an- (CFS, 0'0) ~  an ----t frames(O'o)  =1=  [ 
f 
PROOF This follows  from the rules for  the block execution relation (Definition 4) 
and Pusch's definition of the partial function exec which defines execution of a state 
with an empty list of frames as evaluating to undefined.  _ CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS  51 
'----------'[] 
x  y 
Figure 3.2:  Extension of block, final program counter on right 
As in imperative programs, a bytecode program can be viewed as a block composed 
of several smaller blocks of code.  It is therefore useful to prove some lemmas relating 
to the extension and combining of blocks of code. 
We begin by describing the extension of blocks.  Given a block in the block execution 
relation and the position of the program counter on exit,  pc(an), it is  possible to 
extend the relation to include all instructions in the method on the opposite side of 
the block from pc(an ), and all instructions up to it on the same side. 
Lemma 5  (Extension of block with final program counter on right) 
'if  CFS sf x  y ao  an·  (CFS,ao) ~  an  ~ 
f 
pc(y) < pc(an )  1\  pc(x) < pc(s)  1\  pc(J) < pc(y)  1\ 
pc(y) < length(geLcode  CFS s)  ~  (CFS,ao) ~  an 
y 
PROOF  By  induction on the rules for  the block execution relation  (Definition 4). 
The base case then follows from construction rule Stop and the definitions for  inside 
(Definition  1),  and  outside  (Definition  2).  The inductive step can  be  proved  by 
the inductive hypothesis, construction rule Continue, and the definition of inside 
(Definition 1).  This is shown in Figure 3.2.  • 
Lemma 6  (Extension of block with final program counter on left) 
'if  CFS sf x  Y 170  an·  (CFS,ao) ~  an  ~ 
f 
pc(an )  < pc(x)  1\  pc(x) < pc(s)  1\  pc(f) < pc(y)  1\ 
pc(y) < length(geLcode  CFS s)  ~  (CFS,ao) ~  an 
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Figure 3.3:  Extension of block, program counter on left 
[~} 
'------------~ 
x  y 
Figure 3.4:  Add block on right, finish on right, blocks adjacent 
PROOF  As for Lemma 5.  See Figure 3.3.  • 
We now consider the problem of combining two blocks in the block execution.  Given 
two blocks in the relation where execution of the first block finishes inside the second, 
and execution of the second finishes to the right or left of both blocks, the two can 
be combined  to form  one larger block.  This larger  block  can itself be extended 
to include all  instructions in the method on the opposite side of the block from 
pc(un )  the position of the program counter on exit from the second block~-and all 
instructions up to it on the same side. 
The two original blocks may be adjacent to each other, as in Figure 3.4, be separated 
by a gap,  as in Figure 3.5,  or overlap to the extent that one block is  exactly 'on 
top' of the other.  The only situation not permitted is that the second block should 
be contained within the first,  as it is  necessary from  the definition of the relation 
for  the program counter of the final state to be outside the block.  These lemmas 
refer to situations where there is no looping between blocks (although either or both 
of the individual blocks may contain a loop);  loops will  be dealt with in detail in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
There are four cases that we  will  consider, defined by the position of the program 
counter in the final stage of each block:  add a block to the right of the initial block, 
finish  on the right of the two blocks;  add a block to the right of the initial block, 
finish on the left of the two blocks; add a block to the left of the initial block, finish 
on the right of the two blocks; and add a block to the left of the initial block, finish 
on the left of the two blocks. CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS  53 
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Figure 3.5:  Add block on right, finish on right, gap between blocks 
As  the proofs  are all  very similar,  we  will  only describe in detail the first  case: 
execution of first block finishes on the right of the first block, but within the second; 
execution of the second block finishes to the right of both blocks.  This is depicted 
in Figure 3.3.1. 
We note briefly that one other case does exist, in which execution of the first block 
finishes in the second block, and execution of the second block finishes  in the gap 
between the blocks. It is likely that proofs of this case would necessitate a different 
approach to those described below, but as it is not fundamental to any work later 
in the dissertation consideration of this case is omitted. 
Lemma 7  (Add a  block on right, finishing on right) 
'V  CFS  5 f  x  Y  5' J'  0"0  O"n  O"~. (CFS, 0"0) ~  (Tn  ----+ 
/ 
S' 
(CFS,O"n)  - CT~  -
/' 
pC( 5)  ::;  pC( 5')  A  pC(J)::; pC(J')  -
pC(X)  < pC(5)  A  pc(J') < pC(y)  ----+ 
pC(y) < length(geLcode CFS  5)  ----+ 
pC(y) < pC«(J~) 
----+ (CFS, (J 0)  ---=-.  (J~ 
y 
PROOF The proof proceeds by rule induction (Section 1.3.3) on the first assumption 
(CFS,CTo) ~  (In' 
/ 
Basis 
The base case deals with the case in which our initial assumption was produced by CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 
one application of the Stop rule, giving us the assumption 
exec (CFS,  0"0) =  Some O"n  1\ 
inside 0"0  S f  1\ 
outside 0" nsf 
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(3.8) 
We now consider the two possible positions of the program counter in O"n.  From the 
definition of outside (Definition 2)  we know that 
(3.9) 
The left  hand  disjunct,  pe(O"n)  <  pe(s)  gives  a  contradiction  as  we  know  from 
Lemma 1 that 
inside pe(  O"n)  pe( s')  pe(J')  (3.10) 
and from 3.8 that 
pe( s)  ::;  pe( s')  (3.11) 
Thus pC(J)  <  pe(O"n)  and the basis can then be proved using the Continue rule 
and Lemma 5. 
Inductive Step 
The inductive step deals with the case in which our initial assumption was produced 
by at least one application of the Continue rule.  By rule induction, we  have the 
assumption 
exec (CFS,  0"0) =  Some 0"1  1\ 
inside 0"0  S f  1\ 
(CFS,O"l)  ~  O"n 
f 
And from the inductive hypothesis after simplification we  have 
which by application of the Continue rule, gives the desired result. 
(3.12) 
(3.13) 
• 
A block of size one is equivalent to execution of that instruction, providing the in-
struction is not a 'degenerate' branch (one which branches back to itself, or branches 
outside the bounds of the method), or an instruction which results in a frame being CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS  55 
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Figure 3.6:  Add a block to the right, finish on the right 
pushed or popped from  the stack,  i.e.  method invocation or return.  The latter 
constraint is due to the current, simplified, definition of the block execution relation 
which demands that all states in the relation be in the same method_ 
The constraint on branching instructions is due to the fact that it would be possible 
to create a  bytecode program (though probably not via a conventional compiler) 
which  pushed the value  Null  onto the stack,  followed  by some other values,  then 
had a  "branch if not null"  instruction which looped back to itself.  Initially the top 
value on the stack would not be Null, but every time the branch instruction was 
evaluated, the top value on the stack would be popped, leading eventually to a state 
where the top value was  Null  and the loop was exited.  This would mean that this 
instruction was in the block execution relation, but that this instance of the relation 
was  not equivalent to a single-step execution of the initial state. 
Lemma 8  (Single instruction block execution equivalence) 
\:fCPS  s  X  0"0  O"n- (geLcode  CPS  s)!pc(s)  - x  1\ 
nOLdegenerate_branch  x  1\ 
not--ShifLframe  x  1\ 
pc(s) < length  (geLcode  CPS  s) ~ 
(CPS,  0"0) ~  O"n =  exec( CFS,  0'0) =  Some  O'n 
s 
PROOF  The result follows from case analysis of the instruction x and the operational 
semantics of the JVM.  • 
3.4  The Execution Path Relation 
The block execution relation can be used to reason about an intermediate state in 
the execution of a block and the final state_  It does not, however, allow discussion CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS  56 
Figure 3.7:  One step of execution 
of the connection between an intermediate state and the initial state, or between 
two intermediate states, as both the states in question are inside the block.  Since 
it is clearly useful to be able to do this, a relation that enables us to reason about 
two states, at least one and possibly both of which are within a particular sequence 
of bytecode, is needed. 
This relation is  particularly useful  in  the proofs of the sequencing rule,  where we 
have to prove the existence of a 'crossover' state in the execution of a block which 
is  the result of joining two smaller blocks together.  Also,  in the proof of soundness 
of the while rule  (Chapter 5),  we  must reason about the relationship between the 
initial state and various intermediate states in the execution of the loop. 
The execution path relation is  defined  8..<;  the set of pairs of states obtained by a 
successful execution step,  where  the program counter of the first  member of the 
pair is inside the block in question, see Figure 3.7.  We write (CFS, a 0)  ==*  alto 
f 
mean that ao is inside the block from s to f, and executing the instruction in CFS 
identified by ao results in the state al. 
Definition 7 (Execution step in a  block) 
same_method  s ao a1  f  A  inside ao sf} 
The execution  path relation  is  the transitive  closure  of this  set,  and  we  write 
(CFS,  ao)  ==*+  an  to mean that the pair (ao,  an) is  an element of the transitive 
f 
closure of the set of pairs of states represented by the relationship (CFS, a 0)  ==*  a 1 
f 
Figure 3.8. 
Definition 8  (Execution Path Relation) 
(CFS,  ao) ==*+  an  ==  (ao, an) E {(ao, an). exec (CFS, ao)  =  Some an  A 
f 
same_method s ao an f  A  inside ao  s f}  + CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS  57 
Figure 3.8:  Execution path relation 
Many  of the proofs  involving  the execution path relation  rely  on  lemmas  about 
transitive closure which come as part of the standard Isabelle distribution. 
The following lemmas show the correspondence between the execution path relation 
and the block execution relation. 
Lemma 9 (Block execution relation implies execution path relation ) 
PROOF  This follows  from  induction on the construction rules for  the block execu-
tion relation (Definition 4)  and the definition of the execution path relation (Defi-
nition 8).  _ 
Lemma 10 (Execution path implies block execution) 
V CFS sf  ao  an·  (CFS,  ao)  ==*+  an  /\  outside an sf 
f 
~  (CFS,ao) ~  an 
f 
PROOF  By induction on the execution path relation and the construction rules for 
the block execution (Definition 4).  _ 
Lemma 11 (Unrolling the relation from the start) 
V CPS sf  (To  (Tn·  (CPS,  (To)  ==*+  (Tn 
f 
~  (CFS,ao) ==*  an  V 
f 
:3  a1.  (CFS,  ao)  ==*  a1  /\  (CPS,  (T1)  ==*+  an 
f  f 
PROOF  This follows from the definition of the execution path relation (Definition 8) 
and the standard lemmas for  transitive closure in Isabelle.  _ CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 
Lemma 12 (Unrolling the relation from the end) 
V CFS sf  ao an· (CFS,  ao) ==*+  an 
f 
~  (CFS,  0"0)  ==*  O"n  V 
f 
:3  O"n-I. (CFS,  (To)  ==*+  O"n-I  /\  (CFS,  an-I) ==*  (Tn 
J  f 
58 
PROOF This follows from the definition of the execution path relation (Definition 8) 
and the standard lemmas for transitive closure in Isabelle.  _ 
The execution path relation is also used to define the concept of a list of instructions 
being free of exceptions 
Definition 9 (Exception free instructions) 
excep_free ys  ==  V  CFS xp  hp frs  xp'  hp' frs' sf. 
ys  =  CFS  [s ... fl  /\ 
(CFS,  (xp, hp,frs») ==*+  (xp', hp',frs') 
f 
~  xp  =  None  /\  xp'  =  None 
3.5  Determinism Theorems 
Lemma 13 (Execution of a  single instruction is deterministic) 
V CFS  s f  0"0  0" n  O"~. exec (CFS,  0"0)  =  Some 0" n  /\ 
exec (CFS,  0"0)  =  Some a~ ~ 
PROOF  By case analysis of the instruction identified by ao, followed  by automatic 
simplification with the rules for  exec.  _ 
We  now show that this determinism is  preserved by the block execution relation, 
and discuss the determinism of execution of a series of instructions not defined  in 
relation to any particular class file. CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 
Theorem 1 (Block execution relation is deterministic) 
VCFS sf  ao  an  a~. (CFS,ao) ~ 
I 
(CFS,ao) ~ 
I 
an  --+ 
a'  --+  n 
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PROOF  The proof proceeds by rule induction (Section 1.3.3) on the first assumption, 
(CFS,ao) ~  an· 
I 
Basis 
The base case deals with the case in which our initial assumption was produced by 
one application of the Stop rule, giving us the assumption 
exec (CFS,  ao) =  (Yn  A 
inside  (Yo  s f  1\ 
outside an  s f 
(3.14) 
We  now  consider  the two  possible  cases  of derivation of the second  assumption, 
(CFS,(Yo) ~  a~. 
I 
1.  The block  was  formed  by  one  application of the  Stop rule,  giving  us  the 
assumption 
exec (CFS,  ao)  =  a~  A 
inside ao sf A 
outside  a~ s f 
(3.15) 
From this and (3.14)  we  are able to show the desired conclusion by Lemma 
13. 
2.  The block was formed by at least one application of the Continue rule, giving 
us the assumption 
exec  (CFS,  ao) =  (Y~  A 
inside ao sf  A 
(CFS,a~) ~  (Y~ 
f 
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From this assumption and Lemma 13  it follows  that Un  =  u~, but we  also 
have from  (3.14)  outside  Un  S  f  and,  from  Lemma 1,  inside  u~ s f.  From 
the definitions of inside  (Definition  1)  and outside (Definition 2)  the program 
counter of a state cannot be both inside and outside any block, and so we are 
able to show a contradiction. 
Inductive Step 
The inductive step deals with the case in which our initial assumption was produced 
by at least one application of the Continue rule.  The Isabelle output for  this step 
is shown in Figure 3.9 for comparison.  By rule induction, we  have the assumption 
exec (CFS,  uo) =  Ul  A 
inside  Uo  sf /\  (3.17) 
(CFS,Ul) ~  Un 
f 
The inductive hypothesis is 
{3.18} 
Again we consider the two possible cases of the second assumption, 
1.  The block  was  formed  by  one  application  of the Stop rule,  giving  us  the 
assumption 
exec  (CFS,  uo) =  U~ /\ 
inside  Uo  s f  /\ 
outside u~ s j 
(3.19) 
From this, Lemma 13,  and {3.17}  we can show that U1  =  u~. It follows  from 
Lemma 1 that inside  U1  s j, and from  3.19 that outside  U1  s f.  Once again, 
from  the definitions of inside  (Definition  1)  and outside (Definition  2)  we  are 
able to show a contradiction. 
2.  The block was formed by at least one application of the Continue rule, giving 
us the assumption 
exec  (CFS,  uo) =  a~ /\ 
inside  Uo  sf A 
(CFS,a~) ~  u~ 
f 
By  this,  Lemma  13,  and  (3.17)  we  have  a1 
hypothesis gives the required result. 
(3.20) 
U~ which  by  the inductive 
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CFS  (ent.  (mnt.  pdt).  pcm)  (en2.  (mn2.  pd2).  PCj) 
1- (xpt.  hpt.  frsl)  -bloek-> xp2.  hp2.  frs2  --> 
CFS  (ent.  (mnt.  pdt).  PCm)  (en2.  (mn2.  pd2).  PCj) 
1- (xpl.  hpl.  frsl)  -bloek->  xp3.  hp3.  frs3  --> 
frs2  -=  [)  --> xpt - None  -->  (xp2.  hp2.  frs2)  z  (xp3.  hp3.  frs3) 
t.  !!CFS  a  aa b  ab ae ba ad  ae  bb  af ag be  bd  ab ai be bf. 
[I  exee  (CFS.  a.  aa.  b)  = Some  (ad.  ae.  bb); 
inside  (third_of  (a.  aa.  b»  (ab.  (ai. be).  bf)  (af.  (ag.  be).  bd); 
pc_of  (af.  (ag.  be).  bd) 
< length  (get_code  CFS  (en_of  (ab.  (a1. be),  bf» 
(ml_of  (ab.  (ai. be).  bf»); 
same_method_frs  (ab.  (ai,  be).  bf) 
(hd  (snd  (snd  (a.  aa.  b»» 
(hd  (snd  (snd  (ad.  ae.  bb»» 
(af.  (ag.  be).  bd); 
CFS  (ab.  (ai.  be). bi)  (af.  (ag,  be).  bd) 
1- (ad,  ae.  bb)  -bloek-> abo  ae.  ba; 
CFS  (ab.  (ai. be). bf)  (af.  (ag.  be).  bd) 
1- (ad.  ae.  bb)  -bloek-> xp3.  hp3.  frs3 --> 
ba  -=  []  --> ad =  None  -->  (ab.  ae.  ba)  - (xp3.  hp3,  frs3); 
CFS  (ab.  (ai. be).  bf)  (af.  (ag.  be).  bd) 
1- (a.  aa.  b)  -bloek-> xp3.  hp3.  frs3;  ba -=  [];a =  Nonel) 
==>  (ab.  ae.  ba)  = (xp3.  hp3.  frs3) 
Figure 3.9:  Induction step in Isabelle for  Theorem 1 
3.5.1  Determinism of Two Identical Instruction 
Sequences 
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It would seem likely that executing the sequence of instructions xs starting in state 
(To  should result in state (Tn regardless of whether xs is found in one set of class files 
CFS, or a different set  CFS'. 
But this is not the case as, in both the block execution relation and the operational 
semantics on which it is based, instructions are not independent entities which can 
be described separately from the state in which they are being executed.  We might 
consider that a state contains two separate sets of information:  traditional environ-
mental data such as the stack, local variables and program counter; and contextual 
information in the form of a class name and method locator.  This means that two 
states which  are environmentally equal  -and would  consequently be equal in the 
traditional sense-may have different contextual information and therefore not be 
equal at all in the JVM setting. 
Thus it is  possible in some cases to prove that the execution of a sequence of in-
structions is deterministic even if it appears in two, non-identical sets of classfiles. 
However it is  only possible to prove this in  the~somewhat unlikely---situation in CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS  62 
CFS  10111  C  II 
cFs·IGJIIII  F  II 
s·  f 
Figure 3.10:  Two 'coinciding' class files 
CFS  10111  C  II 
cFs·11 
D  1111  F  Il 
s·  f 
Figure 3.11:  Classfiles containing same sequence at different points 
which the two sets of classfiles containing the same instructions, at the same point, 
in identically named methods inside identically named classes (Figure 3.10).  This 
is  a very limited result and leaves us unable to prove determinism for the more re-
alistic scenarios of Figures 3.11  and 3.12, where xs appears in two disparate sets of 
classfiles, or in two different classes in the same set of classfiles. 
3.5.2  Data-equality of States 
As we have seen in the previous section, it is not possible to talk meaningfully about 
deterministic  execution in terms of an entire JVM state.  Pusch's  formalization 
of the JVM aims to mirror as closely  as possible the 'real world'  in which  Java 
bytecode programs are executed.  Consequently, in Pusch's model of the JVM world 
instructions are not viewed in isolation as independent entities, but as part of the 
state itself.  Therefore, in order to discuss determinism in the accepted sense of the 
word, we  must define a different type of 'equality' for states. 
Two states are said to be dataequal  (~), if their exception options and the values of 
CFS \0  D 
s  f  s·  f 
Figure 3.12:  Two instances of a sequence in one set of classfiles CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 
the stack and local variables in the top frame of their frame stacks are equal: 
Definition 10 (Data-equality of states) 
(xp, hp,frs)  ~ (xp', hp',frs')  ==  xp = xp'  A 
stk frs  - stk frs'  A 
lac frs  =  loc frs' 
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Of course, this definition of data-equality is not the only possible one.  In a situation 
where we wish to compare two states within the execution of a single method- as will 
be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 in relation to while loops  it would be necessary 
only to exclude  the current  value  of the program counter from  the comparison. 
Equally, if we wished to talk about a situation involving the execution of instructions 
which reference the heap, this would have to become part of the definition of data-
equality.  And so it is apparent that there may be several equalities of this nature. 
For the purposes of this document, however, there are only two situations in which we 
will need to use the idea of data-equality.  First, in the proof of the determinism (in 
terms of data-equality) of two identical instruction sequences appearing in different 
places;  and second,  in  the comparison of two  states in  the execution of a  single 
method. 
Both cases  are involved  either directly,  or  indirectly,  with the calculation of the 
weakest precondition with respect to a sequence of instructions and a condition Q. 
As  will  be discussed in some detail in Chapters 4 and 5,  the instructions will  be 
restricted to classfile independent, non-branching instructions, and all instances of 
Q will be concerned only with the stack and local variables of the topmost frame. 
As there will be no alteration to the object fields or heap, the notion of data-equality 
given in Definition 10 is therefore sufficient for  the work described here. 
3.5.3  The Sequence Execution Relation 
In order to prove that if the initial states of two instances of the block execution 
relation are data-equal, then the final states will  also be data-equal, it would seem 
reasonable to proceed by induction on the block execution relation.  But while this 
approach succeeds for  the base case, the step case requires us to prove that if the 
initial cases of each block are data-equal, then the initial state of the second block 
and the state reached after one step of execution of the first block are also data-equal. 
Unfortunately,  this is  not necessarily the case.  For example,  consider the blocks 
s  ~ 
(CFS,ao) ----+  an and (CFS',ab) ----+  a~ where 
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CFS[s .. ·fl = CFS'[s' .. ·f'l  = XS,  ao  ~ ub  and exec (CFS,  uo) = al·  If the first 
instruction in xs pushes a value onto the stack, the length of the stack in state al, 
i.e.  the state reached after one step of execution of the first block,  will  be greater 
than the length of the stack in  a~, and so the states are not data-equal.  We  must 
therefore find another solution to the problem. 
One possibility is  to again abstract away  from  the contextual aspects of the state 
within a set of classfiles.  This results in  an inductively defined relation operating 
only on the elements of state involved in the definition of data-equality, the relevant 
instructions as a sequence in its own right, and a pointer into the current position 
within this sequence. 
One further restriction necessary to produce a truly 'context-independent' relation 
is to limit the instructions involved to only classfile independent instructions. These 
are instructions that do not reference additional information in the relevant classfile, 
such as whether or not it contains a particular class or method instance, and comprise 
the load and store instructions, opstack instructions, and all branching instructions. 
Suppose that 
•  xs is a list of bytecode instructions 
•  Uo  and an are of type minstate, a tuple consisting of an exception option, an 
operand stack, a list of local variables, and a program counter relative to the 
start of xs. 
We  write xs  f- ao ~  an if executing the sequence of instructions in xs in the state 
Uo  results in the state an, where the instruction identified by an is not contained in 
xs (where xs is non-empty). 
The function  execindep is  defined  as  a  partial function  using  Option types.  It 
returns the updated state according  to  the operational semantics for  all  opstack 
instructions, load and store instructions, and branching instructions, and the value 
None  for  all other instructions.  It follows  as  closely  as  possible the definition of 
exec in the underlying semantics, but with the omission of the 'exception handling' 
method of returning an empty list of frames if a state containing an exception is 
executed.  Here the result is  simply None- the result reached by exec  on  the next 
step of execution in any case. CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 
Definition 11 (Execute CFS independent instruction) 
execindep ([ ], (xp,frs»  = None 
execindep (xs, (None, (stk,loc, pc») =  case xs!pc of 
I  LAS  ins::} let (stk', loc', pc') =  execJas ins stk loc  pc  in 
Some  (None, (  stk', loc' , pc') ) 
ICO ins  ::}  None 
I  MO  ins  ::}  None 
I  MA  ins  ::}  None 
ICH  ins  ::}  None 
I  MI  ins  ::} None 
IMR ins  ::}  None 
lOS  ins  ::} let  (stk', pc')  =  execos ins stk pc  in 
Some (None, (stk',loc, pc'» 
ICBF ins::} let (stk', pc') = execcb_fwd ins  stk pc  in 
Some (None, (stk', loc, pc'») 
ICBB ins ::} let (stk', pc')  =  execcb_bwd ins stk pc  in 
Some (None, (stk',loc, pc'») 
IUBF ins ::} let  (pc')  =  execub_fwd ins pc  in 
Some (None, (stk,loc, pc') 
IUBB ins::} let  (pc')  = execub_bwd ins pc  in 
Some (None, (stk,loc, pc')) 
execindep (xs, (Some xp,frs»  =  None 
We  also define 
Definition 12 (Inlist) 
inlist xs  pc  ==  0 s pc  A  pc S «(length  xs) - 1) 
and 
Definition 13 (Outlist) 
outlist xs  pc  ==  (length xs) S pc 
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The sequence execution relation is then described by the following rules 
Definition 14 (Sequence Execution Relation) 
execindep(xs,  TO)  =  Tn; 
XS  =f.  [J; 
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inlist xs  pe(TO); 
outlist xs pe(  Tn) 
xs  I- TO  ~  Tn 
(Seq-Stop) 
execindep(xs,  TO) 
xs  =f.  []; 
inlist xs pe(  TO); 
XS  I- T1  ~  Tn 
xs  I- TO  ~  Tn 
(Seq-Continue) 
Using  these definitions,  we  arc  able to prove determinacy for  execindep and,  by 
induction, for  the sequence execution relation. 
Lemma 14 (Execute CFS independent function is deterministic) 
v xs sf  TO  Tn  T~. execindep(xs,  TO)  =  Some Tn  /\ 
execindep(xs, TO)  =  Some < 
I 
--+ Tn  =  Tn 
PROOF  By  exhaustion on  the instruction  at  pe(  TO)  and simplification  using  the 
definition of execindep (Definition 11).  • 
Theorem 2 (Sequence execution relation is deterministic) 
v xs sf  TO  Tn  T~. XS  I- TO  ~  Tn 
XS  I- TO  ~ < 
I 
--+ Tn  =  Tn 
PROOF  By  induction on the rules for  the sequence execution relation (Seq-Stop, 
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3.5.4  Determinism of Instruction Sequences with Data-equality 
Using the sequence execution relation described above, we are now able to prove the 
determinacy of a block of bytecode instructions, regardless of their location within 
a  set of classfiles.  We  begin  by  establishing the relationship  between  the block 
execution and sequence execution relations. 
Although in the above definition and the subsequent lemmas involving the sequence 
execution relation values of type minstate are denoted by the symbol T  for  ease of 
reading,  such variables of course represent a  4-tuple of the form  (xp, stk, loc, pc). 
Despite being stated in terms of a single state in the Isabelle proof scripts, Isabelle 
produces an induction theorem in  terms of the fully  expanded minstate.  This is 
useful  as  it makes it possible  to prove  by  induction lemmas concerned with the 
value of individual elements of a minstate (Figure 3.13). 
The definition of the block execution relation is similarly stated in terms of a single 
variable of type state of the form  (xp, hp,frame stack list).  In this case, however, 
Isabelle produces an induction theorem where the frame stack list is  a single,  un-
expanded variable (Figure 3.13).  This means that, unlike the case of the sequence 
execution relation, we are unable to use the induction theorem to prove statements 
involving individual parts of a frame stack, e.g., Lemma 21. 
This makes  it necessary to introduce a definition that is  equivalent  to the block 
execution definition but which explicitly mentions the individual parts of a frame 
stark.  This is  done by defining the frame stack list of any state as  two separate 
variables:  the topmost frame on the stack and a list containing the lower  frames. 
The production rules for this and the original block execution relation are shown in 
Figure 3.14 and the induction rule for the expanded version in Figure 3.15. 
It was proved that if two states are in the block execution relation with expanded 
syntax then they are also in the standard syntax block execution, allowing lemmas 
involving both the block execution relation and the sequence execution relation to 
be obtained.  But as the expanded relation is  essentially an artefact of the proof 
tool and not of any interest in  itself no further lemmas explicitly involving it will 
be discussed in this document.  Interested readers can examine the proofs on the 
attached CD. 
We now prove a number of lemmas involving the sequence execution relation, several 
of which use  the following  predicate on  lists as  defined  in  the standard Isabelle 
distribution 
Definition 15 (All elements in list have property P) 
lisLall  P  xs  ==  Vx. x E (set  xs) --- Px CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 
val exec_instrs.induct  = 
"[I  ?xi  1- (?xh,  ?xg,  ?xf,  ?xe)  -instrs-> ?xd,  ?xc,  ?xb,  ?xa; 
!!a aa ab  b  ac ad ae  ba xs. 
[I  execCFSindep  (X5,  a,  aa,  ab,  b)  R  Some  (ac,  ad,  ae,  ba);  xs  -- []; 
inlist xs  (snd  (a,  aa,  ab,  b»; 
outlist xs  (snd  (ac,  ad,  ae,  ba»  I] 
==>  ?P  xs  a  aa ab b  ac  ad ae ba; 
!!a aa ab b  ac ad ae  ba af ag ab bb  xs. 
[I  execCFS1ndep  (xs,  a,  aa,  ab,  b)  - Some  (af,  ag,  ab,  bb);  xs -. []; 
inlist xs  (snd  (a,  aa,  ab,  b»; 
xs  1- (af,  ag,  ab,  bb)  -instrs-> ac,  ad,  ae,  ba; 
?P  xs af  ag ab  bb  ac  ad ae  ba  I]  _.>  ?P  xs  a  aa  ab  b  ac  ad ae ba  I] 
-=>  ?P  ?xi ?xh ?xg  ?xf  ?xe  ?xd  ?xc  ?xb  ?xa"  :  thm 
val exec_block3.induct  = 
• [I  ?xo  (?m,  (?xm,  ?xl) , 
?xk)  (?xj,  (?xi,  ?xh),  ?xg)  1- (?xf,  ?xe,  ?xd)  -block-> ?xc,  ?xb, 
?xa; 
!!CFS  a  aa b  ab ac ba ad  ae  bb  bc af ag bd  be. 
[I  exec  (CFS,  a,  aa,  b)  - Some  (ab,  ac,  ba); 
inside  (third_of  (a,  aa,  b»  (af,  (ag,  bd),  be)  (ad,  (ae,  bb),  bc); 
pc_of  (ad,  (ae,  bb),  be) 
< length 
(get_code  CFS  (cn_of  (af,  (ag,  bd),  be» 
(ml_of  (af,  (ag,  bd),  be»); 
same_method_frs  (af,  (ag,  bd),  be)  (hd  (snd  (snd  (a,  aa,  b»» 
(hd  (snd  (snd  (ab,  ac,  ba»»  (ad,  (ae,  bb),  be); 
outside  (third_of  (ab,  ac,  ba»  (af,  (ag,  bd),  be) 
(ad,  (ae,  bb),  bc)  I] 
-=>  ?P  CFS  af  ag bd  be ad ae bb be  a  aa b  ab ac  ba; 
!!CFS  a  aa b  ab ac ba ad  ae bb  af  ag  bc  bd  ab a1  be bf. 
[I  exec  (CFS,  a,  aa,  b)  - Some  (ad,  ae,  bb); 
inside  (third_of  (a,  aa,  b»  (ab,  (ai, be),  bf)  (af,  (ag,  bc),  bd); 
pc_of  (af,  (ag,  bc),  bd) 
< length 
(get_code  CFS  (cn_of  (ab,  (ai, be),  bf» 
(ml_of  (ab,  (ai,  be), bf»); 
same_method_frs  (ab,  (ai,  be),  bf)  (hd  (and  (snd  (a,  aa, b»» 
(hd  (snd  (snd  (ad,  ae,  bb»»  (af,  (ag,  bc),  bd); 
CFS  (ab,  (ai,  be), 
bf)  (af,  (ag,  be),  bd)  1- (ad,  ae,  bb)  -block-> ab,  ac,  ba; 
?P  CFS  ab ai be  bf af ag  bc  bd  ad ae  bb  ab  ac ba  I] 
-=>  ?P  CFS  ab ai be  bf af ag  bc  bd  a  aa b  ab ac  ba  I] 
._>  ?P  ?xo ?m ?xm  ?xl ?xk  ?xj  ?xi  ?xh ?xg ?xf  ?xe  ?xd ?xc  ?xb  ?xa"  thm 
Figure 3.13:  Induction theorems for sequence and block execution relations 
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val exec_block3.Stop = 
"[I exec  (?CFS,  ?a)  =  Some  ?b;  inside  (third_of  ?a)  ?s  ?f; 
pc_of  ?f  < length  (get_code  ?CFS  (cn_of  ?s)  (ml_of  ?s»; 
same_method_frs  ?s  (hd  (snd  (snd ?a»)  (hd  (snd  (snd ?b») ?f; 
outside  (third_of  ?b)  ?s ?f  I]  ==>  ?CFS  ?s  ?f  1- ?a -block->  ?b"  thm 
val exec_block3.Continue = 
"[I  exec  (?CFS,  ?a)  =  Some  ?c;  inside  (third_of  ?a)  ?5  ?f; 
pc_of  ?f  <  length (get_code  ?CFS  (cn_of  ?s)  (ml_of  ?s»; 
same_method_frs  ?8  (hd  (snd  (snd ?a»)  (hd  (snd  (snd ?c») ?f; 
?CFS  ?s ?f  1- ?c  -block-> ?b  I] ==>  ?CFS  ?s  ?f  1- ?a  -block->  ?b"  thm 
val exec_blockO.Stop -
"[I exec  (?CFS,  ?xp,  ?hp,  (?stk,  ?loc,  ?cn,  (?mn,  ?pd),  ?pc)  #  ?frs)  a 
Some  (?xp',  ?hp',  (?stk', ?loc', ?cn',  (?mn',  ?pd'),  ?pc')  #  ?frs'); 
inside  «?stk, ?loc,  ?cn,  (?mn,  ?pd),  ?pc)  #  ?frs) 
(?cnS,  (?mnS,  ?pdS),  ?pcS)  (?cnF,  (?mnF,  ?pdF) ,  ?pcF); 
?pcF  < length  (get_code  ?CFS  ?cnS  (?mnS,  ?pdS»; 
same_method_frs  (?cnS,  (?mnS,  ?pdS) ,  ?pcS) 
(?stk,  ?loc,  ?cn,  (?mn,  ?pd),  ?pc) 
(?stk',  ?loc',  ?cn',  (?mn',  ?pd'),  ?pc')  (?cnF,  (?mnF,  ?pdF) ,  ?pcF); 
outside  «?stk',  ?loc',  ?cn',  (?mn',  ?pd'),  ?pc')  #  ?frs') 
(?cnS,  (?mnS,  ?pdS),  ?pcS)  (?cnF,  (?mnF,  ?pdF) ,  ?pcF)  I] 
a=>  (?CFS,  (?cnS,  (?mnS,  ?pdS),  ?pcS),  (?cnF,  (?mnF,  ?pdF),  ?pcF) , 
(?xp,  ?hp,  ?stk,  ?loc,  ?cn,  (?mn,  ?pd),  ?pc), 
(?xp',  ?hp'.  ?'stk',  ?loc',  ?cn',  (?mn',  ?pd
J
),  ?pc
J
), ?frs, ?frs') 
exec_blockO"  :  thm 
val  exec_blockO.Continue = 
"[I exec  (?CFS,  ?xp,  ?hp,  (?stk,  ?loc,  ?cn,  (?mn,  ?pd),  ?pc)  #  ?frs)  ~ 
Some 
(?xp",  ?hp",  (?stk", ?loc", ?cn",  (?mn",  ?pd"),  ?pc")  #  ?frs"); 
ins1de  «?stk,  ?loc,  ?cn,  (?mn,  ?pd),  ?pc)  #  ?frs) 
(?cnS,  (?mnS,  ?pdS),  ?pcS)  (?cnF,  (?mnF,  ?pdF) ,  ?pcF); 
?pcF  < length  (get_code  ?CFS  ?cnS  (?mnS,  ?pdS»; 
same_method_frs  (?cnS,  (?mnS,  ?pdS) ,  ?pcS) 
(?stk,  ?loc,  ?cn,  (?mn,  ?pd),  ?pc) 
(?stk", ?loc", ?cn",  (?mn",  ?pd"), ?pc") 
(?cnF,  (?mnF,  ?pdF),  ?pcF); 
(?CFS,  (?cnS,  (?mnS,  ?pdS),  ?pcS),  (?cnF,  (?mnF,  ?pdF),  ?pcF) , 
(?xp",  ?hp",  ?'stk",  ?loc",  ?'cn",  (?mn",  ?pd"),  ?pc"), 
(?xp',  ?hp',  ?stk', ?loc', ?cn',  (?mn',  ?pd'),  ?pc'), ?frs", ?frs') 
:  exec_blockO  I] 
_a>  (?CFS,  (?cnS,  (?mnS,  ?pdS),  ?pcS),  (?cnF,  (?mnF,  ?pdF) ,  ?pcF) , 
(?xp,  ?hp,  ?stk,  ?loc,  ?cn,  (?mn,  ?pd),  ?pc) , 
(?xp',  ?hp'.  ?stk',  ?loc',  ?cn',  (?mn',  ?pd'),  ?pc J )  J  ?frs, 7frs') 
:  exec_blockO"  :  thm 
Figure 3.14:  Production rules for block execution relations 
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val exec_blockO.induct  & 
• [I  (1ya,  (1xz,  (1xy,  1xx),  1xv) ,  (1xv,  (1xu,  1xt),  1xs), 
(1xr,  1xq,  1xp,  1xo,  1xn,  (1xm,  1xl), 1xk), 
(1xj,  1xi,  1xh,  1xg,  1xf,  (1xe,  1xd),  1xc),  1xb,  1xa)  :  exec_blockO; 
!!eFS cn cn'  cnF  cnS  frs frs'  hp  hp'  loc loc'  mn  mn'  mnF  mnS  pc  pc'  pcF 
pcS  pd  pd'  pdf pdS stk stk'  xp  xp'. 
[I  exec  (eFS,  xp,  hp,  (stk,  loc,  cn,  (mn,  pd),  pc)  #  frs)  = 
Some  (xp', hp',  (stk', loc', cn',  (mn',  pd'), pc')  #  frs'); 
inside «stk,  loc,  cn,  (mn,  pd),  pc)  #  frs)  (cnS,  (mnS,  pdS),  pcS) 
(cnF,  (mnF,  pdf),  pcF); 
pcF  <  length  (get_code eFS  cnS  (mnS,  pdS»; 
same_method_frs  (cnS,  (mnS,  pdS) ,  pcS)  (stk,  loc,  cn,  (mn,  pd),  pc) 
(stk', loc',  cn',  (mn',  pd'),  pc')  (cnF,  (mnF,  pdF),  pcF); 
outside  «stk', loc', cn',  (mn',  pd'), pc')  #  frs') 
(cnS,  (mnS,  pdS),  pcS)  (cnF,  (mnF,  pdf),  pcF)  I] 
==>  1P  CFS  cnS  mnS  pdS  pcS  cnF  mnF  pdf pcF  xp  hp  stk loc  cn  mn  pd  pc 
xp'  hp'  stk'  loc'  cn'  mn'  pd'  pc'  frs frs'; 
!!CFS  cn cn'  cn"  cnF  cnS  frs frs'  frs"  hp  hp'  hp"  loc loc'  loc"  mn 
mn'  mn"  mnF  mnS  pc  pc'  pc"  pcF  pcS  pd pd'  pd"  pdF  pdS  stk stk' 
stk"  xp  xp'  xp". 
[I  exec  (eFS,  xp,  hp,  (stk,  loc,  cn,  (mn,  pd),  pc)  #  frs)  '" 
Some 
(xp' ,  I  hp' J  I  (stk') ,  loc J J,  cn  J  "  (mn J  "  pd' , ),  pc» J)  •  frs' , ) ; 
inside «stk, loc,  cn,  (mn,  pd),  pc)  #  frs)  (cnS,  (mnS,  pdS),  pcS) 
(cnF,  (mnF,  pdf),  pcF); 
pcF  < length  (get_code eFS  cnS  (mnS,  pdS»; 
same_method_frs  (cnS,  (mnS,  pdS),  pcS)  (stk,  loc,  cn,  (mn,  pd),  pc) 
(stk", loc", cn",  (mn", pd"), pc")  (cnF,  (mnF,  pdf),  pcF); 
(CFS,  (cnS,  (mnS,  pdS),  pcS) ,  (cnF,  (mnF,  pdf),  pcF), 
(xp",  hpJ',  stk",  loc",  cn",  (mn", pd"), pc"), 
(xp',  hp', stk', loc',  cn',  (mn',  pd'), pc'), frs", frs') 
:  exec_blockO; 
1P  CFS  cnS  mnS  pdS  pcS  cnF  mnF  pdf pcF xp" hp" stk" loc" cn" 
mn' ,  pd"  pc"  xp'  hp'  stk'  loc'  cn'  am'  pdt  pc'  frs"  frs'  I] 
="'>  1P  CFS  cnS  mnS  pdS  pcS  cnF  mnF  pdf pcF xp  hp stk loc  cn  mn  pd  pc 
xp'  hp'  stk'  loc'  cn'  mn'  pd'  pc'  frs frs'  I] 
==>  1P  1ya ?xz  ?xy 1xx 1xv 1xv ?xu  1xt 1xs ?xr 1xq ?xp  1xo  1xn  ?xm  1x1  ?xk 
1xj 1xi 1xh 1xg 1xf  ?xe  ?xd  ?xc  1xb  ?xa"  :  thin 
Figure 3.15:  Induction theorem for expanded syntax block execution relation 
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In the following  lemmas involving the sequence execution relation full  states are 
abbreviated by a  and minstates by T  in the statement of the lemma, followed  by 
expanded versions signified by 'where'. CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 
Lemma 15 (Full state execution implies minstate execution) 
where 
\;/  CFS s I  (To  (TnTO  Tn  XS. exec(CFS,(To)  =  Some (Tn  1\ 
I  isLa  II  CFSjndep xs  1\ 
lisLall  nOLbranch  xs  1\ 
XPo  =  None  1\ 
CFS[s ... fl  =  xs  1\ 
pc( s) ::;  pc(J)  1\ 
pc(J) < length  (geLcode)  CFS s) 
--+ execindep (xs,  TO)  =  Some Tn 
(TO  (XPo,  hpo,  (stko, loco, cno, mlo, pco)  : frso) 
(Tn  (XPn,  hpn,  (stkn, locn, cnn, mln, PCn)  : frsn) 
TO  =  (XPo, stko, loco, (pco  - pC(S))) 
Tn  (XPn, stkn, locn, (pcn - pc(s))) 
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PROOF  By case analysis of the instruction at (pc(s) - pc(s)), followed by simplifica-
tion with the definition of execindep (Definition 11)  and the operational semantics 
of JVM execution.  Note that this instruction is the instruction at pCo  in the original 
code, and pco  - pc(s) in the block xs, e.g.  if pCo  =  pc(s), the instruction would 
be the first instruction in xs.  • 
Lemma 16 (Minstate execution implies full state execution) 
\;/  CFS sf  (To  (TnTO  Tn  XS.  execindep (XS,  TO)  =  Some Tn  1\ 
lisLall  CFSjndep xs  1\ 
lisLall  nOLbranch  xs  1\ 
XPo  =  None  1\ 
CFS[s ...  fl  =  xs  1\ 
pC( s) ::;  pC(J)  1\ 
PC(J)  < length  (geLcode CFS s)  --+ 
\;/  hp Irs. exec( CFS, (To)  =  Some (Tn CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS  72 
where 
ao  =  (XPo,  hpo,  (stko, loco, cno, mlo, pees) + pco) : frso) 
an  - (XPn,  hpo,  (stkn, locn, cno, mlo, pees) + PCn)  : frsn) 
TO  =  (XPo, stko, loco, pCO) 
Tn  =  (  XPn, stkn, [OCn, pCn) 
PROOF  By case analysis of the instruction at pees), followed by simplification with 
the definition of execindep (Definition 11)  and the operational semantics of JVM 
execution.  _ 
Lemma 17 (Inlist implies inside) 
where 
\rI  CFS sf  ao  anTO  Tn  XS.  XS  i= []  1\  xs =  CFS[s ...  f]  1\ 
inlist xs  pCO  1\ 
pe(J)  <  (length (geLcode CFS s)) 
----+ inside pc(ao) sf 
ao  (XPo, hpo, (stko, loco, cno, mlo, pco +  pees»~ : frso) 
TO  - (XPo, stko, loco,pco) 
PROOF  From  the  definitions  of  inlist  (Definition  12),  inside  (Definition  1),  and 
CFS[s ...  f]  (Definition 5).  _ 
Lemma 18 (Inside implies inlist) 
where 
'if  CFS sf  ao  anTO  Tn  XS.  XS  i= []  1\  xs =  CFS[s ...  f]  1\ 
inside  pe(ao)  s f  1\ 
pe(J)  <  (length  (geLcode CFS  s») 
----+ inlist xs  TO 
ao  =  (XPo, hpo, (stko, loco, cno, mlo, pco)  : frso) 
To  =  (XPo,stko,loco,pco -pe(s» 
PROOF  From  the definitions  of inlist  (Definition  12)  ,  inside  (Definition  1),  and 
CFS[s ... f]  (Definition 5).  _ CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 
Lemma 19 (Outlist implies outside) 
where 
V CFS sf  Uo  UnTO  Tn  XS.  XS  =1=  [1  /\  xs =  CFS[s ...  J]  /\ 
outlist xs  TO  /\ 
PC(J)  <  (length (geLcode CFS s)) 
~  outside pc(  U  0)  s f 
Uo  (XPo, hpo, (stko, loco, cno, mlo, pco + pc( s)) : frso) 
TO  (XPo, stko, loco, pco) 
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PROOF  From the definitions of outlist  (Definition 13), outside  (Definition 2),  and 
CFS[s .. . fl  (Definition 5).  • 
Lemma 20 (Outside implies outlist ) 
V CFS sf  Uo  UnTO  Tn  XS.  (CFS,uo) ~  Un  ~ 
f 
where 
inside pc(  U  0)  s f  /\ 
excep_free xs  /\ 
CFS[s ...  fl  = xs  /\ 
lisLall  CFSjndep xs  /\ 
lisLall  nOLbranch  xs  /\ 
pc(J)  <  (length  (geLcode CFS  s))  1\ 
outside PC(<Tn)  S f 
~  outlist xs  Tn 
U  0  =  (XPO, hpo, (stko, loco, cno, mIo, pco)  : frso) 
<Tn  =  (XPn, hpn, (stkn' locn, cnn, mIn, PCn)  : frso} 
Tn  =  (XPn, stkn, locn,pcn - pC(S)) 
PROOF  In addition to the definitions of outlist (Definition 13), outside (Definition 2), 
and CFS[s ... J]  (Definition 5), we need the additional assumptions (CFS, uo) ~ 
f 
<Tn  and I  isLa  II  nOLbranch IS, which allow us to show that PC(<Tn)  =  pc(J) + 1. CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS  74 
This is necessary since  all  program counters are defined  as  natural numbers and, 
while  IS  may have instructions on the left  as part of a larger list of instructions 
in a dassfile,  we  cannot refer  to positions to the left of the head of the list  IS in 
isolation.  _ 
Lemma 21  (Block execution implies sequence execution ) 
V CFS sf  ao  anTO  Tn  I  IS.  (CFS,ao) ~  an  ----+ 
I 
where 
CFS[s ... fl  =  IS A 
lisLall CFSjndep IS  A 
lisLall  not-branch  IS  A 
excep_free  IS  ----+ 
IS  f- TO  ~  Tn 
ao  - (XPO,  hpo,  (stko, loco, cno, mlo,pco) : frso) 
an  (XPn,  hpn,  (stkn, locn, cnn, mLn, PCn)  : frsn) 
TO  =  (XPo, stko, loco, (pco  - pC(S))) 
Tn  (XPn, stkn, locn, (pcn - pc(s))) 
PROOF  Under the condition that the initial states in the block are data-equal and 
are pointing to the same  instruction within  the block  of instructions,  the proof 
proceeds by rule induction on the assumption 
(CFS,ao)~ a'. 
I 
Base 
The base case deals  with the case  in  which our initial assumption was  produced 
by one application of the Stop rule for  the block execution relation, giving us  the 
assumption 
exec ( CFS, (To)  =  Some an  A 
inside pc(ao) sf A 
same_method  s  (To  (Tn f  A 
PC(j)  < length(get-code CFS s) A 
outside pc(an )  sf 
(3.21) 
from  this assumption, the first  production rule for  the sequence execution relation 
Seq-Stop, and Lemmas 15, 18 and 20,  we are able to show the desired conclusion. CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS  75 
Inductive step 
The inductive step deals with the case in which our initial assumption was produced 
by one application of the second production rule for  the block execution relation 
(Continue), giving us 
exee( CFS, ao) =  Some al f\ 
inside pe(ao) sf f\ 
same_method s  ao  aJ  f  f\ 
pe(J) < length(geLeode CFS s) f\ 
The inductive hypothesis is 
where 
CFS[s ... fl  =  xs  f\ 
lisLall CFSjndep xs  f\ 
lisLall  nOLbraneh  xs  f\ 
excep_free xs  ---+ 
xs  f- Tl  ~  Tn 
al  - (XP1,  hpJ,  (stkll locJ,cnJ,mlJ,pcd :frsJ) 
Tl  (xPl,stkJ,locJ,(pcJ-pc(s))) 
(3.22) 
(3.23) 
Thus, from  the rule Seq-Continue and Lemmas  15  and 18,  we  are able to show 
the desired conclusion.  _ 
Lemma 22 (Sequence execution implies block execution) 
wedgeV  CFS sf  TO  Tn  X  XS. 
xs  f- TO  ~  Tn  ---+ 
CFS[s .. . fJ  =  xs  f\ 
pe(!) < length(geLeode CFS S)  f\ 
pe(  s )  ::;  pC(J)  f\ 
lisLall CFSjndep xs  f\ 
lisLall  nOLbraneh xs  f\ 
lisLall excep_freejnstr xs  ---+ 
V hp frs.  (CFS,ao) ~  an 
f CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 
where 
ao  - (XPo,  hpo,  (stko, loco, cno, mlo, pc(s) + pco)  : frso) 
an  =  (XPn,  hpo,  (stkn, [ocn, cno, mlo, pc(s) +  PCn)  : frso) 
TO  (XPo,stko,loco,pc(S)) 
Tn  (XPn, stkn, loen, PCn) 
PROOF  By rule induction on the assumption xs I- TO ~  Tn. 
Base 
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The base case deals with the case in  which  our initial assumption was  produced 
by one application of the first production rule for  the sequence execution relation 
(Seq-Stop), giving us 
execindep (xs, TO)  =  Some Tn  /\ 
xs;f[]/\ 
inlist  pC( TO)  /\ 
outlist pC( Tn) 
(3.24) 
Thus, from the Stop rule for the block execution relation, and Lemmas 16,  17 and 
19 we are able to show the desired conclusion. 
Inductive step 
The inductive step deals with the case in which our initial assumption was produced 
by one application of the second production rule for the sequence execution relation 
(Seq-Continue), giving us the assumption 
execindep (xs, TO)  = Some  T1  /\ 
xs;f []/\ 
inlist  pC( TO)  /\ 
xs I- T1  ~  Tn 
The inductive hypothesis is 
CFS[s ...  f]  =  xs  /\ 
pC(J) < length(geLcode CFS S)  /\ 
pC( s )  :s  pC(J)  /\ 
lisLall  CFSjndep xs  /\ 
lisLall  nOLbranch  xs  /\ 
lisLall excep_freejnstr xs  ~ 
V hp frs.  (CFS,a1) ~  an 
f 
(3.25) 
(3.26) CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 
where 
:I hpofrso.al  (XP1,  hpo,  (stkl,locl,cno,mlo,pc(S)+pcl):frso) 
:I hpo  frso.  an  - (XPn,  hpo,  (stkm  locn, cno, mio, pc(s) + PCn)  : frso) 
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We  instantiate hp  and frs  in  3.26  to hpo  and frso  (as  in  0"0)  and  then,  by  the 
Continue rule for the sequence execution relation and Lemmas 16 and 17,  we are 
able to show the desired conclusion.  _ 
Theorem 3  (Block execution deterministic for data-equal states) 
V CFS  CFS' sf s' J'  ao  an  a~ a~ IS. 
where 
CFS[s .. ·fl  = IS  /\  CFS'[s' .. ·J'l  = IS 
list-all CFSjndep IS  /\ 
list-all  not-branch IS  /\ 
excep_free IS  /\ 
pco  - pc(s) =  pc~ - pc(s') /\ 
(CFS,ao) ~  an  /\ 
f 
(CFS', a~) ~  a~ /\ 
f' 
rv  , 
ao  =  ao 
~  an  ~ a~ 
0"0  (XPo, hpo, (stko, loco, cno, mIo,pco) : frso) 
an  (XPn, hpn, (stkn, locn, cnn, mIn, PCn)  : frsn) 
a~  - (xp~,  hp~,  (stk~, loc~, cn~,  ml~,  pc~) :  frs~) 
O"~  (xp~,  hp~,  (stk~, loc~, cn~,  ml~,  pc~) : frs~) 
PROOF  From Lemma 21, 
where 
TO  - (XPo, stko, loco, (pco  - pC(S») 
Tn  (XPn,stkn, locn, (pCn - pC(S») 
(3.27) CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 
and 
where 
(CFS'  (T')  ~ 
,0  f' 
, 
(Tn  --+ XS 
, 
TO 
T'  n 
(xp~,  stk~, loc~, (pC~ - pC(S'»)) 
(xp~,  stk~, loc~, (pC~ - pC( S'») 
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(3.28) 
By the fact that the states (To  and (Tb  are data-equal (Definition 10)  we  now  have 
from  (3.27) and (3.28) 
, 
TO  =  TO 
This gives us 
xs  I- TO  ~  Tn 1\  XS  I- TO  ~  < 
and so by Theorem 2 
which, from  the definition of data-equal (10), gives  llS 
as required. 
Lemma 23 (Extend CFS independent execution to the right) 
where 
'if xs  ys  TO  Tn. execindep (xs,  TO)  =  Some  Tn  1\ 
inlist xs  TO  1\  xs  =I- [1 
--+ execindep (xs@ys,  TO)  =  Tn 
TO  =  (XPo,stko,loco,pco) 
Tn  (XPn, stkn, locn, PCn) 
(3.29) 
(3.30) 
(3.31) 
(3.32) 
-
PROOF  By case analysis of the instruction at pco,  followed  by simplification with 
the definition of execindep (Definition 11)  and the operational semantics of JVM 
execution.  _ CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS 
Lemma 24 (Extend CFS independent execution to the left ) 
Vxs  ys  TO  Tn·  execindep (ys,  TO)  =  Some Tn  /\ 
where 
nOLbraneh  YS!pCO  /\ 
inlist xs  TO  /\  xs  =I  [1  /\  ys  =1=  [1 
~  execindep (xs@ys,  TO)  =  Some Tn 
TO  =  (XPO, stko, loco, pco + IXS\) 
Tn  =  (XPn, stkn, locn, PCn + Ixs\) 
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PROOF  By case  analysis of the instruction at peo,  followed  by simplification with 
the definition of execindep (Definition  11)  and the operational semantics of JVM 
execution.  _ 
Lemma 25 (Extend instance of sequence execution relation to left ) 
xs  r  (XPo, stko, loco, pco) ~  (xPn, stkn, Zocn, PCn)  ~ 
lisLall  CFSjndep xs  ~ 
lisLall  nOLbraneh  xs  ~ 
ys@xs  r  (xpo, stko, loco, pco  +  Iys\) ~  (xPn, stkn, locn, PCn  +  lysl) 
PROOF  By rule induction on the sequence execution relation and by the construc-
tion rules  for  the sequence execution relation  (Seq-Stop,  Seq-Continue), and 
Lemma 24.  _ 
Lemma 26 (Combine two instances of sequence execution relation ) 
xs  r  (XPo, stko, loco, pea) ~  (XP1, stkl, Zoel, pel)  ~ 
xs  =1=  [1 ~ 
lisLall  CFSjndep xs  ~ 
lisLall  nOLbraneh  xs  ~ 
ys  r  (XP1, stkl , loel, 0) ~  (xPn, stkn, loen, PCn)  ~ 
xs@ys  r  (XPo, stko, loco, pea) ~  (XPn, stkn, loen, pen  +  Iysl) 
PROOF  By rule induction on the sequence execution relation, and by the construc-
tion rules for  the sequence execution relation 
(Seq-Stop, Seq-Continue) and Lemma 25,  using the fact that since none of the 
instructions in xs  are branching instructions, pc!  =  Iysl.  This means that in execu-
tion of the sequence xs@ys, execution of xs finishes and leaves the program counter 
pointing to the first instruction in  ys.  _ CHAPTER 3.  BYTECODE EXECUTION RELATIONS  80 
3.6  Conclusions 
Having extended the instruction set formalized by Pusch to include arithmetic in-
structions, and modified the model of branching instructions to facilitate proofs of 
concrete values, we  now have sufficient relations describing execut.ion  t.o  develop a 
programming logic for bytecode described in the next chapter. It has been demon-
strated that while a simple execution relation defined by entry and exit from a block 
of code is enough to base much of our programming logic on, it does have several 
limiting features. 
Firstly, it does not allow us to reason about intermediate states in the execution of 
a block.  Often in the proofs outlined in Chapters 4 and 5 we wish to say something 
about the final  state in the execution of a  block.  As  the value of this state will 
usually depend on the result  of execution of some  state between the initial  and 
final  states, the execution path relation becomes necessary.  Additionally, the idea 
of deterministic execution of instructions is complicated by the fact that bytecodes 
are seen not as separate entities, but as part of a classfile.  Either we could define a 
concept of determinism that includes the context of the instruction, or as we  have 
done here retain the accepted definition of determinism, but with a restricted class 
of instructions, a.s  in the sequence execution relation. 
These considerations, and others that will be addressed in the coming chapters, raise 
the question once more as to whether it is really desirable to reason about code at 
this level.  This is open to debate, but the fact remains that as the current situation 
for  both Java and new platforms such as Microsoft's .NET [31]  is based on a stack 
machine model running bytecode or similar, considering these questions and finding 
solutions is of definit.e value. Chapter 4 
A  Bytecode Programming Logic 
Having defined execution relations for byt.ecode programs, we now define a pre- and 
post-condition relation for  the execution of such programs.  Traditionally,  such  a 
relat.ion  is  defined  in terms of t.he  various syntact.ic patterns of t.he  programming 
language in question.  As bytecode programs are fiat,  no such patterns are explicit. 
in the code and we must therefore determine what constitutes, for  example, a loop 
or a conditional statement. 
It is  at this point that we  must address again the question raised in Section 3.3: 
what do we mean by the execution of a sequence of bytecode? None of the relations 
discussed so far place any particular restraints on the position of the program counter 
of the initial state within the block.  But, while one could potentially begin execution 
of a sequence of instructions at any of a number of points in the sequence, the final 
state would be dependent on which instructions in the sequence had actually been 
executed. 
For example, execution of the instructions 
bipush 5 
bipush 4 
iadd 
bipush 2 
could lead to a type-safe execution beginning at either the first  instruction, or at 
the last.  In the first  case,  the value of the stack in  the final  state would  be 2  :: 
9  ::  iniLstk, in  the second  it would  be 2  ::  iniLstk.  Consequently the weakest 
precondition with respect to a particular condition for  any list of instructions will 
be entirely dependent on which of these instructions are actually executed. 
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Clearly then, a meaningful weakest precondition definition for  bytccode must iden-
tify the initial position of the program counter, and it seems reasonable to decide 
that execution should start at the first  instruction in  t.he  list.  This problem does 
not  arise in standard programming logics  as  one cannot  start execution midway 
through a command in the language.  Even in commands built up inductively from 
other commands, it is implicit that execution starts at the beginning of the topmost 
command, and not at one of the inner subcommands. 
4.1  A Pre- and Post-Condition Relation 
for Execution of Bytecode 
We write {P}  xs {Q} to mean that for all classfiles CFS containing the instruction 
sequence xs bounded by the instructions identified by sand f, if the condition P 
holds in state ao  and (CFS,  ao) ~  an,  then condition Q holds in state an.  The 
f 
definition is given by cases on whether or not xs is empty. 
Definition 16 (Pre-/Post-condition relation for bytecode) 
{P}x:xs{Q}=  'V  CFS ao  an  sf. [(CFS,ao) ~  an  1\ 
f 
CFS[s ...  f]  =  x:xs  1\  pc(ao) = pc(s) 1\ 
P(ao)]  ---+ Q(an ) 
(4.1) 
(4.2) 
Note  that logical  operations  are defined  pointwise,  i.e.  the assertion {P  1\  S} 
applied to state a is taken to mean P a  1\  Sa. 
4.2  Rules 
We  present a collection of derived rules for  simple bytecode patterns.  Proofs for 
loops  and conditional statements will  be dealt with  later in  this chapter and in 
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Lemma 27 (Precondition strengthening) 
(''l/ao.  P ao  ---+ R ao)  1\  {R} xs {Q} ::=} {P} xs {Q} 
PROOF  From Definition 16 and induction on the list of instructions xs.  _ 
Lemma 28 (Postcondition weakening) 
(\;fao.  R ao  ---+ Q ao)  1\  {P} xs {R} ::=} {P} xs {Q} 
PROOF  From Definition 16 and induction on the list of instructions xs.  _ 
We  now  define  a  block  of instructions,  execution  of which  always  results  in  the 
program counter pointing to the instruction following that block.  This describes the 
idea of sequential execution of blocks of instructions, e.g.,  x  immediately followed 
by ys. 
Definition 17 (Simple Block) 
simple xs  =  \;fCFS ao  an sf· xs  =  CFS[s ...  f]  1\  inside ao sf  1\ 
exec( CFS,  ao) = Some an  ---+ 
inside an sf V  pc(an )  =  pc(J) + 1 
Note that a simple block may contain an internal loop provided this does not prevent 
the block meeting the requirements of the simple definition. 
Lemma 29 (Splitting a  slice of instructions) 
\;f  a  b xs  ys  zs.  xs  =1=  []  1\  ys  =1=  []  1\  a < b  1\ 
b < Izsl  1\  xs@ys  =  slice a  b zs  ---+ 
xs  =  slice a  ((a + Ixs!)  - 1)  zs  1\ 
ys  =  slice (a + Ixs!)  b zs 
PROOF  From definition of slice  (Definition 6)  and standard lemmas for  take and 
drop in the Isabelle distribution.  _ CHAPTER 4.  A BYTECODE PROGRAMMING LOGIC 
Lemma 30 (Existence of two simple blocks) 
where 
\;fCFS  ao  al an sf. (CFS, ao) -1  an 
1\  CFS  [s ...  fl  =  xs@ys  1\ 
simple xs  1\  simple ys  ---t 
3al.(CFS,ao} ~  al  1\  (CFS,al) ~  an 
y  f 
m = s{pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl- I} 
n = s{pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl} 
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PROOF  From Lemma 9 we show the existence of an instance of the execution path 
relation corresponding to the relation  (CFS, ao)  ~  an.  We  then carry out in-
f 
duction on this relation using one of the standard Isabelle induction theorems con-
verse_trancUnduct,  which  'unrolls'  the transitive closure  relation from  the start. 
This in conjunction with the definition of simple (Definition 17), gives us 
3 al. (CFS,  ao)  ==*+ al  1\  (CFS,  (1)  ==*+ an 
y  f 
1\  pc(a1)  =  pc(s) + Ixsl 
Similar treatment of the second conjunct in 4.3 then gives us 
and from 4.3, 4.4 and Lemma 10 we have the desired result. 
Theorem 4  (Sequencing Rule) 
{P} xs  {R} 
{R} ys  {Q} 
simple xs 
simple  ys 
{P} xs@ys  {Q} 
PROOF This follows  from Definition 16 and Lemmas 29 and 30. 
(4.3) 
(  4.4) 
• 
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We  now  describe  the lemmas necessary for  the proof of a  rule for  unconditional 
branches forwards. 
Lemma 31 (Narrowing of block containing a simple block) 
where 
V (To  (Tn  CFS sf. (CFS,(To) ~  (Tn  /\ 
f 
CFS[s ...  J]  =  xs@ys  /\ 
xs  =1=  []  /\  ys  =1=  [] /\ 
simple ys  /\ 
pe((To)  = pees)  + Ixsl + 1 
~  (CFS,(To) ~  (Tn 
f 
y = s{pe:= pees) + Ixsl + I} 
PROOF  This follows  from the fact that the instructions ys make up a simple block 
(Definition 17), the execution of which can only result in a state where the program 
counter is  pointing inside the block or at the instruction immediately to the right 
of it.  Under these circumstances, once execution reaches the beginning of ys (or if 
it begins there) the instructions in xs will not be executed again within this block. 
By induction on  the block execution  relation followed  by  use  of its construction 
rules, we are able to demonstrate the existence of the smaller block as the program 
counter will always be inside this smaller block during execution.  _ 
Lemma 32 (Elimination of unconditional branch forward) 
V (To  (Tn  CFS sf· (CFS, (To)  ~  (Tn  /\ 
f 
CFS[s ...  f]  =  [Goto_fwd  (jxsl+l)]@xs@ys  /\ 
xs  i=  []  /\  ys  =1=  []/\ 
simple xs  /\  simple ys  ~ 
3 (Tl.  (CFS, (To)  ~  (Tl  /\  (CFS, (Tl)  ~  (Tn 
s  f 
where 
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PROOF By induction on the block execution relation, and the operational semantics 
of the JVM, we are able to show that 
:3  0"1· exec( CFS, 0"0)  =  Some 0"1  " 
PC(0"1)  =  pc(s) + Ixsl + 1  "  (4.5) 
(CFS'O"l)~ O"n 
f 
Then by Lemma 31, we can show that this implies the existence of a smaller instance 
of the block execution relation involving 0"1  and O"n. 
Note that as xs  and ys  are simple, execution will never return to the unconditional 
branch forward instruction from the block xs@ys.  • 
Theorem 5  (Unconditional branch forward rule) 
{P} [Goto_fwd  Ixsl + 1]  {R} 
{R}ys{Q} 
xs  =J  [I 
ys  =J  [I 
excep_free  [Goto_fwd  Ixsl + l]@(xs@ys) 
simple  xs 
simple  ys 
{P}  [Goto_fwd  Ixsl + l]@(xs@ys)  {Q} 
PROOF  This follows from Definition 16 and Lemmas 32  and 31. 
4.3  A  Rule for Loops in Bytecode 
Unlike the simple imperative language used in the standard Hoare logic which con-
tains the while command,  there are no explicit loop constructs in  bytecode pro-
grams.  In order to develop rules for  programs containing loops it is  therefore nec-
essary to identify the patterns of bytecode instructions that are used to code them. 
Of course,  Java programs may contain loops other than while loops-- namely for 
loops and repeat-until loops.  For the purposes of this work,  however,  we  shall 
restrict our attention to while loops. 
Consider the following very simple Java program that repeatedly increments a vari-
able i CHAPTER 4.  A BYTECODE PROGRAMMING LOGIC 
public class SimpleWhile { 
public static void  main(String args[]) 
{ 
} 
} 
int i=O; 
while  (i<5) 
{  i++;  } 
the corresponding bytecode for this program is 
o bipush 0 
1  istore_l 
2  goto  8 
5  iine  1  1 
8  iload_1 
9  ieonst_5 
10  iCicmplt 5 
13  return 
where the instructions 
o bipush 0 
1  istore_l 
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initialize the variable i to 0, by pushing the constant value 0 onto the stack and then 
storing it in variable location 1.  The return instruction simply returns at the end 
of the method, and so the loop itself consists of the instructions 
2  goto  8 
5  iine  1  1 
8  iload_1 
9  iconst_5 
10  if  _icmplt  5 
where 
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is the body of the loop, incrementing the value in variable location 1, that is,  i. The 
instructions 
8  iload_1 
9  iconst_5 
load the value of i  and the constant value 5 on to the stack, ready for  the actual 
branching instruction 
10  iCicmplt  5 
Here,  if the second value on the stack is less than 5,  the program counter is set to 
the instruction labelled 5 ready to execute the body of the loop again, otherwise the 
loop exits. The instruction 
2  goto  8 
is  only executed  once---~at the beginning of the loop- and ensures that the guard 
condition is tested before the body is  executed, thereby making this a while loop 
rather than a repeat-until loop. 
A diagram showing the outline of this loop can be seen  in  Figure 4.1,  where xs 
represents the instructions making up the body of the loop, and ys the instructions 
used to prepare the stack for  the conditional branch.  A general representation of 
such a loop may now be written 
[(UBF Ixsl  + 1)]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB Ixs@ysl)]  (4.6) 
where UBF Ixsl  + 1 is the unconditional branch forward instruction to the head of 
ys· a jump of one more than the length of xs, and CBB  Ixs@ysl  is the conditional 
branch backwards to the start of xs-a jump of the length of xs@ys. 
While other possible loop forms exist . one is shown in Figure 4.2  we shall discuss 
only  the type described  above  in  this work.  Treatment of the alternative forms 
would, however, be similar. 
The notation UBF n, UBB n, CBF nand CBB n  for  branching instructions is  an 
abbreviation used for clarity of reading.  As detailed in Chapter 3, there are a number 
of branching instructions: 
cond_branch-fwd  - IfnulLfwd nat 
I Ifiacmpeq_fwd ins_type  nat 
IlficmplLfwd nat CHAPTER 4.  A BYTECODE PROGRAMMING LOGIC 
Figure 4.1:  Loop structure 
IfnulLbwd  nat 
I Ifiacmpeq_bwd  ins_type  nat 
I IficmplLbwd  nat 
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In the case of a  rule  involving conditional  branch instructions,  such as  the loop 
rule and the conditional branch forwards rule discussed in Section 4.5.2, it would be 
necessary to prove the rule for all three cases of the conditional branching instruction 
in question in order to obtain a general loop rule. 
Due to the prohibitive size  and complexity of such proofs  (an issue discussed  in 
some detail in Sections 6.2  and 7.1),  while the loop  rule and conditional branch 
forwards rule are stated generally, only the case relating to the Ificmplt  variety has 
been proved.  This refers to a branch taken if the value at the top of the stack is less 
than the value immediately below it on the stack.  Proofs involving the other two 
conditions would be practically identical. 
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Figure 4.2:  Loop structure 
{P 1\ S}  C  {P} 
{P}  while S do  C  {P 1\ oS} 
where P is  an invariant of the loop and S is  the loop guard.  In  a similar rule for 
the bytecode representation of a while loop it seems obvious that xs in  Figure 4.1 
corresponds to C  (the body of the loop), and that the invariant P does not depend 
on the language we  are dealing with.  This leaves the question of what constitutes 
S,  the loop guard, in the bytecode. 
The loop guard is not explicit in the bytecode, as it is in the higher level language. 
But if we  consider what role  the loop guard plays in the imperative language,  it 
becomes clearer.  Evaluation of the loop guard determines whether or not the body 
of the loop will be executed for each iteration of the loop.  In the bytecode, evaluation 
of the conditional branch determines whether or not the body of the loop is executed 
for a particular iteration. So this must mean that S is the condition  branch_cond 
tested by the conditional branch, and our proposed rule looks something like this 
{P  !\  branch_cond} 
xs 
{P} 
{P} 
[UBF  Ixsl + lJ@[xsJ@[ysJ@[CBB  Ixs@ysll 
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before  after 
hd(t1 stk)  hd(t1 stk) 
< hd(stk)  < hd(stk) 
=  True  execute  = 1 
branch if 
EE 
hd(tl stk) 
< hd(stk) 
Figure 4.3:  State of stack before and after conditional branch 
But this is  not quite accurate.  The conditional branch instructions test  certain 
properties of the value or values at the top of the stack, e.g.  'Jump if the value at 
top of the stack is  equal to Null', or 'Jump if the value at the top of the stack is 
not equal to zero'.  A side effect of the comparison is to pop the values involved in 
this comparison off the stack, with the result that any predicate involving the top 
of the stack is  meaningful  zmmediately before  execution of the  branch instruction. 
An example of this is shown in Figure 4.3 where the branching condition is  'branch 
if the second value on the stack is  less than the top value'.  Immediately prior to 
execution of the branch instruction this condition can be evaluated, but when the 
branching instruction has been executed the relevant  values are no  longer on the 
stack and the statement is no longer sensible.  In fact,  in the case where popping 
the values empties the stack, it is undefined. 
So a rule stating that a branch condition involving values on the stack holds any-
where other than just before the branch is executed is incorrect.  This means that 
our rule is incorrect, as we  require the branch condition to be true at the beginning 
of execution of the body,  X8,  and to be false  at the end of the loop,  immediately 
after execution of the branching instruction. 
The solution to this particular problem is to 'wind back' the conditional being tested 
until we  have a condition in terms of actual variables and values rather than items 
on the stack.  We  are, in effect, reconstructing the original guard condition present 
in the Java source code which is concealed in the bytecode instructions. If  we look at 
the bytecode for the loop we can see that the sequence of instructions ys  is executed 
prior to the conditional branch every time through the loop.  These instructions 'set 
up' the stack so that the correct values are available for  the comparison.  By taking 
the weakest preconditzon of these instructions and the condition of the branch we 
are able to determine the actual guard S.  Our loop rule is  therefore as follows: CHAPTER 4.  A BYTECODE PROGRAMMING LOGIC 
{P  1\  wp  ys branch_cond} 
xs 
{P} 
{P} 
[(UBF  Ixsl + l)j@[xsj@[ysj@[(CBB  Ixs@ysl)j 
{P 1\ ...,wp  ys  branch_cond} 
4.4  Weakest Precondition 
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The weakest precondition·  actually called the weakest liberal precondition in cases 
of partial correctness - is the least condition necessary to hold at the start of execu-
tion of a command that will guarantee that a particular condition holds at the end 
of execution (assuming termination): 
Our definition of weakest precondition for  bytecode programs is: 
Definition 18 (Weakest precondition for bytecode) 
wp  xs  Q  ==  (A  Uo·  V Un· (uo, Un) E {(Uo, Un).(  CFS, uo) 7  Un  1\ 
pc(uo) =  pc(s) 1\ 
CFS[s ...  fl  =  xs  -- Q u'}) 
Using this, the two defining properties of the weakest precondition can be proved, 
namely: 
Lemma 33 (Weakest precondition is a  precondition) 
xs t= [l ===>  {wp xs Q}  xs  {Q} 
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Lemma 34 (Weakest precondition is the weakest possible precondition) 
vP. {P} xs  {Q}  ---+ 'lao. P ao:)  (wp  xs  Q)  aD 
PROOF From the definition of weakest precondition for  bytecode (Definition 18) .• 
Several other useful properties may also be shown: 
Lemma 35 (Postcondition false implies weakest precondition false ) 
'lao an·  (CFS,ao) ~  an  1\  xs  =  CFS[s ... fl  1\  -,Q Un 
f 
---+  -,(  wp  xs  Q)  aD 
PROOF  Suppose it is  possible to execute xs starting in state ao  and finishing  in 
state an, where the condition Q is  false in an.  Then the weakest precondition did 
not hold in ao.  This is, of course, the contrapositive of Lemma 34.  • 
4.4.1  Calculating the Weakest Precondition 
As is  the case with conventional Hoare logics, to calculate the value of the weakest 
precondition for  a sequence of instructions we start with the desired postcondition 
and work backwards. In this way we can determine what condition must have held 
before  an instruction is  executed in order to ensure the postcondition holds after 
execution.  This condition is  in fact  the weakest  precondition of  that instruction 
with respect to the postcondition.  This operation is carried out incrementally over 
each instruction in the list. 
To illustrate this, we might calculate the weakest precondition with respect to the 
branching condition of part of our example loop program in Section 4.3: 
public  class SimpleWhile  { 
public static void  main(String args[]) 
{ 
} 
} 
int i=O; 
while  (i<5) 
{  i++;  } CHAPTER 4.  A BYTECODE PROGRAMMING LOGIC 
with corresponding bytecode 
o bipush 0 
1  istore 1 
2  goto  8 
5  iine 1  1 
8  Hoad  1 
9  bipush 5 
10  iCiemplt  5 
13  return 
We wish to calculate the weakest precondition of the instructions 
8  Hoad  1 
9  bipush 5 
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with respect to the branch condition, which is 'is the second value on the stack less 
than the value at the top of the stack?', i.e. 
hd (tl stk) < hd stk 
the calculation of which,  using  the hoisting  technique,  is  as follows.  Taking the 
desired postcondition 
hd (tl stk) < hd stk 
we calculate the weakest precondition with respect to the second instruction in our 
list 
bipush 5 
which pushes the value 5 onto the stack, giving us the condition 
hd (tl (5 : stk)) < hd (5 : stk) 
we  now calculate the weakest precondition with respect to this new postcondition 
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Hoad  1 
which pushes the value stored in local variable 1 onto the stack, resulting in the 
condition 
hd (tl (5 : (LvI: stk») < hd(5 : (lvi : stk» 
When simplified, the weakest precondition is therefore 
LvI  < 5 
As the value of i  is stored in local variable 1,  as can be seen from the initialisation 
instructions at the start of the program 
o bipush 0 
1  istore 1 
the weakest precondition is i < 5:  the loop guard of the original Java program. 
In order to carry out this operation we  need to know the weakest precondition of 
any individual instruction.  Below  we  give proofs of two  instructions:  Bipush  i  is 
a  classfile independent instruction that pushes the integer value i  onto the stack, 
ins_type IAastore i  is  a classfile dependent instruction that stores the value i  in an 
array. 
Definition 19 (Non-terminating state) 
noLterm-state  =  >.  (xp, hp ,Irs). xp  =  None  1\  frs  =1=  [1 
Definition 20 (Insert load and store arguments) 
putLASargs  =  >.(xp,hp,frs) (stk',loe',pc').let (stk,loe,en,ml,pc) 
hd frs  in  (xp, hp, (stk', loe', en, ml, pc') : (ti frs» 
Definition 21  (Extract first load and store argument) 
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Definition 22 (Extract second load and store argument) 
getLASarg2  =  A(xp,hp,frs).let (stk,loc,cn,ml,pc)  =  hdfrs in  lac 
Definition 23 (Extract third load and store argument) 
getLASarg3  =  A(xp, hp,frs). let (stk, lac, en, ml, pc)  =  hd  frs  in  pc 
Lemma 36 (Block execution of Bipush implies exec~as Bipush) 
VCFS s ao  an  i.  CFS! s  =  (Bipush  i)  1\  xp(ao)  =  None  1\ 
(CFS,ao) ~  an ~ 
s 
an = (putLASargs ao  (execJas (Bipush  i) 
(getLASargl a 0)  (getLASarg2  a 0)  (getLASarg3 a 0») 
PROOF  By Lemma 8 and the operational semantics of the JVM. 
Lemma 37 (exec_las Bipush implies block execution of Bipush ) 
VCFS s ao  an  i.  CFS! s  =  (Bipush  i)  1\  xp  (ao)  =  None  1\ 
pc  (s) < length (geLcode  CFS s)  1\ 
an  =  (putLASargs ao  (execJas (Bipush  i) 
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(getLASargl ao)  (getLASarg2  ao)  (getLASarg30"0))) 
~  (CFS,ao) ~  an 
s 
PROOF  By the rules for construction of the block execution relation and the oper-
ational semantics of the JVM.  _ 
Lemma 38 (Existence of set of classfiles containing Bipush) 
:I  CFS.  CFS[s ... s]  =  [Bipush  i] 
PROOF  We  show that such a set of classfiles exists by constructing an instance of 
Pusch's formalisation of a classfile, substituting this for  the existentially quantified 
variable, and simplifying with Isabelle's automatic tactics.  _ CHAPTER 4.  A BYTECODE PROGRAMMING LOGIC  97 
Lemma 39 (Weakest precondition of bipush instruction ) 
wp  [Bipush  i]  Q =  (.A  (fo. (noLterm_state (fo)  ~ 
Q (putLASargs  (Jo  (execJas (Bipush  i) 
(getLASargl  (J 0)  (getLASarg2  (J 0)  (getLASarg3  (J 0»  » 
PROOF  In order to prove equality,  we  prove implication in both directions.  This 
involves Lemmas 36 and 37.  • 
Definition 24 (Insert manipulate array arguments) 
putMAargs  =  .A(xp, hp,frs) (stk', loe', pc'). let  (stk, loe, en, ml, pc)  = 
hd  frs  in  (xp, hp, (stk', loe', en, ml, pc') : (ti frs» 
Definition 25 (Extract first manipulate array argument) 
getMAargl  =  .A(xp, hp,frs). hp 
Definition 26 (Extract second manipulate array argument) 
getMAarg2  =  .A(xp,hp,frs).let (stk,loc,en,ml,pc)  =  hdfrs in  stk 
Definition 27 (Extract third manipulate array argument) 
getMAarg3  =  .A(xp, hp,frs). let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc)  =  hd frs  in  pc 
Lemma 40 (Weakest precondition of IAastore ) 
excep_free  [ (ins _type  IAastore  i)]  ==} 
wp  [( ins_type  IAastore  i)]  = 
(.A  (fo. V CFS.  (noLterm..state (fo)  ~  CFS! (Jo  =  IAastore 
~  Q (putMAargs  (Jo  (execma (ins_type  IAastore  i)  CFS 
(getMAargl  (f  0)  (getMAarg2  (J 0)  (getLASarg3  (f  0»» 
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We now return to the original aim of this section: a method of  calculating the weakest 
precondition of a sequence of instructions. The technique described at the beginning 
of this section is based on the equality:  wp (x: xs) (assert Q)  =  (wp [xl  (wp xs (assert Q))). 
To prove this we rely on the assumption ..  correct in the case of most standard high 
level  languages~ that execution proceeds in a  linear manner, moving through the 
code from left to right one command at a time.  In the case of bytecode instructions 
this may not be the case, and so we must attach another predicate, linear, to instruc-
tion sequences the weakest precondition of which we  wish to be able to calculate. 
This is defined as 
Definition 28 (Linear code) 
linear xs  ==  lisLall  not_branch  xs  1\  lisLall  CFSjndependent xs  (4.7) 
It is necessary that all the instructions are classfile independent and non-branching. 
This is due to the fact that the proof hinges on the idea of the deterministic execution 
of a  list of instructions.  As discussed  in Section 3.5.3,  in order to obtain proofs 
involving the standard idea of determinism (i.e.  for a list of instructions independent 
of context) we  must restrict the instructions involved to those which  are classfile 
independent. 
The function (assert) provides a way of applying a predicate that is concerned solely 
with the operand stack, stk, and local variables, loc, of a method frame to a complete 
state consisting of an exception option, heap, and frame stack.  This is necessary as 
we want to restrict the discussion to data-equal states, and our present definition of 
data-equality involves only the stack and local variables. 
Definition 29 (Assert) 
assert  Q  ==  (>.(xp, hp,frs). (let (stk, loc, en, ml, pc) 
Q(stk, loc») 
Lemma 41 (Decompose block) 
VCFS (10  (1n  S f  m  x  xs.  (CFS, (10) ~  (1n  1\ 
f 
CFS [s ...  f]  =  x:xs  1\ 
linear (x:xs)  1\ 
pC«(1o) =  pc(s) ~ 
(hd frs)  in 
~(11.(  CFS, (10) ~  (11  1\  (CFS, (11) ~  (1n 
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where 
y =  s{pc:= pc(s)+l} 
PROOF  This follows by case analysis of block execution relation.  \Ve know from the 
definition of linear that the instruction at pC(O"o)  is not a branching instruction. This 
means that execution of the instruction will result in a state whose program counter 
is  equal to pc(  s) +  1.  As  none of the other instructions in the block are branches, 
execution of the instructions from pc(  s)  +  1 to pc(J) will continue without returning 
to the instruction at pc(  s).  Hence, by application of the rules for the block execution 
relation we can show the existence of the two blocks as required.  _ 
As we wish to prove that assert Q holds in the state resulting from execution of the 
instructions x : XS,  we  must show that the execution of x  in one classfile, followed 
by xs from  another classfile is  equivalent in  effect  to executing x: xs  from  a single 
classfile. 
Lemma 42 (Two adjoining block executions imply a  sequence ) 
VCFS 0"0  0"1  O"n  S  I  m  x  XS.  lisLall  nOLbranch  (X:XS)  1\ 
lisLall CFSjndependent (X: XS)  1\ 
excep_free (X: XS)  1\ 
where 
0"0  -
0"1  -
(Tn  -
TO 
Tn  -
(XPO,  hpo, 
(Xp1,  hpo, 
(CFS, 0"0) ~  0"1  1\  CFS  [S .. .  /1  =  [xl  1\  (4.8) 
f 
(CFS', 0"1)  ~  O"n  1\  CFS' [S' ...  !'l  =  xs 
I' 
~  TO  Tn.  (X:XS)  f-- TO  ~  Tn 
(  stko, loco, cno, mIo, pco) : Irso) 
(Stkl' lOCI, cno, mio, PCJ)  : Irso) 
(XPn,  hpo,  (stkn, locn, cno, mio, pen) : Irso) 
(XPo, stko, loco,pco - pC(S» 
(XPn, stkn, locn,pcn - pC(S» CHAPTER 4.  A BYTECODE PROGRAMMING LOGIC  100 
PROOF We show that the two instances of the block execution relation for x and xs 
and 0"0  and O"n  admit an instance of the sequence execution relation involving x: xs 
and the corresponding minstates rand r. This follows from Lemma 21  and Lemma 
26,  together with the fact that there exists a classfile containing the sequence x: xs 
(proof similar to that of Lemma 38).  • 
Lemma 43 (Weakest precondition of a  list of instructions) 
xs=/:  [] 
excep_free  [x]  /\ 
I  isLa II  noLbra nch  (x: xs)  /\ 
lisLal1  CFSjndependent (x: xs)  /\ 
excep_free  (x: xs)  /\ 
==>  wp  (x: xs)  (assert Q)  - (wp  [x]  (wp  xs  (assert Q») 
PROOF  Once again, we show equality by proving the implication in each direction. 
After rewriting with the definition of weakest precondition (Definition 18), the right-
t<>-left  version of the equality can be proved using Lemma 42,  followed  by Lemma 
22  to show that the existence of this instance of the sequence execution relation 
implies the existence of an equivalent instance of the block execution relation.  The 
left-t<>-right part of the equality can be shown using Lemma 41.  • 
4.5  Data-equality and Loops 
One major difference between the execution of a while loop in an imperative language 
and a loop sequence in the bytecode is the effect of executing the 'structure' of the 
loop.  As discussed in Section 9 a general pattern for loops in bytecode is 
[(UBF  Ixsl  + 1)]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB  Ixs@ysl)]  (4.9) 
where the instructions xs represent the loop body, and the instructions (UBF Ixsl + 1), 
ys, and (CBB  Ixs@ysl) constitute the structual parts of the loop. 
In an imperative language,  the rules  for  execution state that executing  a  while 
statement in an initial state in which the loop guard is false results in an unchanged 
state. In the bytecode, execution of a loop sequence in which the guard is false in the 
initial state results in a different state, as evaluating the sequences which constitute 
the structure of the loop means the value of the program counter will have changed. 
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Figure 4.4:  States before and after evaluation of guard to false 
Figure 4.5:  States before and after evaluation of guard to true 
Similarly,  with  the situation where  the body of the loop  is executed,  if  a  while 
statement is  executed in state 0'0 in which  the loop guard is  true, we  can talk of 
executing the body of the loop in the same state--evaluation of the loop guard does 
not affect the state.  Again, this is  not the case in the bytecode sequence.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 4.5. 
At  first  glance,  this  may seem likely  to add to the complexity of a  proof of the 
bytecode rule.  But closer  inspection of the effect  of executing the structure of a 
bytecode loop sequence, shows that the only element of the state affected (assuming 
the instructions concerned satisfy certain constraints) is the program counter.  This 
means that once again we can use the idea of data-equality, discussed in  the previ-
ous chapter.  As  the branch condition does not mention the program counter, and 
assuming that the loop invariant does not either, data-equal states in the bytecode 
execution can take the place of equal states in the source code execution. 
4.5.1  Data-equality and the Weakest Precondition 
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Figure 4.6:  States for which weakest precondition must evaluate to true or false 
{P  1\  wp  ys  branch_cond} 
xs 
{P} 
{P} 
[(UBF  Ixsl + 1)]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB  Ixs@ysl)] 
{P 1\ -,wp ys  branch_cond} 
we see that we  need wp  ys branch_cond  to be false in state an, one step after the 
execution of ys is  complete.  But wp  is  a relation which deals specifically with the 
state aD  immediately prior to execution of ys.  In fact,  even if the two  states in 
question are data-equal ---as  they will be in a  well-formed  loop------it  is  not the case 
that 
wp  ys branch_cond  0"0  ----+  wp  ys branch_cond  O"n  (4.10) 
This is  because the definition of wp depends on the block execution relation which 
is  expressed  in  terms of the position of the program counter in  a  state relative 
to the class  file.  Unlike  higher  level  languages,  a  state is  inextricably  bound to 
the instruction indicated by its program counter.  This means that despite every 
other element of the two states ao  and an being equal, wp  ys branch_cond does not 
hold  in an  as  its program counter value is  outside the block containing ys.  The 
position of states 0"0  and O"n  with respect to ys is illustrated in Figure 4.6.  Equally, 
wp  ys branch_cond  will not hold in the state in which execution of the loop begins, 
because its program counter will be pointing to the unconditional branch instruction. 
The above definition of weakest precondition for  bytecode is clearly not suitable for 
the purposes of our While Rule, and we must modify it to remove the dependence 
on  the position of the program  counter.  One solution  is  to define  the weakest 
precondition in terms of the sequence execution relation (Section 3.5.3) rather than 
the block execution relation.  This effectively transforms the definition into that of 
the conventional definition of weakest precondition, where only the 'non-positional' 
parts of a state are relevant.  We define the sequence weakest precondition as: CHAPTER 4.  A BYTECODE PROGRAMMING LOGIC 
Definition 30 (Sequence weakest precondition) 
sequence_wp  IS Q  ==  >.  ao.  \;I Tn.  noLtermstate aO  /\ 
IS  f- TO  '""vI- Tn  --+  (assert Q O"n) 
where 
0"0  {XPo, hpo, {( stko, loco, cno, mlo, pco) : frso)) 
TO  (XPO, stko, loco, 0) 
Tn  (XPn, stkn, locn, PCn) 
an  =  (XPn, hpo, «stkn, loen, cnO, m1o, PCO  + PCn)  : frso)) 
103 
This new definition does not replace our previous definition (Definition 18) since the 
sequence weakest precondition can only be used to reason about classfile independent 
instructions (from the definition of the sequence execution relation, 3.5.3).  In order 
to reason about programs including non-classfile independent instructions we  will 
need the original definition.  However,  since the instructions contained in  a  well-
formed while loop are assumed to be classfile independent, we  are able to use the 
sequence weakest precondition. 
Once again, the two defining properties of the weakest precondition were proved for 
sequence weakest precondition: 
Lemma 44 (swp is a  precondition ) 
IS  =f:.  [1  /\  lisLall nOLbranch  IS /\ 
lisLall CFSjndependent IS  /\ 
excep_free IS 
===} {sequence_wp IS  Q}  IS  {assert Q} 
PROOF  From the definition of sequence weakest precondition (Definition 30)  and 
Lemma 21.  • 
Lemma 45 (swp is the weakest possible precondition) 
CFS[s ...  J]  =  IS  /\  pc(f)  <  length{geLcode CFS s) /\ 
pc(  s)  :S  pc(f)  /\  IS  =f:.  [1  /\  lisLall  not_branch  IS /\ 
lisLall  CFSjndependent IS  /\ 
lisLall excep_freejnstr IS  /\ 
{assert P}  IS  {assert Q} 
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PROOF  From the definition of sequence weakest.  precondition (Definition  30)  and 
Lemma 22.  As  the pre- and post-condition relation  (Definition  16)  is  defined  in 
terms of the block execution relation, it is necessary to include more information in 
the assumptions of the theorems involving both the pre- and post-condition relation 
and sequence_wp than in those concerned only with only sequence_wp. 
As for the block execution definition of weakest precondition, the following lemmas 
were proved for  the sequence weakest precondition: 
Lemma 46 (Condition false implies swp false ) 
V (70  (7n  S  f  CFS  xs  Q.  xs  =I  [1  A  lisLall  nOLbranch  xs A 
lisLall  CFSjndependent xs  A 
excep_free  xs  A  (CFS, (70)  ~  (7n  A 
f 
,(assert Q)(7n 
-- ,(sequence_wp xs  Q)  (70 
PROOF If it is possible to execute xs starting in state (70  and finishing in state (7n, 
where the condition Q is  false  in (7n,  the sequence weakest  precondition does  not 
hold in (70.  This is the contrapositive of Lemma 44 and can be understood intuitively 
as the consequence of Lemma 45.  • 
Lemma 47 (swp false implies condition false) 
xs  f- TO  ~  Tn  A  ,(sequence_wp xs  Q) (70  ===}  ,(assert Q) (7n 
where 
(70  =  (XPo, hpo, «stko, loco, cno, mlo, pco) : frso)) 
TO  =  (XPo, stko, loco, 0) 
Tn  - (  XPn, stkn, locn, pcn) 
(7n  =  (XPn, hpo, «stkm locn, cno, mlo, pco  + pen)  : frso)) 
PROOF If  the relevant parts of states (70 and (7n are in the sequence execution rela-
tion, and sequence_wp xs Q does not hold in (To,  then assert Q will not hold in (Tn.  The 
result follows from the definition of sequence weakest precondition (Definit.ion 30) .• CHAPTER 4.  A BYTECODE PROGRAMMING LOGIC  105 
Lemma 48 (Condition holds implies swp held ) 
xs  f- TO  ~  Tn  /\  (assert Q) (Tn  ==:::}  (sequence_wp xs  Q) 0'0 
where 
0'0  (XPO, hpo, ((stko, loco, cno, mlo, pco) : frso)) 
TO  - (XPo, stko, loco, 0) 
Tn  - (XPn, stkn, locn, PCn) 
an  (xPn' hpo, ((stkn,locn, cno, mlo, pco  +  PCn)  : frso)) 
PROOF If the relevant  parts of states  0'0  and an  are  in  the sequence execution 
relation, and assert Q holds in an, then sequence_wp xs Q must have held in 0'0.  The 
result follows from the definition of sequence weakest precondition (Definition 30) .• 
Lemma 49 (Relation of wp to swp ) 
linear xs  /\  excep_free xs  /\ 
lisLali excep_free_instr xs  /\  xs  =1=  [1 
~  wp xs  (assert Q)  =  sequence_wp xs  Q 
PROOF  This is  similar to the the proof of Lemma 43,  and again we show equality 
by proving implication in both directions.  In this case,  however,  the result follows 
simply from Lemma 21 and Lemma 22, along with a proof that there exists a classfile 
containing the sequence xs  (as in Lemma 41).  • 
Lemma 50 (swp preserved by data-equality) 
PROOF  This follows  from  the definition of sequence weakest  precondition (Defini-
tion 30), assert (Definition 29), and data-equality (Definition 10).  • 
Lemma 51 (Assert preserved by data-equality) 
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PROOF From  the definitions  of assert  (Definition  29)  and data-equality  (Defini-
tion 10).  • 
We  are now  able to state the final  version of the While Rule for  bytecode.  As  we 
have seen,  the role in the conventional Hoare logic  of the loop guard S is  played 
here by the sequence weakest precondition of the instructions ys with respect to the 
branch condition.  From its definition,  (Definition 30), we  know that the sequence 
weakest precondition is only meaningful in the context of a non-terminating initial 
state.  So,  in order to ensure that the actual value of sequence_wp  ys branch_cond 
can be calculated - essential when  actually using the logic  to prove  properties of 
programs -we add the predicate noLterm_state  to the postcondition of the while 
rule. 
The predicate welLformedJoop is defined as 
Definition 31 (Well-formed loop) 
welLformedJoop zs  ==  :lxs  ys.  CFS[s ...  f]  =  zs  A 
zs  =  [( UBFlxsl + l)]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB  Ixs@ysl)]  A 
xs =I- []  A  ys  =I- [ ]A 
simple xs  A  simple  ys  A 
ref _trans_2  ys  A  linear  ys 
Note that the above definition  includes the requirement that the instructions ys 
should be referentially transparent, denoted by the term ref _trans2 ys.  The execu-
tion of a sequence of referentially transparent instructions affects only the stack and 
the program counter.  For a list of instructions ys, the execution of which places two 
values on the stack. the definition is 
Definition 32 (Referential transparency of a list of instructions ) 
reLtrans_2  ys  ==  V CFS ao  an sf. ys =  CFS[s ...  f]  A 
linear  ys  A  pc(ao)  =  pc(s) A 
(CFS,ao) ~  an  ~ 
J 
XPo  =  XPn  A  hpo  =  hpn  A 
3 a b.stkn  =  a: (b  : (stko))  A  loco  =  locn  A 
eno  =  cnn  A  mlo  =  min  A  frso  = frsn CHAPTER 4.  A BYTECODE PROGRAMMING LOGIC 
where 
(10  =  (XPo, hpo, ((stko, loco, eno, mlo, pco) : frso)) 
(1n  (XPn, hpn, ((stkn, [ocn, e~,  min, PCn)  : frsn)) 
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This, of course,  states that execution of the instructions ys  results in  two  values 
being placed  on the stack.  If,  for  example,  ys  =  [Pop,  Pop]  this would  not be 
the case.  Certainly,  any well-formed  program involving  an  Ificmplt  or Ifiacmpeq 
branch should place two values to be compared on the stack immediately before the 
branch.  However, this would not be the case with an Ifnull  branch (where only one 
value would be placed on the stack). 
Thus the definitions of referential transparency and of a well-formed loop would have 
to be modified to reflect these situations in any future version of the programming 
logic.  For the purposes of the proofs described in this dissertation,  however,  the 
current definitions are adequate. 
Our final  version of the While Rule is  as follows,  and a  proof of the soundness of 
this rule appears in Chapter 5. 
{P  1\  sequence_wp ys  branch_cond} 
xs 
{P} 
weILformedJoop[(UBF Ixsl + 1)]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB  Ixs@ysl)] 
{P} 
[(UBF  Ixsl + 1 )]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB  Ixs@ysl)] 
{P 1\ .sequence_wp ys  branch_cond}  1\  noLterm_state 
4.5.2  Conditional Branch Forward Rule 
We now describe a rule for conditional branches forward which, like the while rule, 
depends on the lemmas for  sequence weakest  precondition and the fact  that the 
instructions zs  immediately prior to the conditional branch instruction are referen-
tially transparent. CHAPTER 4.  A BYTECODE PROGRAMMING LOGIC 
Lemma 52 (Execute up to conditional branch) 
V CFS  era  ern  s f  m  n  xs  ys  zs.  (CFS, ero)  ~  ern  /\ 
f 
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CFS  [s ...  J}  =  zs@[CBF  (Ixsl  +  1)]xs@ys  /\ 
where 
pc(ero)  =  pc(s)  /\ 
simple zs  /\ 
simple [CBF  (Ixsl  +  1)]@xs@ys 
---l> ::JerI'  (CFS, era) ~  erl  /\ 
y =  S{pC:= pC(S) + Izsl- 1} 
z =  S{pC:= pC(S) + Izsl)} 
y 
(CFS,UI) ~  Un 
f 
PROOF  From the definition of simple (Definition 17), and Lemma 30.  • 
Theorem 6  (Conditional branch rule ) 
{P} zs@[CBF  (Ixsl  +  1)]  {R} 
{R  /\  (sequence_wp zs  branch_cond)}  ys  {Q} 
{R  /\  -,(sequence_wp zs  branch_cond)}  xs@ys  {Q} 
xs  =1=  [];  ys  =I- [];  zs  =I- [] 
excep_free  zs@[CBF  (Ixsl  +  1)]@xs@ys 
simple xs;  simple  ys 
ref _trans_2  zs;  simple [CBF  (Ixsl  +  1)]@xs@ys 
{P}  zs@[CBF  (I  xsl  +  l))]@xs@ys  {Q} 
PROOF  From the pre- and post-condition relation for bytecode (Definition 16) we 
know that there is a  block 
(  4.11) 
such that 
CFS[s ...  f]  - zs@[CBF  (Ixsl  + 1)]@xs@ys  (4.12) CHAPTER 4.  A BYTECODE PROGRAMMING LOGIC 
and P holds in state 0"0. 
From Lemma 52 we know that 
where 
30"1·  (CFS, 0"0) ~  0"1  /\  (CFS,O"I) ~  O"n 
y  f 
y=s{pc.- pc(s)+lzsl)-1} 
z = s {pc  .- pC(s) + Izsl} 
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(4.13) 
where the first  block,  from  s  to y, corresponds to execution of the instructions zs 
prior to the conditional branch instruction.  The program counter in state 0"1  points 
to the conditional branch instruction. 
Execution of the second block can take one of two forms depending on whether the 
branching condition is true in state 0"1  or not.  In the case where the condition is 
true, the branch is taken, branch_cond holds in state 0"1  and only the instructions ys 
are executed.  In the case where the condition is false,  branch_cond does not hold in 
state 0"1  and the instructions xs@ys  are executed. 
We now apply case analysis to the second block, noting that the case involving the 
Stop rule cannot apply as  it would  require the program counter to finish  outside 
the block xs@ys as a result of executing a jump of length xs+  1 where both xs and 
ys are non-empty.  This gives us 
(4.14) 
A case split on the value of the branch condition in state 0"1,  followed  by narrowing 
of the blocks as in Lemma 31,  along  with Lemma 52,  gives  us the two  possible 
situations 
and 
where 
30"1  0"2.branch_cond{0"1)  /\  (CFS, 0"0) ~  0"1  /\ 
y 
exec(CFS,O"d  =  Some 0"2  /\  (CFS, 0"2)  ~  O"n 
f 
30"1  0"2·  ....,branch_cond(O"I)  1\  (CFS, 0"0)  ~  0"1  1\ 
y 
exec(CFS,O"d  =  Some 0"2  1\  (CFS,0"2)  ~  0"' 
f 
w = s{pc:= pc(s) + Izsl  + Ixsl+1} 
(4.15) 
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Using Lemma 7 we are now able to obtain a block covering execution of the instruc-
tions zs@[CBF  (Ixsl  + 1)] 
And from the assumption 
{P} zs@[CBF  (Ixsl  + 1)] {R} 
we know that R holds in state a2. 
From Lemma 21  and Lemma 48 we know that 
branch_cond (al)  1\  (CFS,ao) ~  al  1\ 
y 
exec(CFS,al)  =  Some a2 
===?  (sequence_wp zs  branch_cond)  (Jo 
and from Lemma 21  and Lemma 47 
-,branch_cond (al)  1\  (CFS, (Jo) ~  (Jl  1\ 
y 
exec ( CFS, (Jl)  =  Some (J 2 
===?  -, (sequence_wp zs  branch_cond)  (To 
We must now show that in the case of 4.19 that 
(sequence_wp zs branch_cond)  (J2 
and in the case of 4.20 that 
-'(sequence_wp zs branch_cond)  (J2 
(4.17) 
(4.18) 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
(4.21 ) 
(4.22) 
Since the instructions zs are referentially transparent it follows  that when zs  is of 
length 2,  in state (Jo  the stack is equal to the stack in state al with the addition of 
two extra values at the top meaning that 
stko =  tI(tl(stk1))  (4.23) 
and all other values in (Jl--excluding the program counter-are equal to those of (Jo· 
Execution of the conditional branch instruction in  state (Jl  pops the two topmost 
values from the stack (after comparing them).  This means that 
stko =  Stk2  (4.24) 
and, as all other elements of the states apart from the program counters are equal 
(4.25) 
This situation is illustrated in Figure 4.7.  We can now use this result with 4.15,4.16 
and the assumptions {R 1\ (sequence_wp zs branch_cond)} ys {Q} and {R 1\ -,(sequence_wp zs bra 
to show that Q holds in state an.  • CHAPTER 4.  A BYTECODE PROGRAMMING LOGIC  111 
stk before  ys  stk after ys  stk after branch 
Figure 4.7:  Stack unchanged by zs followed  by branch 
4.6  Conclusions 
We  have described a  programming logic containing rules for  sufficient  patterns of 
bytecode to prove bytecode programs including loops and branching structures. Al-
though the rules described are clearly closely related to the rules in the conventional 
Hoare logic, they differ in a number of important ways.  In particular, the necessity 
of treating the execution of the instructions defining a program structure explicitly. 
In the following chapter we describe in detail the difficulties this presents in the case 
of a proof of soundness of the rule for loops in the bytecode logic,  and the ways in 
which these problems can be overcome. Chapter 5 
Soundness of the Loop Rule 
In  this chapter we  will  discuss a  proof of the soundness of the rule  for  loops  in 
bytecode programs that was  proposed in Chapter 4.  We  begin  by  describing the 
proof of the while  rule in the conventional Hoare logic  and how  it relates to our 
proof of the loop rule for  bytecode programs.  Both of these proofs depend on proofs 
of two subsidiary properties: w 
1.  The loop guard condition will be false on exit from  the loop 
2.  If  a property is invariant for one execution of the loop body it is also invariant 
for  the loop itself 
In a  conventional  axiomatic semantics  these  properties are  very  simple  to prove 
as  they follow  almost immediately from  the execution rules  for  the language.  In 
the bytecode world.  however,  they are considerably more difficult to prove and we 
discuss the methods used to achieve these proofs in some detail. 
5.1  Outline of Proof Method 
The standard Hoare logic while rule for a simple imperative programming language 
(4.3) states that if P is  an invariant for one execution of C whenever S holds then 
it is  also an invariant for  the execution of the statement while S  do  C, and that S 
will be false on termination of the loop. 
{PAS}C{P} 
{P}  while S do  C  {P A oS} 
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Example proofs of its soundness can be found  in  [10]  and [56],  and  they can be 
broken down into proofs of each of the two properties mentioned in the introduction 
to this chapter.  In  [10]  these are represented by the following lemmas: 
Guard false on exit from loop-conventional Hoare logic 
V C sl s2. eval  C sl  =  s2  ----+ (V  S' C'.  (C  =  while  S' C') 
----+ -(S' s2)) 
Preservation of invariant-conventional Hoare logic 
V C sl s2. 
eval  C sl  =  s2  ----+ 
(V  S' C'.  (C  = while  S' C')  ----+ 
(V  sl s2. P sl  /\  S' sl  /\  C'  sl s2  ----+  P s2)  ----+ 
(P sl  ~  P s2)) 
Both lemmas can be proved using the operational semantics of the languages they 
are concerned with, either immediately or by strong rule induction. 
For the Bytecode Programming Logic, recall that our postulated Loop Rule is 
{P  /\  sequence_wp  ys  branch_cond} 
xs 
{P} 
welLformedJoop[(UBF  Ixsl + 1 )]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB  Ixs@ysl)] 
{P} 
[(UBF  Ixsl + 1 )]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB  Ixs@ysl)] 
{P /\ -sequence_wp  ys  branch_cond  /\  nOLterm-state} 
and we assert that equivalent statements can be defined for  the bytecode: 
Proposition 1 (Guard false on exit from loop--bytecode logic) 
V ao  an CFS sf· (CFS,ao) ~  an  /\ 
f 
CFS[s ...  f]  =  [(UBF  Ixsl + 1)]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB  Ixs@ysl)]  /\ 
welLformedJoop  CFS[s ...  f) 
----+  - (sequence_wp  ys  branch_cond)  an CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE  114 
Proposition 2  (Preservation of invariant-bytecode logic) 
\;/ 0"0  O"n  CFS  s f. (CFS, 0"0) ~  O"nA 
f 
welLformedJoop  CFS[s ...  J]  A 
P 0"0  A 
['V  O"~  O"~  O"~  CFS'  w  y s' !,. 
(CFS', O"~) ~  O"~  A 
y 
( CFS', O"~) ~  O"~  A 
f 
welLformedJoop  CFS'[s' .. .  J']  1\ 
P  O"~ A 
(sequence_wp  ys  branch_cond)  O"~  ~ 
P  O"~] 
~  P  O"n 
where 
w =  s' {pc := pc{ s/) + 1 } 
y =  s' {pc := pc(s') + Ixsl} 
z =  s' {pc := pC(S') + Ixsl + 1} 
Here,  the fact that the invariant is  preserved by  one execution of the body of the 
loop is represented by the statement 
\;/  O"~  O"~  O"~ CFS'  w  y s' J'.  (CFS', O"~) ~  O"~  A 
y 
(CFS', O"~) ~  O"~  A 
f 
welLformedJoop CFS/[s' .. .  J']  1\  (5.1) 
P  O"~ 1\ 
(sequence_wp  ys  branch_cond)  O"~  ~ 
P  O"~ 
which says that, in fact, the invariant is preserved by one execution of the body of 
the loop-the list of instructions xs~  -~plus execution of the 'structural' instructions 
ys@CBB. 
In the next three sections we  present proofs of Propositions 1 and 2,  followed  by a 
proof of soundness of the Loop Rule. CHAPTER 50  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE 
5.2  Guard Condition False on Exit from Loop 
Our aim here is a proof of Proposition 1 
Vao an  CFS s fo  (CFS,ao) ~  an  A 
f 
CFS[s'ldotsfl  =  [(UBF  Ixsl + 1)l@[xsl@[ysl@[(CBB  Ixs@ysl)] 
welLformedJoop  CFS[s ...  fl 
---+  -, (sequence_wp  ys  branch_cond)  an 
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Our strategy involves showing that there exists a  penultimate state an-I,  whose 
program counter points to the conditional branch instruction, and execution of which 
results in final state an: 
Proposition 3  (Penultimate state exists) 
where 
Vao an  CFS sf y  Zo  (CFS,ao) ~  an  1\ 
f 
welLformedJoop CFS[s o· ofl  ---+ 
::I  an-2 an-I' (CFS,an_2) ~  an-l  1\ 
z 
exec  (CFS, an-I) =  Some an  A 
pc(an-l) =  pc(J) 
y =  s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl} 
z = f {pc := pC(J) - 1} 
We  then use  the fact  that the branching condition  must  be false  in  this  penul-
timate state in  order for  us  to exit  the loop,  the idea  of data equality  (Defini-
tion 10),  and the lemmas for  the sequence weakest precondition (Definition 30)  to 
show  -, (sequence_wp ys branch_cond) an. 
5.2.1  Lemmas for Guard Condition False 
In this section we describe a series of lemmas necessary for the proof of Proposition 1: 
the guard condition is  false on exit from the loop. 
To allow us to focus attention on the main part of the loop--the section 
xs@ys@[CBB  Ixs@ysll  we  show  that for  a  well-formed  loop in the block execu-
tion relation, executing the initial unconditional branch forward results in another 
instance of the relation consisting only of the instructions xs@ys@[CBB  Ixs@ysll· CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE 
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CTo  CT,  CT 
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Figure 5.1:  Elimination of unconditional branch 
Lemma 53 (Elimination of unconditional branch) 
where 
V ao  an  CFS sf. (CFS,ao) ~  an  /\ 
f 
welUormedJoop CFS[s ...  fl  -
:1  a1' exec ( CFS, ao)  =  Some aJ  /\ 
pc(aJ)  =  pc(s)  +  Ixsl  +  1  /\ 
(CFS,al) ~  an 
f 
w =  S {pc:= pc(s) + 1} 
PROOF  This follows from the fact that the instructions 
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xs@ys@[CBB  Ixs@ysll  make  up a  simple  block  (Definition  17),  the execution  of 
which can only result in a state where the program counter is  pointing inside the 
block or at the instruction immediately to the right ofit. Under these circumstances, 
once  the unconditional branch instruction at the beginning of the loop  has been 
executed once, it will  never be executed again within this block.  We  are therefore 
able to effectively discard it and concentrate our attention on the smaller resultant 
block.  The situation is represented in Figure 5.1.  • 
We now consider our smaller loop, and show that there exists a state, a2,  in which 
the conditional branch instruction is executed for  the first time. CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE 
Lemma 54 (Conditional branch is executed at least once ) 
'tfCFS  Ul  Un  S  /  w  y z.( CFS, (1) ~  Un  /\ 
I 
where 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ...  fJ  /\ 
simple ys  /\ 
pc(a1) =  pc(s) +  Ixsl + 1 ~ 
3a2.( CFS, (1) ~  a2/\ 
w=s{pc:=pc(s)+1} 
z 
pc(a2) =  pc(J)/\ 
(CFS,a2) ~  an 
I 
y =  S {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl  + 1} 
z =/  {pc:= pc(f) -I} 
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PROOF  \Ve know that the program counter of Ul is pointing to the first instruction 
of ys.  As we are assuming the existence of the larger block from  Uo  to an,  we  know 
that execution must leave the block ys  at some point in order to reach state an· 
But because ys  is  a simple block we  cannot reach Un  directly from  any instruction 
in  ys,  and there must exist an intermediate state,  U2,  whose  program counter is 
pointing  to  the instruction immediately  to the right  of  ys,  i.e.  the conditional 
branch instruction.  Execution of the conditional branch instruction in  this state 
will then lead to an, either immediately or following a number of executions of the 
loop- . represented by the instance of the block execution relation (CFS, (2) ~  an. 
I 
In order  to  prove  the existence  of a  penultimate state (Proposition  3),  we  now 
consider the block  (CFS,a2)  ~  Un,  with  PC(U2)  =  pc(f) , and apply the block 
I 
execution case rule.  This presents the two possibilities shown in Figure  5.2 
•  the Stop rule applies: 
exec(CFS,U2) =  Some Un  /\  PC(U2)  =  pc(f)  (5.2) 
•  the Continue rule applies: CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE  118 
Continue 
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Figure 5.2:  Possible outcomes of executing branch instruction 
In the Stop case the proof of Proposition 3 is complete; in the second case we need to 
know whether or not the branch condition is true in order to determine the position 
of the program counter after execution. 
In the case where the condition is false we have a contradiction: executing the branch 
instruction in this situation results in the program counter of 0"3  being outside the 
block, but the existence of the block (CFS,0"3)  ;1  O"n  means that, from Lemma 1 
it must be inside the block. 
This leaves the third case in which the branching condition is true.  Again we consider 
statement 5.3, relating to the situation where the branching condition is true.  From 
the definition of a well formed loop (Definition 31) we know that the program counter 
of state 0"3  points to the first instruction in xs  as a result of the conditional branch 
backwards in a state where the condition is  true.  We now reason 'backwards' from 
the final state, O"n. 
We  show that if,  starting in a state whose program counter is  equal to pc(s) + 1, 
i.e.  the state produced by executing the conditional branch when  the condition is 
true,  we  have reached O"n-a fact implicit in  the definition of the block execution 
relation (Stop, Continue)-then there must be some state O"n-l  in  the execution 
path relation for  the block that evaluates to O"n. 
Lemma 55 (Penultimate state exists in execution of the loop ) 
VCFS 0"3  sf w.  (CFS, 0"3) ~  O"n  1\ 
f 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ...  fl ~ 
30"n-l.  (CFS,  0"3)  ~+  fO"n-l  1\ 
w 
pc(  0" n-l) =  pc(f) 
1\  exec ( CFS, O"n-l)  =  Some O"n 
where 
w=s{pc:=pc(s)+l} CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE  119 
PROOF  From Lemma 9 we  know that as  l13  and l1n-I are in the block execution 
relation,  they are also  in the execution path relation.  We  then apply  transitive 
closure elimination to 'unwind' the final  execution step from  the relation  which, 
along with the definition of the execution path relation (Definition 8), implies that 
::!CTn-i'  exec ( CFS, l1n-I)  =  Some  CTn.  As  xs  and  ys  are simple,  we  can show  that 
PC(l1n-I) =  pc(f), since from the definition of simple, (Definition 17), it is impossible 
to reach the final state outside the block from either xs  or ys.  • 
We  show  that if  we  have  reached  this penultimate state,  l1n-I,  starting  from  a 
position l13  inside xs there must be a sequence of states spanning the final execution 
of ys  that starts in a state whose program counter points to the first instruction in 
ys  and culminates in CTn-i' 
Lemma 56 (Ante-penultimate state exists in loop execution) 
where 
VCFS  CT3  s /  w.  (CFS,l13) ~  l1n  /\  welLformedJoop CFS[s ... /]----+ 
f 
::!CTn-l l1n-2· (CFS,  (13)  ~+  l1n-2  /\ 
f 
w=s{pc:=pc(s)+l} 
y =  s {pc:= pc(s) +  Ixsl + 1} 
z = / {pc:= pc(f) - 1} 
(CFS,  l1n-2) =&.+  l1n-l  /\ 
z 
pC(CTn-2) =  pc(m) 
pC(CTn-l) =  pc(f) 
exec( CFS, l1n-d =  l1n 
PROOF  From the definition of simple,  (Definition 17), the only section of the block 
from  which  it is  possible  to reach  the conditional  branch instruction is  ys,  and 
in order to reach  ys we  must have come from  xs  (as  it is  not reachable from  the 
conditional branch).  Furthermore, the only instruction outside xs  reachable from 
within it is  the first  instruction in  ys.  The path of execution is  shown in Figure 
5.3  • CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE 
Figure 5.3:  Final steps of execution 
This allows us to prove Proposition 3 
Lemma 57 (Final step preceded by execution of ys exists) 
where 
V (70  (7n  CFS s f. (CFS, (70) ~  (7",  1\ 
f 
welLformedJoop  CFS[s ...  fl ~ 
:3  (7",-1  (7n-2  .  (CFS, (7",-2) ~  (7n-1  1\ 
w =  s {pc := pC( s) + 1} 
Y =  s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl + 1} 
z = f {pc:= pc(J) - I} 
z 
exec  (CFS, (7",-1)  =  Some (7",  1\ 
PC((7n-2)  =  pc(m) 
PC((7",_l) = pC(J) 
PROOF  From Lemma 55 and Lemma 56. 
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• 
We now prove some more preliminary lemmas in order to prove prove Proposition 
1. 
We know from  Lemma 57 that 
:3(7n-1' exec  (CFS, (7",-1) = Some (7",  (5.4) 
where the instruction at (7n-1  is  the conditional branch backwards to the start of 
xs.  The fact that the branch is  not taken  execution results in state (7n  which  is 
outside the block--implies that the branch condition is false in state {7n-1  (from the 
operational semantics of branching instructions).  This gives us CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE 
Lemma 58 (Branch condition false implies swp false ) 
V an-l an-2 . (CFS,an-2) -.!..  an-l  A 
where 
z 
welLformedJoop CFS[s .. . fJ  A 
...,(branch_cond an-I) ---t 
...,  (sequence_wp  ys  branch_cond)  an-2 
y =  s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl + 1} 
z = f {pc:= pc(f) - 1} 
PROOF  From Lemma 56 and Lemma 46. 
'rVe now show that states an-2 and an  are data-equal: 
Lemma 59 (Antepenultimate and final states are data-equal) 
where 
V an-l an-2 . (CFS, an-2) -.!..  an-l  A 
z 
welLformedJoop  CFS[s ...  fJ  A 
exec( CFS, a n-l)  =  Some an  ---t 
y =  s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl + 1} 
z = f {pc := pc(J) - 1} 
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PROOF  From  the definition  of a  well  formed  loop  (Definition  31)  we  know that 
ys  is  referentially transparent.  From  Definition  32  we  see  that the execution  of 
a sequence of referentially transparent instructions affects only the stack and the 
program counter. 
So  in state an-l the stack is  equal to the stack in state an-2 with the addition of 
two extra values at the top implying that 
stkn- 2  =  tl(tl(stkn _ 1)  (5.5) CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE  122 
stk before  ys  stk after ys  stk after branch 
Figure 5.4:  Stack unchanged by ys followed  by branch 
and all other values in (Tn_l-~excluding the program counter-- are equal to those of 
(Tn-2· 
Execution of the conditional branch instruction in state (Tn-l  pops the two topmost 
values from the stack (after comparing them). This means that 
stkn- 2  =  stkn  (5.6) 
and, as all other elements of the states apart from the program counters are data-
equal 
(5.7) 
This situation is illustrated in Figure 5.4.  • 
Using these lemmas and the lemmas for  the sequence weakest precondition we  can 
now  prove Proposition 1: 
Theorem 7  (Loop guard false on exit-bytecode logic) 
V (To  (Tn  CFS s f. (CFS, ao) ~  an  1\ 
f 
CFS[s ...  f]  =  [(UBF  Ixsl + 1)]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB  Ixs@ysl)] 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ... fl 
~  -, (sequence~wp ys branch_cond) an 
PROOF  From Lemma 56,  Lemma 57, and Lemma 59.  • CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE  123 
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Figure 5.5:  Preliminary execution of the loop 
5.3  Preservation of the Invariant 
Assuming  that execution  of the loop  begins  in state 0"0,  in  which  the invariant 
assert P  holds and whose  program counter points to the unconditional branch in-
struction, we  show that the conditional branch instruction is  reached for  the first 
time via the execution of the instructions ys.  This is illustrated in Figure  5.5. 
Lemma 60 (Initial pattern of loop execution ) 
where 
'V  0"0  O"n  CFS sf y  z.  (CFS, 0"0)  ~  O"n  1\ 
f 
pC(O"o)  = pc(s)  1\ 
welLformedJoop  CFS[s ...  fl  ----+ 
:30"1  0"2.  exec  (CFS,O"o)  =  Some  0"1  1\ 
PC(0"1)  = pc(m)  1\ 
y = s {pC:= pc(s) + Ixsl + 1} 
z = f {pc := pc(J) - I} 
(CFS, 0"1)  ~  0"2  1\ 
z 
PC(0"2)  = pc(J) 1\ 
(CFS, 0"2)  ~  O"n 
f 
PROOF  From Lemma 53 and Lemma 54. 
As in the proof described in Section 5.2, we now consider the block 
• 
(CFS,0"2)  ~  O"n,  where w  =  s {pc := pc(s) + I} and PC(0"2)  =  pc(J), and apply 
f 
the block execution case rule.  Once again this presents the two possibilities shown 
in Figure  5.2 CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE  124 
•  the Stop rule applies: 
exec (CFS,  0"2) =  Some O"n  /\  pc(  0"2) =  pc(J)  (5.8) 
•  the Continue rule applies: 
:30"3· exec (CFS,  0"2) =  Some 0"3  /\ (CF8, 0"3) ~  O"n  /\  PC(0"2)  =  pc(J)  (5.9) 
f 
In the Stop case, we prove the following lemma: 
Lemma 61 (Initial, second and final states data-equal ) 
where 
V 0"0  0"1  0"2  O"n  CFS sf y  z.  welLformedJoop  CFS[s .. ·fl /\ 
pC(O"o)  =  pc(s) /\ 
exec (CFS,O"o)  =  Some 0"1  /\ 
(CFS, 0"1) ~  0"2  /\ 
z 
exec (CFS,  0"2) =  Some  O"n  /\ 
PC(0"2)  =  pc(f) --+ 
y =  s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl + 1} 
z = f {pc := pc(J) - I} 
PROOF  From the operational semantics of the unconditional branch instruction, we 
know that only the program counters of states 0"0  and 0"1  differ, so 0"0  ~ 0"1· 
From the definition of a well  formed loop (Definition 31)  we  know that ys  is  refer-
entially transparent and so, as in Lemma 59,  0"1  ~ O"n.  _ 
This then allows us to show that the invariant is preserved for  the Stop case: 
Lemma 62 (Invariant preserved-Stop case) 
V ao  an  CFS sf y  z.  (CFS,ao) ~  O"n  /\ 
f 
exec ( CFS, 0"0)  =  an 
pC(O"o)  =  pc(s) /\ 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ...  fl  --+ 
(assert P)  an CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE  125 
PROOF  From Lemma 60,  Lemma 61  and Lemma 51.  • 
\Ve now turn to the case relating to the Continue rule.  As in the proof of Theorem 
7,  we  reason by cases on the branch condition, which produces a contradiction in 
the case where the condition is  false,  leaving us to consider the case in which the 
branch is taken. 
We again use the fact that the unconditional branch instruction will not be reached 
again during the execution of this block (Lemma 53).  This leaves us to concentrate 
on the preservation of the invariant, assert P, by the execution of the instructions 
xs@ys@[GBB], assuming we start in a state pointing to the start of xs and in which 
assert P holds. 
It  is obvious that, in order to prove that the preservation of assert P by one execution 
of the loop body implies its preservation by multiple executions, it will be necessary 
to use some form of inductive argument.  This is the approach used in the proofs of 
soundness of the while rule for more traditional Hoare logics  [56,  lOj.  These proofs 
are rea..<;onably  straightforward as  in  the inductive definition of the language,  one 
step of execution corresponds to one execution of the body of the loop. 
In the bytecode programming logic, however, this is not the case.  The block execu-
tion relation works at a much finer grain, i.e.  that of individual bytecode instruc-
tions, several of which may be needed to represent a single 'higher level' instruction 
like  array assignment.  In addition, although the invariant holds at the beginning 
and end of the body of the loop, it mayor may not hold between these points. 
In standard inductive definitions of execution like those mentioned above,  this is 
not a problem as the body, C, of a loop many be inductively built up from several 
commands el , ...  , en,  but is  viewed as a single command in its own right.  In this 
way we can abstract away from the finer detail and view its execution to be viewed 
as a single step.  In the block execution relation however, a single step of execution 
is that of a single bytecode instruction, and so we cannot use the block execution 
relation directly to reason about the preservation of assert P  across  a loop  body 
consisting of several bytecode instructions. 
It is  clearly necessary to find  a relation describing a  'big step' of execution in  the 
bytecode world.  If the execution of the loop can be described  in such a  manner 
we can then carry out a successful induction leading to the proof of preservation of 
the invariant.  Of course, this relation must also take into account the fact that we 
must explicitly execute the 'structure' of the loop, represented by the instructions 
ys@[GBBj. CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE  126 
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Figure 5.6:  Decomposition of loop 
a 
Figure 5.7:  Loop as transitive closure of blocks 
5.3.1  A  'Big Step' Execution Relation for Loops 
If we  consider the section xs@ys@[GBB  Ixs@ysl]  of a well-formed  loop for  which 
the relation (GFS,(jo) ~  (jn  holds, where w =  s {pc := pc(s) + l)jpc(s)], we see 
f 
that it could be viewed as two separate blocks:  xs  and ys@[GBB].  The states (jo 
and (j n  can then be seen to be members of a set of states representing 'big steps' of 
execution: 
Definition 33 (Loop as series of big steps) 
bigstepJoop  ==  ({a, b):  :3  c.  (GFS, a) ~  c  1\  (GFS, c).2...,.  b}+ 
x  f 
where 
w =  s {pc:= pc(s) + 1)jpc(s)] 
x =  s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl)jpc(s)] 
y =  s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl + l)jpc(s)] 
Even if the branch is  taken back to the start of xs, the state b is outside the block 
ys@[GBB  Ixs@ysl]  and so  the relation  holds.  This is  shown  in  Figure  5.6  and 
Figure 5.7. 
As the pairs of states in this relation span the whole of the block 
xs@ys@[ GBB Ixs@ysll we now have a relation upon which we can perform induction. CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE  127 
But first  we  must show that if two states are in  the block execution relation they 
are also in the 'big step· relation, (Definition 33).  Once again the mismatch of step 
size means the proof cannot be obtained directly by induction on (CFS, ao) --!  an, 
f 
and we  must first address this issue. 
The following  lemma defines the notion of 'big' steps of execution that start any-
where  in  the instructions  xs@ys  and finish  by executing the conditional  branch 
instruction at pe(J), as shown in Figure  5.8.  The conditional branch can be viewed 
as a 'pivot' instruction:  after each execution of the body of the loop, the conditional 
branch must be executed, resulting either in termination of the loop, or at least one 
subsequent execution of the loop body. 
Lemma 63 (Loop execution 'pivots' on conditional branch) 
where 
VCFS sf w z ao  an·  (CFS, ao) ~  an  1\ 
f 
welLformedJoop CFS[s ...  fl ----+ 
(ao,  an) E 
{( a, b):  exec ( CFS, a)  =  b  1\  pe( a)  =  pe(!) V 
(3  c.  exec(CFS, c)  =  b  1\ 
w =  s {pc := pees) + 1} 
z = f {pc := pe(J) - 1} 
pe( c)  =  pe(J)  1\ 
(CFS, a) ~  c)  V 
z 
w 
PROOF  By  rule induction on (CFS, ao)  ----+ an.  In both the Stop and Continue 
f 
cases we  now  proceed by cases on the condition pe(ao)  =  pc(J). 
In the Stop case we have 
exee(CFS,ao)  =  Some an  (5.10) 
If pe(ao)  =  pe(f),  the lefthand disjunct  of our goal  holds.  In  the case where 
pe(uo)  =1=  pe(f), we have a contradiction as pc(un )  is outside the block and is only 
reachable from  the instruction at f. 
For both truth values of pe(ao)  =  pe(J) in the Continue case, we use the induction 
hypothesis,  along  with  the standard Isabelle  theorems  for  "unrolling"  transitive 
closure relations and the construction rules for  the block execution relation to show 
that the required result holds.  • CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE  128 
s  f 
Figure 5.8:  Relation "pivoting" on instruction at f 
Lemma 64 (States in block relation imply states in big step relation) 
where 
VCFS ao  an sf w  X  y.  (CFS,ao) ---! an  1\ 
f 
welUormedJoop CFS[s ...  f]  ~ 
w =  s {pc:= pc(s) + 1} 
(ao,  an) E  {(a, b):  :3  c.  (CFS, a) ~  c  1\ 
I 
(CFS, c)  -.!!.....  b}+ 
f 
x = s {pc := pc(s) + Ixsl} 
y =  s {pc:= pc(s) + Ixsl + 1} 
PROOF  From Lemma 63  • 
This result  allows  us to carry out the induction over  the body of the loop  (plus 
structure instructions), leading us to a proof of Proposition 2: CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE 
Theorem 8  (Invariant preserved by loop) 
'V  0"0  O"n  CFS sf· (CFS,O"o)  ~  O"n/\ 
f 
welLformecUoop  CFS[s ...  fJ  /\ 
P  0"0  /\ 
['V  O"~  O"~  O"~  CFS'  w  y  z s' 1'. (CFS', O"~) ~  O"~  /\ 
x 
( CFS', O"~) ~  O"~  /\ 
f 
welLformedJoop  CFS'[s' ...  1'J  /\ 
P  O"~ /\ 
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(sequence_wp  ys  branch_cond)  O"~  --. 
where 
--+  P  O"n 
w =  s' {pc := pc( s') + 1} 
x =  s' {pc := pc(s') + Ixsl} 
y =  s' {pc := pc(s') + Ixsl + 1} 
P  O"~] 
PROOF  By induction on the Bigstep relation (Definition 33), and from Lemma 60, 
Lemma 61, Lemma 62,  Lemma 63, and Lemma 64.  • 
5.4  Proof of Soundness of Loop Rule 
In this section we describe the proof of soundness of the Loop Rule itself, beginning 
with the proof of some necessary lemmas. 
Lemma 65 (First exception is None in exception free block ) 
'V  0"0  O"n  CFS  s f. (CFS, 0"0) ~  O"n  /\ 
f 
CFS[s ...  fJ  =  xs  /\ 
excep_free  xs 
--. XPo  =  None CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE  130 
where 
PROOF  By case analysis of the block execution relation plus the definition of excep_free .• 
Lemma 66 (Exception free implies final state non-terminating) 
"lao an  CFS s f. (CFS, ao) ~  an  " 
f 
CFS[s ...  f]  =  xs" 
lisLalLnoLshifLframe xs " 
excep_free  xs 
~  noLterm.5tate an 
PROOF  By induction on the block execution relation, and Lemmas 4 and 65.  • 
\Vhen the Loop Rule is rewritten with the definition of the pre- and post-condition 
relation described in Chapter 4 and simplified, it becomes a proof of the statement 
(assert P  "  ...,  sequence_wp  ys  branch_cond  "  nOLterm.5tate) an  (5.11) 
under the assumptions 
['V  CFS (10  (1n sf. ( CFS, (10) ~  an " 
f 
(CFS,ao) ~  an 
f 
CFS[s ... f]  =  xs  "  (assert P)  ao 
~  (assert P) an] 
CFS[s ... f]  =  [UBF Ixsl + l]@[xs]@[ys]@[CBB  Ixs@ysl)] 
welLformedJoop  [UBF  Ixsl + l]@[xs]@[ys]@[CBB  Ixs@ysl)] 
(assert P)  ao 
(5.12) 
(5.13) 
(5.14) 
(5.15) 
(5.16) 
A  proof of  (...,  sequence_wp  ys  branch_cond)  an,  can be obtained immediately  by 
Theorem 7 and  Assumptions 5.13,  5.14  and 5.15.  Similarly,  a  proof of the third CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE  131 
conjunct, noLterm.state an, can be achieved by Lemma 66  and Assumptions  5.13, 
5.14 and 5.15. 
The proof of (assert P) an is, however, slightly more complex.  \Ve begin by resolving 
with Theorem 8 (after implication introduction), as its conclusion matches that of 
our current goal.  After simplification, we require to prove 
V a~ a~ a~ CFS' s' f' w  x  y  y. (CFS', a~) ~  a~  /\ 
x 
(CFS', a~) ~  a~  /\ 
f' 
welLformedJoop CFS'[s' ...  f']  /\  (5.17) 
where 
w =  s' {pc:= pc(s') + 1} 
x = s' {pc := pc(s') + Ixsl} 
y =  s' {pc := pc(s') + Ixsl + 1} 
(assert P)  a~ /\ 
(sequence_wp  ys  branch_cond)a~  ---t 
(assert P)  a~ 
under Assumptions 5.12,5.13,5.14,5.15 and 5.16.  Further simplification transforms 
this into the problem of proving 
(assert P)  a~ 
under the assumptions 
[V  CFS ao  an sf· (( CFS, ao) ~  an /\ 
f 
(CFS,ao) ~  an 
f 
CFS[s ... fl  =  xs  /\  (assert P) ao 
---t (assert P) anl 
welLformedJoop  CFS[s ... j]  (assert P) ao 
(CFS',a~) ~  a~ 
x 
(CFS',a~)~---t  a~ 
f 
welLformedJoop  CFS'[s' .. . f'] 
(5.18) 
(5.19) 
(5.20) 
(5.22) 
(5.23) 
(5.24) 
(5.25) CHAPTER 5.  SOUNDNESS OF THE LOOP RULE 
(assert P) O"~ 
(sequence_wp ys  branch_cond}O"~ 
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(5.26) 
(5.27) 
Working with these assumptions, we  begin by proving that the invariant holds in 
state O"~, after one execution of the loop body: 
Lemma 67 (Preservation of invariant across body of loop) 
where 
V CFS'  O"~  w  x s'1'. [V  CFS  0"0  O"n  S f· (CFS, 0"0) ~  O"n  /\ 
f 
CFS[s ... J]  =  xs  /\  (assert P)  0" 
-- (assert P) 0" n]  /\ 
welLformedJoop  CFS'[s' ...  1']/\ 
(CFS',O"~) ~  O"~  /\ 
x 
(assert P)  O"~ 
-- (assert P)  O"~ 
w =  s' {pc := pc( s') + 1} 
x  =  s' {pc := pc(s') + Ixsl} 
PROOF  From instantiation of the universally quantified variables CFS,  0"0,  O"n>  s, f 
in Assumption 5.19 to CFS',  O"~,  O"~, k,  l, followed  by simplification.  _ 
We now need to show that the invariant is preserved by the block 
(CFS', O"D  ~  O"~, representing execution of the instructions 
f' 
ys@[(CBB  Ixs@ysl)]. 
The definition of a well-formed loop (Definition 31)  tells us that ys  is  simple,  and 
we begin by showing that this means that the block (CFS, O"D  -'!4  O"~ can be split 
f' 
into a smaller block representing the execution of ys,  followed  by the execution of 
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Lemma 68 (Final state reached by execution of branch) 
where 
V CFS'  a~  a~ s' I  f' IS  yS.  (CFS',a~) ~  a~ 1\ 
f' 
x =  s' {pc := pc(s') + Ixsl} 
inside  s' x  a~ 1\ 
IS  =J.  [J  1\  ys  =J.  [ J 1\ 
CFS'[S' ... f'J  =  ys@[(eBB  IIS@ysl)J -+ 
3(J2'  (eFS',(J~) ~  (J~ 1\ 
x 
exec ( CFS', (J~)  =  Some  (J~  1\ 
pc(  (J~ )  =  pc(J') 
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PROOF  From the definition of simple  (Definition 17),  the only position outside ys 
that it is possible to reach from within ys is the instruction at f.  Therefore the final 
state,  (J~, must be reached by executing the instruction at f.  We  know that  (J~ is 
inside the instructions ys  as it is reached by executing the simple  block  xs  and so 
its program counter must be equal to pc(s)  + length  xs  + 1.  State (J~ is the state 
reached by executing the loop once (as mentioned in the previous lemma) and so is 
inside the block IS.  • 
This gives us (assert P)  (J~ from  Lemma 51,  and we are now able to prove the Loop 
Rule. 
Theorem 9  (Loop Rule) 
{P  1\  sequence_wp  ys  branch_cond} 
xs 
{P} 
welLfermedJoop  [( UBF  Ixsl  +  1)]@[Is]@[ys]@[(eBB  Ixs@ysl)] 
{P} 
[( UBF  Ixsl  +  1 )]@[xs]@[ys]@[(CBB  Ixs@ysl)] 
{P 1\  ....,( sequence_wp  ys  branch_cend  1\  nOLterm~tate} 
PROOF  From  Theorem  7,  Theorem 8,  Lemma 51,  Lemma 66,  Lemma  67,  and 
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5.5  Conclusions 
Despite the superficial similarity of the rule for  loops in bytecode to the while rule 
of the conventional Hoare logic, the proof of soundness for the former is a great deal 
more complex than that of the latter.  This is  due mainly to two points:  the need 
to impose a structure on a 'fiat' bytecode program, and the granularity or step-size 
of our execution relations. 
Conventional Hoare logics are normally based on an operational semantics defined 
in terms of a small number of commands.  The semantics consist of rules for  how 
these commands may be combined to form other commands, and these map easily 
onto the corresponding rules in the Hoare logic.  Additionally, each command can be 
viewed as a separate entity, independent of its context.  In the bytecode world,  the 
commands involved relate to very small steps of execution, and there is no concept 
of combining commands to create other commands.  A program has no structure, 
it is  simply a list.  This means that in order to prove more complex properties of 
bytecode programs, we are compelled to impose a structure on the bytecode which, 
to some extent, does not really exist.  Also, in order to reflect the 'real world' nature 
of the JVM, instructions are not independent entities, but must be viewed  within 
the context of a classfile. 
When it comes to proving properties of our imposed  higher level  structures that 
involve induction, such as in the case of the preservation of an invariant by a loop, we 
again come up against the problem of the lack of any sort of 'combinatory' property 
of bytecode commands. In the conventional logic, the body of a loop is  a command 
and so, using an inductively defined semantics based on the idea of the execution of 
commands, we  are able to induct over the body of any loop regardless of how it is 
formed.  In the bytecode world, the only situation in which we could induct over the 
body of a loop using the execution relations defined  at the level of execution of a 
bytecode command, is if the body only contained one instruction.  Again, there is no 
notion of two bytecode instructions combining to become another type of bytecode 
instruction, they will merely form a list of two instructions.  Consequently, there is 
no way  of proving that any property is  preserved by one step of execution of the 
body, as there is no relation which describes this concept. 
As we have demonstrated, these problems can be overcome and indeed quite elegant 
solutions found.  The idea of data-equality of states deals with the problem of exe-
cuting the structure of higher level patterns explicitly.  This brings the proof more 
in line with that of the conventional logic, where such 'control' structure as if  and 
while are explicitly present in the rules by nature of their formulation in terms of 
syntax.  The definition of execution of a  block of bytecode in terms of 'big-steps' 
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talk about the execution of a 'compound' command in one step. 
We  have shown  that, despite the apparent mismatch between the structured lan-
guage of the conventional Hoare logic and the fiat  unstructured world of bytecode, 
and the considerable challenges it represents, it is  possible to reconcile the two.  In 
addition, we  have been able to produce a workable logic  that will  allow  proofs of 
simple bytecode programs including loops. Chapter 6 
Verification Example 
In  this chapter we  present a proof involving a simple bytecode program containing 
a loop, demonstrating the bytecode programming logic in use.  We also discuss why, 
while is would be possible to prove that the array bounds checks for  another small 
program could be eliminated, it is not currently practical to do so. 
6.1  While Program 
This section details a proof involving the small loop program from Chapter 4: 
public class SimpleWhile  { 
public static void  main(String args[]) 
{ 
} 
} 
int i=O; 
while  (i<5) 
{  i++;  } 
with corresponding bytecode 
o bipush 0 
1  istore 1 
2  goto 8 
5  iinc 1  1 
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8  iload 1 
9  bipush 5 
10  if_icmplt  5 
13 return 
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We  wish to prove that, if execution terminates, the value stored in variable i  is 5. 
In terms of the bytecode program,  we  want to show that the final  value  in  local 
variable 1 (written loc  ! 1)  is equal to 5.  We omit the return instruction as the 
bytecode logic currently does not allow method call or return. 
Proposition 4  (Proof of a  small program with loop) 
{A  a.  (let (stk,loe,en,ml,pe)  =  hd  (snd(snd a))  in 
1  <  length  loe  /\  xp  =  None  1\  frs  I- []) } 
[LAS  bipush  0,  LAS  IAstore  1, 
UBF  (Goto_fwd  2),  LAS  (Iinc  1 1),  LAS  (iload  1), 
LAS  (Bipush 5),  eBB (lficmplLbwd 3)] 
{>.  a.  (let (stk,loe, en, ml, pe)  =  hd  (snd(snd a)) in 
1  <  length  loe  /\  (loe! 1)  =  5)} 
We begin by considering the part of the program containing the loop: 
2  goto 8 
5  iinc  1  1 
8  iload  1 
9  bipush 5 
10  iCicmplt 5 
We take the loop invariant to be 
A a.  (let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc)  =  hd(snd(snd a)  in 
1  <  length loe  1\  (loe! 1)  ~  5) 
(6.1) 
and want to show  that this is  preserved across the body of the loop.  The term 
1  <  length loc  is included because the local variable are represented in  the oper-
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indexing the local variables from 1.  This means that, in order for  us to be able to 
carry out proofs on the list of local variables in Isabelle,  we  must know that the 
length of the list is at least one greater than the highest indexed variable we refer 
to. 
The loop guard is 
sequence_wp [ LAS  (iload 1),  LAS  (Bipush 5)J 
('x  ~. let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc)  =  hd  (snd(snd (1))  in  (6.2) 
(hd(tI stk»  < hd  stk»» 
and we want to show that this is false on exit from the loop. 
We begin by calculating the sequence weakest precondition (Definition 30) of the in-
structions [ LAS  (iload 1),  LAS  (Bipush 5)J  which set up the stack for the conditional 
branch. 
Lemma 69 (Example calculation of swp of list) 
'if  ~. nOLterm_state £1  ~ 
[(sequence_wp [ LAS  (iload  1),  LAS  (Bipush 5)J 
(,x  £1.  let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc)  =  hd  (snd(snd (1))  in 
(hd(tl stk»  < hd  stk») £1 
(A  £1.  let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc)  hd  (snd(snd (1»  in  (loe! 1) < 5) ~J 
PROOF  By Lemma 43, Lemma 49, and lemmas for weakest precondition of 
(6.3) 
iload and bipush.  • 
We now  show that execution of the body of the loop preserves the invariant,  as 
required by the loop rule: 
Lemma 70 (Loop body preserves invariant) 
{,x  £1.  (let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc)  =  hd  (frames  (~»  in 
1  <  length  loe  1\  (loe!1)  ~  5  1\  (loe!1)  < 5)} 
[LAS  (Iinc  1  1)J 
{,x~. (let (stk, loe, en, ml,pe)  =  hd  (frames  (~»  in 
1  <  length  loe  1\  (loc! 1) ~  5)} 
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PROOF  By the weakest precondition of the line instruction, and simplification.  _ 
These lemmas now allow us to prove the following lemma about the loop section of 
the program 
Lemma 71 (Proof of correctness-loop section) 
{(A  a.  (let (stk, loe, en, ml,pe)  =  hd  (frames (a))  in 
1  <  length  loe  /\  (loe!  1) ::;  5  /\  (loe  1 1) < 5} 
[UBF  (Goto_fwd  2),  LAS  (line 1 1),  LAS  (iload  1), 
LAS  (Bipush 5),  eBB (lficmplLbwd  3)J 
{(A  a.  (let (stk, loe, en, ml,pe)  =  hd  (frames (a))  in 
1  <  length  loe  /\  (loe!  1) ::;  5} 
PROOF  By Lemma 70 and the Theorem 9 (Loop Rule).  -
We are also able to prove that, on termination of the loop, the desired postcondition 
holds. 
Lemma 72 (Invariant and negation of guard implies postcondition) 
Va.  (A  a.  (let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc)  =  hd  (frames (a))  in 
1  <  length  loe  /\  (loel  1) ::;  5  /\  -, (loe  1 1) < 5 
/\  nOLterm_state a)) a 
==>  (A  a.  (let (stk, loe, en, ml, pc)  =  hd  (frames (a))  in 
1  <  length  loe  /\  (loel1) =  5)) a 
PROOF  By Lemma 28  (Postcondition Weakening) and simplification. 
We  now return to the first section of the program: 
o bipush 0 
1  istore 1 
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and show that, assuming the desired precondition, execution of these instructions 
results in the loop invariant 
Lemma 73 (Precondition leads to invariant) 
{'x  u.  1  <  length  loc  1\  xp  =  None  1\  (frames (u))  =1=  []} 
(let (stk,loc, cn, ml, pc)  =  hd  (frames (u))  in 
[LAS  bipush 0,  LAS  IAstore  1] 
{(,X  u.  (let (stk,loc, cn, ml,pc)  =  hd  (frames (u))  in 
1  <  length  loc  1\  (loc!  1) ~  5))} 
PROOF  By Theorem 4 (Sequencing Rule) and lemmas for the weakest preconditions 
of the instructions bipush and IAstore.  _ 
We are now able to prove Proposition 4: 
Theorem 10 (Proof of simple incrementation while loop program) 
{,X  u.  (let (stk,loc, cn, ml, pc)  =  hd  (frames (u))  in 
1  <  length  loc  1\  xp  =  None  1\  (frames (u))  =1=  []) 
[LAS  bipush  0,  LAS  IAstore  1, UBF  (Goto_fwd  2),  LAS  (Iinc 1 1),  LAS  (iload  1), 
LAS  (Bipush 5),  eBB (lficmplLbwd 3)] 
{.A  u.  (let (stk, loc, cn, ml, pc)  =  hd  (frames (0"))  in 
1  <  length  loc  1\  (loc! 1)  =  5)} 
PROOF  By the Sequencing Rule (Theorem 4), Lemma 72  and Lemma 73.  _ 
6.2  Array Bounds Elimination 
After the proof of a small program containing a  loop,  our intention was  to prove 
that it was safe to eliminate the array bounds checks on a  program containing a 
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public class Arraybounds  { 
} 
public static void main(String args[])  { 
int  i=O; 
} 
int myarray[]  = new  int[5]; 
while  (i<  5)  { 
} 
myarray[i]  = 2; 
i++; 
with bytecode 
0  iconst_O 
1  istore_1 
2  iconst_5 
3  new array int 
5  astore_2 
6  goto  16 
9  aload_2 
10  iload_1 
11  iconst_2 
12  iastore 
13  iinc 1  1 
16  iload_1 
17  iconst_5 
18  if_icmplt  9 
21  return 
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Our aim is to prove that, immediately before an array update operation the array 
address is  non-null  and the index is  within bounds.  However,  the array update 
instruction is  in the  middle  of the body of the loop.  As  we  can only  say  with 
certainty that the loop invariant holds at the beginning and end of the loop body, 
we cannot ensure that a loop invariant that included our desired property will hold 
just before the array update instruction. 
The ideal solution to this problem would  be to introduce some kind of assertion 
statements to the logic.  These would allow us  to state that certain properties hold 
at various intermediate points in the code.  But this would  entail a  fairly  major CHAPTER 6.  VERIFICATION EXAMPLE  142 
addition to the logic,  and is  therefore included in the  "Further Work"  section of 
Chapter 7. 
A more ad hoc solution would be to alter the bytecode of the program slightly so 
that the array update instruction appeared at the beginning of the loop body, where 
the loop invariant would hold. 
° 
iconst_O 
1  istore_1 
2  iconst_5 
3  newarray int 
5  astore_2 
6  aload_2 
7  iload_1 
8  iconst_2 
9  goto  16 
10  aload_2 
11  iload_1 
12  iconst_2 
13  iastore 
14  iinc 1  1 
16  iload_1 
17  iconst_5 
18  iLicmplt 9 
21  return 
But while this would produce a program that our current programming logic could 
deal with, it seems to defeat the purpose of our aim of smaller, more efficient  byte-
code programs as the "provable" bytecode program is three instructions longer than 
the original program. 
In addition to this, the proof involving the smaller loop program of seven instructions 
is in the region of 400 lines long.  As the longer proof involves a program containing 
almost three times as many instructions, it is likely to be around 1,200 lines long. 
Therefore, while it would be feasible  to carry out an array bounds elimination with 
the logic in its current state, it can be argued that it is not really reasonable.  Ren-
dering such proofs managable in practice is likely to require two features.  Firstly, 
the addition of assertion statements to the logic to avoid the necessity of reordering 
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instructions, a precondition, and a postcondition and carrying out the proof using 
the rules of the programming logic.  A description of such a  tactic can be found 
in [16]. 
6.3  Conclusions 
Although we  have not successfully managed to prove a  property more related to 
JIT optimization,  the above proof demonstrates that we  have been successful  in 
constructing a  framework  in  which it is  possible  to prove  properties of bytecode 
programs.  With the addition of the features discussed in Section 7.2  most of them 
already documented in other work~  it would be possible to prove many properties 
necessary for  JIT optimization. Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
Our aim was to develop a way of proving properties of bytecode programs that would 
allow JIT compilers to make optimizations not currently possible. 
In chapter 3 we  give  the definitions of a  number of relations for  the execution of 
bytecode programs, and describe the proof of some related lemmas and thE'orE'ms. 
The concept of data-equality is  introduced as a method of comparing thE'  parts of 
two JVM states not related to position within a particular classfile. 
These formalized concepts form the basis for the subsequent development of several 
rules constituting a  programming logic for  bytecode programs.  The derivation of 
these rules is  presented in Chapter 4,  and the idea of data-equality is  used again, 
this time to overcome the problems inherent in having to execute the structure of 
loops and conditional sequences explicitly. 
In  chapter 5 we  present  a  proof of the soundness of our proposed  rule for  loops, 
contrasting its complexity with that of the same proof in conventional Hoare logics. 
Finally, in chapter 6 we  present a proof of a simple bytecode program containing a 
loop, thereby demonstrating the use of our programming logic. 
7.1  Bytecode Proof and Mechanized Reasoning 
In this section we discuss our experiences of the difficulties inherent in  carryinl!, out 
proof at the level of bytecode instructions, along with the benefits and disadvant ages 
of using a mechanized proof tool. 
The use  of a  mechanized proof tool is  central to our results.  It has  the benefit 
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of enabling us  to keep  track of very  complex  proofs  involving  many definitions. 
Additionally, as mentioned before, it provides an additional degree of confidence in 
the validity of these proofs. The Isabelle system was considered particularly suitablf' 
for our work as it facilitates the definition of logics and subsequent proofs involving 
them.  In the course of the work, however, we encountered several difficulties which 
offset these advantages. 
7.1.1  Size and Complexity of Proofs 
As  previously  discussed,  bytecode  programs lack  the sort of syntactic structure 
present in the higher level languages for  which Hoare logics  are more usually de-
fined.  This means that rather than recognising,  for  example, the keyword while 
and applying the relevant rule,  we  must identify 'structural instructions' within a 
bytecode pattern, check that they conform to certain constraints, and explicitly ex-
ecute them. This results in a great deal of proof in addition to that neces.c'a.ry in  th£> 
conventional logics (c.f.  Chapter 5). 
Possibly the main difficulty we encountered in the course of this work was the sheer 
length and complexity of the proofs involved.  Although the concepts behind the 
proofs can be communicated in a fairly high-level way to human beings  as we hope 
we have demonstrated in the preceding chapters  this approach cannot be applipd to 
the Isabelle definitions and proof scripts. The JVM world is vpry detailed; it contains 
a  great deal  of information  and the Isabelle  model  must  reflect  this.  It  Hwans, 
however,  that there can be no  'glossing over' of the details, and every  inference 
however small---must be spelled out. 
The proofs of the various theorems in this report each run to several hundred lines 
of code, not including the necessary lemmas.  The files  related to the soundness of 
the while rule contain in the region of 10,000 lines of code.  The complete count for 
the whole logic is around 22,000 lines.  It is likely that this could be reduced to some 
extent by packaging repeated patterns of proof as tactics, or by more effective use 
of the automatic tactics. It gives an idea, however of the amount of detail involved 
in the proofs. 
One feature that would be invaluable with proofs of this length would b£>  the a.bility 
to save only the successful commands in a proof session.  The basic Isabellf' intt'rfac(' 
relies on the user remembering to note down every successful command  and remove 
every  unsuccessful  command  used  to achieve  a  proof in  a  text editor.  This is 
reasonable with smaller proofs,  but in those running to several hundred lines  it is 
all too easy to make mistakes.  Unfortunately even one instruction missed out or left 
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in order to identify the error. 
Fortunately,  Proof General  [7],  the most recently available interface  for  use  with 
Isabelle,  has a  mechanism  for  "locking"  commands in  a  text editor  as  they  are 
successfully executed by the prover.  It is our opinon that improved user int£'rfaces 
to proof tools will become essential as proofs get larger and more complex in order 
to deal with real world systems (c.f.  the ESC and LOOP projects).  Certainly it 
is the case that no team of software engineers would attempt to carry out sizeable 
projects with only a compiler and a text editor. 
7.1.2  Proofs Involving Lists 
Another drawback to the structureless form of bytecode programs is  the necC'5..<;ity 
of dealing with a large number of proofs involving lists.  Normally this would  not 
be a problem:  list properties can usually be proved by induction, and the Isabelle 
distribution already contains many lemmas about lists. 
Unfortunately the lists of instructions we are interested in are often not lists in their 
own right as  such, but slices of a larger list (Definition 6).  As  we  are,  in a s£'nse, 
coming at the list from both ends we  cannot use induction:  if we  induct on either 
the start or end position we change the length of our list; if we try to induct on th£' 
slice itself we  upset the relationship between the start and end points.  This ml'ClnS 
that we  must rely on rewriting with the various lemmas for  take and drop,  which 
can result in some quite tricky proofs. 
7.1.3  Automatic Tactics 
The fact that instructions are not viewed as independent entities, but rather Illust 
be extracted from  a set of class  files  and a state, means that a  lot  of information 
is  contained within the assumptions of each  proof.  The block execution H'lation 
involves  two states each consisting of three elements,  a set of classfil£'s.  two class 
name identifiers, two method identifiers, and two program count('r valul's.  So an  ~­
sumption or definition involving quantification over these variables requir£'s thirh'£'ll 
instantiations.  Often there are too many possibilities for Isabelle's rC'solution tactics 
to find these instantiations automatically, so each variable must bp instantiat{'(l hy 
hand. 
The large number of assumptions in many of the proofs also  frC'qu('utly  confusC's 
the automatic  tactics.  It is  often  the case  that the simplifier  will  g('t  nowh£'rf' 
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conclusion.  But if the relevant assumptions are extracted and used in the goal of a 
separate lemma the tactics succeed almost immediately. 
This may well  be a  problem that is  solved in more recent versions of Isabelle;  in 
particular the rewriting of asm_full_simp_  tac so that results do not depend on the 
order in which the assumptions appear might well  have a significant effect on  this 
problem.  Unfortunately, one of the more recent versions of Isabelle made significant 
changes which would have necessitated changes in Pusch's formalisation of the se-
mantics, and consequently we made the decision to stay with our current version of 
the prover (Isabelle 99)  despite the improved features of newer versions. 
The size and complexity of our proofs pushed the computing power available to ns 
to its limits.  The memory requirements of our proofs often exceeded the 256Mb of 
RAM available to us, causing Isabelle to crash. 
These difficulties call into question the wisdom  of attempting proofs  of bytecode 
programs.  But, as mentioned before, despite its drawbacks, the stack based virtual 
machine appears to be here to stay,  at least for  the foreseeable  future.  Therefore 
the ability to carry out proof at this level has oefinite value. 
7.2  Further Work 
Having developed a simple programming logic  for  bytecode programs, then" are a 
number of ways  in which it could be extended.  The most obvious first step is  the 
extension of the operational semantics to include all bytecode instructions available 
in the JVM,  rather than the subset currently treated.  One possibility  would  b(' 
to transfer the underlying formalization on which our work is  based to the J!Java 
theories  [39],  which  include  a  larger set of instructions and deal  with  exception 
handling. 
In terms of the bytecode execution relations, the main drawback is  the restriction 
that states must be all in the same method of a particular class.  This means that 
it is  impossible to work  with bytecode programs that include  method invocation 
or return, which is  clearly not realistic.  One possible way of lifting this restriction 
might be to in effect inline the code of the method being called (Section 1.2), which 
would result in a larger block that included the code of all methods called. 
Alternatively, as the frame of the method in which we start a block remains on the 
frame  stack when  a  new  method is  called,  we  could  require  that rather than all 
classes and methods being equal across a path of execution that there exists a chain 
through various method calls, returning to the calling method. That is CHAPTER 7.  CONCLUSIONS 
in_frame_stack s (xp, hp,fr: Irs)  same_method s (xp, hp,fr) V 
in_frame..stack s (xp, hp,frs) 
in_frame_stack  S  (To  " 
same_method s (Tn 
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The fact that our programming logic relies on the code that is being executed never 
throwing exceptions is  again unrealistic in a  real world  situation.  Consequently, 
another useful extension would involve modelling Java's exception handling method 
in the operational semantics,  and altering the programming logic  in  such  a  way 
that it allows us to reason about programs that terminate abruptly as a  result of 
exceptions being raised.  The logic described by Jacobs in  [21]  has this ability. 
Finally, it would be useful to add assertion statements to the programming logic. 
This would allow the proof of assertions at intermediate points in a program, rather 
than just the start and finish.  This would facilitate the proof of more complex loop 
programs, as discussed Section 6.2. 
In terms of incorporating bytecode proof into a working system, it would obviously 
be unreasonable to invoke  Isabelle at runtime.  Also,  any system requiring much 
extra work from users is unlikely to be popular, and so a model similar to that used 
by ESC where user input to the proof process is  minimal and viewed  as a  kind of 
"advanced typechecker"  would be preferable. 
Another possibility would be to build on either the Annotated JIT projfft where 
bytecode programs arrive with optimizing annotations than can be used by  an an-
notation aware JIT compiler.  Obviously this raises the question of whethrr or not 
the annotations can be trusted.  Therefore it seems likely that some sort of digita.l 
signature might be required here, or possibly a proof checker like that used in proof 
carrying code systems.  Alternatively,  it might  be possible to prove  that for  cer-
tain patterns of bytecode particular optimizations are safe, e.g.  a loop of thl8 form 
including an array operation can have  the array bounds check eliminated.  These 
'proved patterns' could be stored as a library against which incoming programs could 
be compared and action taken by the JIT accordingly. 
7.3  Contribution 
We  have demonstrated that it is  possible to define a progrcuullling logic  for  byte-
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instructions available for  use in the programs are currently limited, but the basis is 
in place for  extension. 
The development of this logic was not by any means straightforward.  It required the 
definition of several execution relations for  bytecode programs, each necessary  for 
proofs of different  aspects of execution.  In addition, the flat,  unstructured nature 
of bytecode programs presents a number of difficulties, particularly when reasoning 
about loops.  But there are, as we demonstrate, some quite elegant solutions to these 
problems. 
While it would be possible to use the logic in its current state to prove properties that 
would allow the speeding up of bytecode programs, we believe that such proofs would 
be of an unreasonable size and complexity to carry out in practice.  The addition 
of assertion statements to the logic and the creation of an Isabelle tactic capable of 
automating such proofs would be necessary to render such proofs managable. 
7.4  Concluding Remarks 
In the course of this work we have demonstrated that it is possible to carry out proof 
at the level of Java bytecode instructions.  In order to reach this state we  have bC<'n 
forced  to consider and find  solutions for  some hard problems, involving some long 
and complex proofs which pushed the bounds of wha.t  our mechanized  proof tool 
was able to handle. The resulting programming logic,  while not complete, provid('s 
a firm basis that with some extension should allow the proofs of bytecode  pro~rams 
necessary to allow several JIT optimizations. Appendix A 
Extension of LoadAndStore.  thy 
LoadAndStore  = Runtime  + 
(**  load and  store instructions transfer values between  local variables 
and  operand stack **) 
datatype load_and_store = 
lAload  ins_type nat  (11_  load  _"  30) 
(*  load intlref from  local variable *) 
I  lAstore  ins_type nat  ("_  store  II  30) 
(*  store int into/ref local variable *) 
I  Bipush int 
(*  push  int *) 
I  Aconst_null 
(*  push null  *) 
I  line nat int 
(*increment  local var by  int *) 
I  ladd 
(*add two  integers at top of stack *) 
consts 
exec_las  ::  II[load_and_store,opstack,locvars,p_count]  => 
(opstack *  locvars  *  p_count)II 
primrec 
"exec  las  (X  load idx)  stk vars pc = 
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((vars  !  idx)  #  stk  ,  vars  ,  pc+l)" 
"exec las  (X  store  idx)  stk vars pc  = 
(tl stk  ,  vars [idx: =hd  stk]  ,  pc+1) " 
"exec las  (Bipush  ivaI)  stk vars pc  = 
(Intg ivaI  #  stk  ,  vars  ,  pc+l)" 
"exec_las  Aconst_null  stk vars pc  = 
(Null  #  stk  ,  vars  ,  pc+i) " 
"exec_las  (linc idx  ivaI)  stk vars pc  = 
(stk,  vars[idx:=  (lntg(get_Intg(vars  !  idx)  +  ivaI))],  pc+i)" 
"exec_las  Iadd stk vars pc  = 
(Intg  ((get_Intg  (hd stk))  + 
(get_Intg  (hd(tl stk))))  #  (tl(tl stk))  ,  vars  ,  pc+i)" 
end 
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Isabelle .  thy Files 
B.l  ListSlice.  thy 
ListSlice =  HOL  +  List +  Nat  + 
(*  mid  m n  xs  consists of  n  elements  of  xs  from  position m 
onwards.  Precondition is that m +  n  <=  length xs.  *) 
constdefs mid  ::  "nat  =>  nat  =>  ) a  list =>  ) a  list" 
"mid  m n  xs  ==  take n  (drop m xs)" 
(*  fromto  s  f  xs  consists of  the  elements of  xs  from  position s  to 
position f  inclusive.  Precondition is that s  < length xs & 
f  < length xs  *) 
constdefs fromto  ::  "nat =>  nat =>  ) a  list =>  ) a  list" 
"fromto  s  f  xs  ==  mid  s  (Suc  (f  - s))  xs" 
end 
B.2  State_parts.  thy 
State_parts =HOL  +  Exec  + 
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types 
boundary 
minframe  "opstack *locvars *p_count" 
minstate =  "(xcpt option  *minframe)" 
constdefs 
get_stk 
"get_stk 
get_Ioc  .. 
"get_Ioc 
frame  =>  opstack 
%(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc). 
"frame  =>  locvars" 
%(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc). 
"boundary  =>  cname" 
%(cn,ml,pc).  cn" 
cn_of::  "boundary  =>  cname" 
stk" 
loc" 
"cn_of  strt  ==  let  (cn,ml,pc)  = strt in cn" 
st_cn_of::  "frame=>  cname" 
"st cn  of st  ==  let  (stk,  loc,  cn,ml,pc)  = st in cn" 
stk_of  ::  "frame  =>  opstack" 
"stk_of st ==  let  (stk,  loc,  cn,ml,pc)  = st in stk" 
loc_of  ::  "frame  =>  locvars" 
"loc_of  st  let (stk,  loc,  cn,ml,pc)  =  st in loc" 
st_pc_of  ::  "frame  =>  p_count" 
"st_pc_of st ==  let  (stk,  loc,  cn,ml,pc)  =  st in pc" 
"boundary  =>  method_loc" 
%(cn,ml,pc).  ml" 
ml_of  ::  "boundary =>  method_loc" 
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let  (cn,ml,pc)  =  s  in ml" 
st_ml  of  "frame  =>  method_loc" 
"st_ml_of st  ==  let  (stk,loc,  cn,ml,pc)  st in ml" 
get_pc  "frame  =>  p_count" 
"get_pc -- %(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc).  pc" 
pc_equals  ::  "[frame,  p_count]  =>  bool" 
"pc_equals frs pca ==  let  (stk,loc,cn,ml  ,pc)  ..  frs in 
pc  =  pca" 
pc_of  ..  "boundary =>  p_count" 
"pc_of  %(cn,ml,pc).  pc" 
same_method_bounds  ::  "[boundary,  boundary]  =>  bool" 
"same_method_bounds  s  f  ==  (cn_of  s  =  cn_of  f)  &: 
(ml_of  s  = ml_of  f)" 
same_method_frs  ::  "[boundary,  frame,frame,  boundary]  -> bool" 
"same_method_frs  s  a  b  f  ==  «st_cn_of  a  = st_cn_of  b)  &: 
Cst_cn_of  a  =  cn_of  s)  &:  Cst_cn_of  a  =  cn_of  f»  &: 
CCst_ml_of  a  =  st_ml_of  b)  &:  (st_ml_of  a  amI_of  s)  &: 
(st_ml_of  a  = ml_of f»" 
inlist::  "[instr list, minframe]  =>  bool" 
"inlist xs  a  ==  let  (stk,loc,pc)  =  a  in 
o <=  pc  &:  pc  <=  «(length xs)  - 1)" 
outlist ::" [instr list, minframe]  -> bool" 
"outlist xs  a  ==  let (stk,loc,pc)  =  a  in 
(length xs)  <=  pc" 
third_of  ::  "excpt option *  heap  *frame list)  =>frame  list" 
"third_of  ==  % (xp,  hp,  frs).  frs" 
inside  "[frame list, boundary,  boundary]  .. >  bool" 
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"inside frs  s  f  let  (stk,loc,cn,ml,pc)  =  hd  frs in 
outside  ::  "[frame list, boundary,  boundary]  =>  bool" 
"outside frs s  f  ==  let (stk,loc,cn,ml,pc) = hd  frs  in 
constdefs 
getOSargl  "frame  =>  opstack" 
"getOSargl  'l.(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc).  stk" 
getOSarg2  "frame  =>  p_count" 
"getOSarg2  'l.(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc).  pc" 
getOSarg3  "frame  =>  cname" 
"getOSarg3  ==  'l.(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc).  cn" 
getOSarg4  "frame  =>  method_loc" 
"getOSarg4  'l.(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc).  ml" 
putOSargs  ::"[frame,(opstack*p_count)]  =>  frame" 
"putOSargs  ==  %(stk',  loc',  cn' ,m!' ,pc')  (stk,  pc). 
(stk,  loc' ,cn' ,ml' ,pc)" 
getLASargl 
"getLASargl 
getLASarg2 
"getLASarg2 
getLASarg3 
"getLASarg3 
== 
--
"frame  =>  opstack" 
%(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc).  stk" 
"frame  =>  locvars" 
%(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc).  loc" 
"frame  =>  p_count" 
%(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc).  pc" 
putLASargs  ::"[frame,(opstack*locvars*p_count)]  =>  frame" 
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"putLASargs  ==  %(stk', lac',  cn',ml',pc')  (stk,loc, pc). 
(stk,  lac, cn' ,ml' ,pc)" 
get_p_count  ::  "frame  =>  p_count" 
"get_p_count  ==  %(stk,loc,cn,ml,pc).  pc" 
consts 
execCFSindep::"(  instr list*minstate)  =>  (minstate  option)" 
recdef  execCFSindep  "{}" 
"execCFSindep  ([],  (xp,  frs»  None" 
"execCFSindep  (xs,  (None,(stk,loc,pc»)  =  (case  (xs!pc)  of 
LAS  ins =>  (let  (stk',loc',pc') =  exec_las  ins stk lac pc 
in 
Some  (None,(stk',loc',pc'») 
ICO  ins =>  None 
IMO  ins =>  None 
IMA  ins =>  None 
ICH  ins =>  None 
1M!  ins  =>  None 
IMR  ins  =>  None 
IDS  ins  =>  (let  (stk' ,pc')  = 
in 
Some  (None,(stk',loc,pc'») 
ICBF  ins =>(let  (stk' ,pc')  = 
in 
exec_os  ins 
exec_cb_fwd 
Some  (None,(stk',loc,pc'») 
stk  pc 
ins stk  pc 
ICBB  ins =>(let  (stk',pc')  =  exec_cb_bwd  ins stk  pc 
in 
Some  (None,(stk',loc,pc'») 
IUBF  ins =>(let  (pc')  =  exec_ub_fwd  ins pc 
in 
Some  (None,(stk,loc,pc'») 
IUBB  ins =>(let  (pc')  =  exec_ub_bwd  ins  pc 
in 
Some  (None,(stk,loc,pc'»»  II 
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"execCFSindep  (xs,  (Some  xp,  f»  None" 
end 
B.3  Exec_blockO.  thy 
(****************************************** ••  *  ••••••••••••••••••••  ) 
(*  Relation equivalent to the block execution relation,  but  with .) 
(*  separate listing of  head  and tail of  frame  list  .) 
(*  Used  to produce big step relation for  loops  .) 
(***********************.**.***** •••  ***** •••••••••••••••••••••••••  ) 
Exec_blockO  =  HOL  +  Set + List  +  Exec+  State_parts + ListSlice + 
consts exec_blockO  ::"(bytecode •  (cname.(mname.param_desc)  .p_count)  • 
(cname*(mname*param_desc).p_count)  •  (xcpt option. heap .(opstack • 
locvars  *cname  .(mname.param_desc).p_count».(xcpt option. heap. 
(opstack .locvars *cname  *(mname*param_desc).p_count».(opstack  • 
locvars  .cname  .(mname*param_desc)  .p_count)list.(opstack .locvars • 
cname  *(mname*param_desc)  .p_count)list)  set" 
inductive exec_blockO 
intrs 
(.***  •••  ****  End  of  execution of  a  block  - ••••••••••••  ) 
(*** •••  *****  pc'  outside block**  ••••••••••  ) 
Stop"  [I (exec(CFS,  (xp,hp,(stk,loc,cn,(mn,pd),pc)#frs»  •  \ 
\  Some  (xp',hp',(stk',loc',cn',(mn',pd'),pc')#frs'»;\ 
\  inside  «stk,loc,cn,(mn,pd),pc)#frs)  (cnS,(mnS,pdS),pcS) 
(cnF,  (mnF,pdF),pcF);\ 
\  pcF  <  (length(get_code CFS  enS  (mnS,  pdS»);  \ 
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\  same_method_frs  (cnS,(mnS,pdS),pcS)  «stk,loc,cn, (mn,pd) ,pc» 
«stk' ,loc' ,cn' ,(mn' ,pd') ,pc'»  (cnF,  (mnF ,pdF) ,pcF) ; \ 
\  outside  «stk',loc',cn',(mn',pd'),pc')#frs') 
(cnS,(mnS,pdS),pcS)  (cnF,  (mnF,pdF),pcF)I]\ 
\  ==>  (CFS,  (cnS,(mnS,pdS),pcS),  (cnF,  (mnF,pdF) ,pcF) , 
(xp,  hp,  (stk,  loc,  cn,  (mn,pd),  pc», 
(xp',  hp',( stk', loc', en',  (mn',pd'), pc'», frs,  frs'):exec_blockO" 
(***********  Continuation of  execution of  a  block  -'***********) 
(***********  pc"  inside block ***********) 
Continue  "[I(exec(CFS,  (xp,hp,(stk,loc,cn,(mn,pd),pc)#frs»  • 
Some  (xp",hp",(stk",loc",cn",(mn",pd"),pc")#frs"»;\ 
\inside  «stk,loc,cn,(mn,pd),pc)#frs)  (cnS,(mnS,pdS),pcS) 
(cnF,  (mnF,pdF),pcF);\ 
\  pcF  <  (length(get_code  CFS  cnS  (mnS,  pdS»);\ 
\  same_method_frs  (cnS,(mnS,pdS),pcS)  «stk,loc,cn,(mn,pd),pc» 
«stk' , ,loc ' , ,cn' , , (mn' , ,pd' , ) ,pc' , ) )  (cnF,  (mnF, pdf) ,pcF) ; \ 
\  (CFS,  (cnS,(mnS,pdS),pcS),  (cnF,(mnF,pdF),pcF), 
(xp"  ,hp", (stk"  ,loc"  ,cn",  (mn"  ,pd") ,pc' '»  , 
(xp' ,hp', (stk' ,loc' ,cn', (mn' ,pd') ,pc'», frs", frs') :exec_blockO  11\ 
\  ==>  (CFS,  (cnS,(mnS,pdS),(pcS»,  (cnF,(mnF,pdF)  ,pcF) , 
(xp,hp,(stk,loc,cn,(mn,pd),pc»  , 
(xp' ,hp', (stk' ,loc' ,cn', (mn' ,pd') ,pc'», frs,  frs') :exec_blockO" 
end 
B.4  Exec_block3.  thy 
(*************************************************.* ••••  *) 
(*  Block execution relation  .) 
( •••••  ********************************************.**.***) 
Exec_block3 = Exec  +  Exec_blockO  + 
consts exec_block3  ::"(bytecode * boundary  *boundary  * 
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syntax  l@exec_block3"  ::  [bytecode,  boundary,  boundary, 
jvm_state  ,  jvm_state]  =>  bool  (" ___ 1- _  -block->  _"  ) 
translations 
"CFS  s  f  1- a  -block-> b" 
inductive exec_block3 
II (CFS,  s,f,a,b):exec_block3" 
intrs 
Stop  II [I 
\ 
exec  (CFS,  a)  =  Some  b  ;\ 
inside  (third_of  a)  s  f;  \ 
.\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
(pc_of  f)  < length  (get_code  CFS  (cn_of  s)  (ml_of s»;\ 
same_method_frs  s  (hd(snd(snd a»)  (  hd(snd(snd b»)  f  ;\ 
outside  (third_of  b)  s  fl]  \ 
==>  CFS  s  f  1- a  -block-> b" 
Continue  "[1  exec  (CFS,  a)  =  Some  c  ;\ 
inside  (third_of  a)  s  f;\  \ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
end 
B.5 
(pc_of  f)  < length  (get_code CFS  (cn_of  s)  (ml_of s»;\ 
same_method_frs  s  (hd(snd(snd a»)  (hd(snd(snd c»)  f  ;\ 
CFS  s  f  1- c  -block->  bl]\ 
==>  CFS  s  f  1- a  -block-> b" 
Block_pairs.  thy 
(******************************************* •••••••  *.* ••  *) 
(*  Execution path relation  *) 
(***********************************.*** ••••••••••••••  *  ••  ) 
Block_pairs =  HOL  +  Exec  +  Assign  +  State_parts +  Exec_block3 
+  Exec_block_conds  + 
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constdefs 
narrow_boundary  1  "boundary  =>  boundary  II 
"narrow_boundaryi  b  ==  let  (cn,ml,pc)  =  b  in 
(cn,ml, (pc-i»  II 
constdefs 
block_pairs  ::  II[bytecode,  boundary,  boundary,(xcpt option * 
heap  *frame list),  (xcpt  option *  heap  *frame list)]  =>  bool" 
(" ___  1- _ -execute->  _") 
"CFS  S  F  1- s  -execute-> t  == 
(s,t)  :  {(s,t).  exec  (CFS,  s)  Some  t 
& same_method_frs  S  (hd(snd(snd s»)  (  hd(snd(snd t») F & 
inside  (third_of  s)  SF}" 
block_pairs_trancl  ::  II [bytecode,  boundary,  boundary, (xcpt  option * 
heap  *frame list),  (xcpt  option *  heap  *frame list)]  =>  bool" 
(" ___ 1- _  -execute~+-> _") 
"CFS  S  F  1- s  -execute-+-> t  == 
(s,t)  :  {(s,t).  exec  (CFS,  s)  =  Some  t  & 
same_method_frs  S  (hd(snd(snd s»)  (  hd(snd(snd t») F 
& inside  (third_of  s)  S  F  }-+" 
big_step  ::  "[  bytecode,  boundary,  boundary,(xcpt option * 
heap  *frame list),  (xcpt  option *  heap  *frame list)]  =>  bool" 
(" ___  1- _ -bigstep->  _H) 
"CFS  S  F  1- a  -bigstep-> b  == 
(a,b):  {(a,b).«pc_equals  (hd(third_of  a»  (pc_of  F)  & 
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exec(CFS,  a)  =  Some  b)  I  (EX  c.  «pc_equals  (hd(third_of  c»  (pc_of  F)  ) 
& exec  (CFS,c)  =  Some  b  & 
(CFS  S  (narrow_boundary1  F)  1- a  -block-> c»»  }" 
(***  series of big steps  - but all within s  to f  **********) 
big_step_trancl  ::  "[  bytecode,  boundary,  boundary,(xcpt option * 
heap  *frame list),  (xcpt  option *  heap  *frame list)]  =>  bool" 
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"CFS  S  F  1- a  -bigstep-+-> b  == 
(a,b):  {(a,b).«pc_equals  (hd(third_of  a»  (pc_of  F)  & 
exec(CFS,  a)  = Some  b)  1  (  EX  c.  «pc_equals  (hd(third_of  c»  (pc_of  F)  ) 
& exec  (CFS,c)  = Some  b  & (CFS  S(narrow_boundaryl  F)  1- a  -block-> c»»Y+" 
end 
B.6 
constdefs 
excep_free  ::  "[instr list]  -> bool" 
"excep_free  (ys)  -- (ALL  CFS  xpl  hpl frsl xp'  hp'  frs'  cnl  mll  en' 
ml'  pcS  pcF.«  ys  - (fromto  pcS  pcF  (get_code  CFS  cnl  mIl» 
& (CFS  (cnl,(mll),pcS)  (cn',(ml'),pcF) 
1- (xpl,hpl,frs1)  -execute-+->  (xp',hp',frs'») --> 
xp1  = None  & xp'  - None»" 
excep_free_instr  ::  "[instr ]  -> bool" 
"excep_free_instr  (y)  -=  (ALL  xp  stk loc pc  xp'  stk'  loc'  pc'  xs  . 
«xs!pc - y)  & (execCFSindep  (xs,(xp,stk,loe,pc»  -
Some  (xp' ,stk' ,loc' ,pC'»  --> xp  - None  &  xp'  - None»" 
well_formed_loop::  "[instr list]-> bool" 
"well_formed_loop zs =- ( ALL  CFS  cnS  mlS  cnF  mlF  pcS  pcF  xs  ys. 
(  zs  - (UBF  (Goto_fwd  (Suc  (length xs»)#xs  ~( ys  ~ 
[CBB  (Ificmplt_bwd  (length xs  +  length ys»]»  --> 
(  peS  < pcF &  get_code  CFS  cnS  (mIS)  !  peS  -
UBF  (Goto_fwd  (length  (xs)  +  1» 
&  excep_free ys & list_all excep_free_instr ys & 
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(ys = fromto  (pcS  +  length xs  +  1) 
(simple_block xs)  & simple_block ys 
(  pcF-1)  (get_code  CFS  cnS  (mIS)))  & 
& ys  -=  []  &xs-=[]  & 
get_code CFS  cnS  (mIS)  !  pcF  CBB 
(pcF  =  pcS  +  length  (xs  ~ ys)  +  1) 
ref_trans_2 ys & linear ys & 
correct_init_loop_state  (cnS,(mIS), 
end 
B.7 
constdefs 
is_branch  ::  "instr =>  bool" 
"is_branch instr ==  case  instr of 
LAS  ins =>  False 
CO  ins =>  False 
MO  ins =>  False 
MA  ins =>  False 
CH  ins =>  False 
MI  ins =>  False 
MR  ins =>  False 
OS  ins =>  False 
CBF  ins  =>  True 
I  CBB  ins =>  True 
UBF  ins =>  True 
I  UBB  ins  =>  True" 
(Ificmplt_bwd  (length  (xs  ~ ys)))  & 
&(simple_block ys)  & 
pcS)  (cnF, (mIF) ,pcF)  )))" 
( •••••• instructions which  only alter stk,  pc,  and  xp ••••••••••••  ) 
consts 
is_load  ::"load_and_store =>  bool" APPENDIX B.  ISABELLE. THY FILES 
primree 
"is_load  (X  load idx)  = True" 
"is_load  (X  store  idx)  = False  " 
"is_load  (Bipush  ivaI)  = True" 
"is_load (line  idx ivaI)  = False" 
"is_load Iadd  = True" 
eonstdefs 
simple_stk_op  ..  "instr =>  bool" 
"simple_stk_op instr ==  case  instr 
LAS  ins  =>  (is_load ins) 
CO  ins =>  False 
Mo  ins =>  False 
MA  ins =>  False 
CH  ins =>  True 
MI  ins =>  True 
MR  ins =>  False 
OS  ins =>  True 
CBF  ins =>False 
I  CBB  ins  =>  False 
UBF  ins =>  False 
I  UBB  ins  =>  False" 
eonstdefs 
stk_op  "instr =>  bool" 
"stk_op instr ==  case instr of 
LAS  ins  =>  (is_load ins) 
CO  ins =>  False 
Mo  ins =>  False 
MA  ins =>  False 
CH  ins =>  True 
MI  ins =>  True 
MR  ins =>  False 
OS  ins =>  True 
of 
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eBF  ins  =>  True 
I  eBB  ins  =>  True 
I  UBF  ins =>  True 
I  UBB  ins  =>  True" 
consts 
all_stk_ops  ::  "instr list =>  bool" 
recdef all_stk_ops  "measure  (7.  xs.  length xs)" 
consts 
get_cbf_branch 
primrec 
"get_cbf_branch  (Ifiacmpeq_fwd  X i) = i" 
"get_cbf_branch  (  Ificmplt_fwd i) = i" 
consts 
get_cbb_branch 
primrec 
consts 
get_ubLbranch 
primrec 
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consts 
get_ubb_branch 
primrec 
constdefs 
get_branch  ::  "instr =>  nat option" 
"get_branch instr ==  case instr of 
LAS  ins =>None 
CO  ins  =>  None 
MO  ins  =>None 
MA  ins =>  None 
CH  ins =>  None 
MI  ins =>  None 
MR  ins =>  None 
as  ins  =>  None 
CBF  ins =>  Some  (get_cbf_branch ins) 
I  CBB  ins  =>  Some  (get_cbb_branch 
UBF  ins =>  Some  (get_ubf_branch ins) 
UBB  ins  =>  Some  (get_ubb_branch 
constdefs 
ins) 
ins)  " 
is_target  ::"[bytecode,cname,mname,param_desc,  p_count]  =>  bool" 
"is_target CFS  cn  mn  pd  pc  ==  (  ALL  pc1. 
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(is_branch  (  (get_code  CFS  en  (mn,pd)  )  !  pc1) 
--> pc1  +  the  (get_branch 
(  (get_code  CFS  cn  (mn,pd)  )  !  pc1))  = pC)" 
constdefs 
"inrange a  b  s  f  (s  < a)  & (b < f)" APPENDIX B.  ISABELLE.  THY FILES 
linear  ::  "[instr list]  =>  bool" 
constdefs 
simple_block  ::  "[instr list]  =>  bool" 
"simple_block  (ys)  ==  ALL  CFS  xpl  hpl frsl xp'  hp'  frs'  cnl mll  cn' 
ml'  pcS  pcF.( ys = (fromto  pcS  pcF 
(get_code  CFS  cnl mIl» 
& inside  frsl  (cnl,mll,pcS)  (cn',ml',pcF) 
& same_method_frs  (cnl,mll,pcS)  (hd  frsl) 
(hd  frs')(cn',ml',pcF) 
& pcF  < length  (get_code  CFS  cnl mIl) 
& exec  (CFS,  (xpl,hpl,frsl»  = Some(xp',hp',frs'»  --> 
inside  frs'  (enl,mll,peS)  (cn',ml',peF)  I 
pc_equals  (hd frs')  (pcF  +  1)" 
constdefs 
insert_pc_frm  "[frame,  p_countl  =>  frame" 
"insert_pc_frm s  x  ==  let (stk,  loc,  cn,ml,pc)  =  s  in 
(stk,  lac,  cn,ml,x)" 
add_pc_frm  ::  "[frame,  p_count]  =>  frame" 
"add_pc_frm  s  x  ==  let (stk,  loc,  cn,ml,pc)  = s  in 
(stk,  loc,  cn,ml,(pc  +  x»" 
consts 
insert_pc_frames  ::  "(frame list. p_count)  =>  frame  list" 
recdef  insert_pc_frames  "{}" 
"insert_pc_frames  ([]  , x)  = []" 
"insert_pc_frames  «y#ys),  x)  = [Unsert_pc_frm y  x)]  (II (ys) " 
consts 
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add_pc_frames  ::  "(frame list* p_count)  =>  frame  list" 
"add_pc_frames  «(]  ,x)  =  []" 
constdefs 
insert_pc  ::  "[jvm_state,  p_count]  =>  jvm_state" 
"insert_pc  s  x  ==  (let  (xp,  hp,  frs)  =  s  in 
(xp,  hp,  (insert_pc_frames  (frs, x»»" 
add_pc  ::  "[jvm_state,  p_count]  =>  jvm_state" 
"add_pc  s  x  ==  (let  (xp,  hp,  frs)  =  s  in 
(xp,  hp,  (add_pc_frames  (frs, x»»" 
minimise_frm  ::  "frame  =>minframe" 
"minimise_frm a  ==  let (stk,loc,cn,ml,pc) 
consts 
a  in  (stk,  loc,pc)" 
minimise_frs  ::  "frame list =>  minframe list" 
recdef minimise_frs  "measure  (%  xs.  length xs)" 
"minimise_frs  ([])  =  []" 
"minimise_frs  (x#xs)  =  (minimise_frm x)#(minimise_frs  xs)" 
consts 
meta_frames  ::  "(frame list* frame  list)  =>  bool" 
recdef meta_frames  "measure  (%  (xs,  ys).  length xs)" 
"meta_frames  ([], [])  =  True" 
167 APPENDIX B.  ISABELLE. THY FILES 
"meta_frames  «x#xs),[])  =  False" 
"meta_frames  ([], (y#ys»  =  False" 
"meta_frames  «x#xs),  (y#ys»  =  «stk_of  x  =  stk_of  y)  '" 
(loc_of  x  =  loc_of  y)  '" 
meta_frames  (xs,ys»" 
constdefs 
(*******  compare  only xp,  stk,  loc  of  top of  stk *****.*.***) 
"a =-=  b  ==  (fst a)  =  (fst b)  '" 
stk_of  (hd(snd(snd a  »)= stk_of  (hd(snd(snd b») & 
loc_of  (hd(snd(snd a») =  loc_of  (hd(snd(snd b»)" 
(.******  should mention only xp,  stk,  loc of top of stk .*****.**.*) 
meta_holds::  "[instr list,  (jVIn_state  =>  bool), jVIn_state]  =>  bool" 
"meta_holds  ys  q  s  ==  (ALL  CFS  cnl mll  pcS  pcF. 
«ys)  =  (fromto  pcS  pcF 
(get_code  CFS  cnl  (mll») 
-->q  (insert_pc speS»)" 
(*.**.** should mention  only xp,  stk,  loc  of  top of stk *** ••••••••  ) 
meta_inv  ..  "  [«(xept option *  heap *(opstaek .loevars *cname 
.method_loc  *p_count)list»=>bool)  ]  =>  bool" 
ALL  s  x.  P  (s)  --> P  «insert_pc s  x»" 
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ref_trans_2  "[instr list]  =>  bool" 
"ref_trans_2 ys  ==  ALL  CFS  xpl  hpl frsl xp'  hp'  frs'  cnl ml1  cn' 
ml'  pcS  pcF.«( ys  =  (fromto  pcS  pcF 
(get_code  CFS  cnl mIl») 
& linear ys  & pc_equals  (hd frsl)  pcS 
169 
& (CFS  (cnl,(mll),pcS)  (cn',(ml'),pcF)  1- (xpl,hpl,frsl) 
-block->  (xp',hp',frs'») 
end 
B.8 
--> 
(xpl = xp'  & hpl = hp'  & 
(  EX  a  b.  stk_of  (hd(third_of  (xp',hp',frs'»)  = 
(a#(b#(stk_of  (hd(third_of  (xpl,hpl,frsl»»» 
&  loc_of  (hd(third_of  (xpl,hpl,frsl»)  ~ 
loc_of  (hd(third_of  (xp',hp',frs'») 
& st_cn_of  (hd(third_of  (xpl,hpl,frsl»)  = 
st_cn_of(hd(third_of  (xp',hp',frs'») 
& st_ml_of  (hd(third_of  (xpl,hpl,frsl»)  = 
st_ml_of(hd(third_of  (xp',hp',frs'») 
& (tl(third_of  (xpl,hpl,frsl»)  = 
(tl(third_of  (xp' ,hp' ,frs'»»»" 
Exec_instrs.  thy 
(********************************************************************) 
(*  Sequence  execution relation  *) 
(********************************************************************) I 
r 
l 
II 
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Exec_instrs =  Exec  +  State_parts  + 
consts exec_instrs  ::"(instr list * minstate * minstate)  set" 
syntax  lI(Oexec_instrs"  ::  [instr list,minstate,  minstate]  => 
bool  ("_  1- _ -instrs-> _"  ) 
translations 
"xs  1- a  -instrs-> btl  -- "(xs  ,a,b):exec_instrs" 
inductive exec_instrs 
intrs 
Stop 
\ 
"[I  execCFSindep  (xs,  a) 
xs  -=  [];\ 
=  Some  b  ;\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
inlist xs  «snd a»;  \ 
outlist  xs  «snd b»I]  \ 
==>  xs  1- a  -instrs-> btl 
Continue  " [I  execCFSindep  (xs,  a) 
\  xs -=  [] ; \ 
\  inlist xs  «snd a»;  \ 
\  xs  1- c  -instrs->  blJ\ 
= 
\  ==>  xs  1- a  -instrs-> 
end 
B.9  Triple.thy 
Some  c 
btl 
;\ 
(*************************************************************** ••••  *) 
(* Pre- and Post-condition  relation  .) 
(***********************************************.*******.*** •••  ****.*) 
Triple = List  +  Exec_blockO  +  Exec_block3  +  Exec_instrs + 
Block_pairs_conds  +  Ref_trans  + 
consts 
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triple::  "  ««xcpt option *  heap *(opstack *locvars  *cname  *method_loc 
*p_count)list»=>bool)* instr list* 
171 
«(xcpt option *  heap  *(opstaek *loevars *cname  *method_loe 
*p_count)list) )=>bool)  =>  bool)  II 
reedef triple"{}" 
"triple(p,  [],  q)  =  (ALL  xp hp frs 
xp'  hp'  frs'  .«(p«xp, hp,  frs») 
--> q«xp', hp', frs'»»)" 
"triple(p,  (y#ys),  q)  =  (ALL  CFS  xp  hp  frs enl  mll  cn'  ml'  xp'  hp' 
frs'  pcS  pcF. 
«(CFS  (cnl,(mll),peS)  (en',  (ml'),pcF)  1- (xp,  hp,  frs)  -bloek-> 
& «y#ys)  =  (fromto  pcS  peF 
& st_pe_of  (hd frs)  =  peS 
& p«xp, hp,frs»--> 
q«xp', hp', frs'»»)" 
eonstdefs 
(xp' ,hp' ,frs'» 
(get_code  CFS  enl  (mIl»» 
assert  ::  "[«opstaek *loevars)=>bool)  ,  (xept option *  heap  * 
(opstaek *loevars *cname  *method_loc  *p_count)list)]  =>  bool" 
"assert P  ==  (%(xp,hp,frs).  (let  (stk,  loc,en,ml,pe)  =  hd  frs  in 
p  (stk,loc»)" 
end 
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(***********************************************************************) 
(*  Weakest  Precondition for a  list of  commands  *) 
(***********************************************************************) 
constdefs 
WI>  ::  "[ instr list,  ««xcpt option *  heap *«opstack *locvars  *cname  * 
method_loc  *p_count)list  )  ») =>  bool)]  => 
««xcpt option *  heap *«opstack *locvars *cname  *method_loc  * 
p_count)list »»  =>  boo!)" 
"WI>  ys  q  ==  (i.(xp,hp,frs). 
(ALL  CFS  xp'  hp'  frs'  cnl mIl  cn'  ml'  pcS  pcF. 
«(CFS  (cnl,(mll),peS)  (en',  (ml'),peF)I-
«xp,  hp,  frs»  -bloek->  (xP'.  hp'.frs'» 
& «ys)  =  (fromto  pcS  pcF  (get_code  CFS  cnl  (mIl»» 
& st_pc_of(hd frs)  = pcS»--> 
q(xp',  hp', frs'»)" 
not_term_state  ::  "jvm_state =>  bool" 
"not_term_state  s  ==  «fst s)  =  None  &  (third_of  s)  - [])" 
(******************************************) 
(*  Sequence  weakest precondition  *) 
(******************************************) 
meta_WI>  ::  "[ instr list,  «opstack *locvars)  =>  bool)]  => 
««xcpt option *  heap *«opstaek *locvars  *ename  *method_loc 
*p_count)list »»  =>  boo!)" 
"  meta_WI>  ys  q  ==  (i.(xp,hp,frs).  (let  (stk,loc,cn,ml,pc) 
(ALL  xp'  stk'  loc' pc'. 
(not_term_state  (xp,hp,frs)  & 
(hd  frs)  in 
ys  1- (xp,stk,loc,O)  -instrs->(xp',stk',loc',pc'»--> APPENDIX B.  ISABELLE. THY FILES  173 
assert q  (xp',  hp,  (stk' ,Ioe' ,en,ml, (pe  + pe'»#(tl frs»»)" 
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